Bangladesh has recently returned to the headlines of international politics due to a political and institutional crisis that briefly attracted the interest of the media, only to then fall back into almost absolute silence, broken by the recurring news of the monsoon seasons, of the extreme working conditions in local industries, all subcontractors of large international companies, and of the migratory flow. Obviously, the reality of such an important nation is much more complex and the recent internal institutional events can have a significant impact on the regional and international strategic balances.
Bangladesh had been a province of India during British colonial rule and later integrated into Pakistan in 1947 as East Pakistan, established on the politico-religious partition and independence agreement sealed by the Admiral Mountbatten, the last governor of Imperial India. East Pakistan was governed by Islamabad as if it were a real colony, with an iron fist and exploitation of the few local resources and the population, which apart from the Muslim religion, had nothing to do with Pakistan proper.
The presence of East Pakistan was viewed with concern by India which saw it as a second front in the conflictual relationship with Pakistan and wanted to resolve it and reduce the potential security threat in the Gulf of Bengal. The repression of the local independence movement, alongside the recurrent Indo-Pakistani tensions, led New Delhi to a new conflict with Islamabad in 1971, which was quickly resolved with Pakistani defeat and the birth of independent Bangladesh, led by the resistance leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (17 March 1920–15 August 1975, also known by the honorific “Bangabandhu”).
Thereafter, Bangladesh entered the sphere of influence of New Delhi, facilitated by the presence of the neighboring Indian federal state of West Bengal, although populated by Bangla Hindus and Christians (at the request of this Muslim majority, in 1905 the British divided the province of Bengal into two zones, with Dhaka being the capital of the eastern zone and by far the most populous, now numbering more than 10 million people, while the West had as its capital Calcutta, or Kolkata).
Under the firm direction of the leadership of the resistance movement, it also progressively established good relations with Washington, also thanks to the gigantic humanitarian assistance operation Sea Angel (1991) of the US armed forces (a military disaster relief effort launched in response to the devastating cyclone).
In the ensuing years, the Awami, the secular party which for years has led the country in occasional alternance with the National Party, managed also at a high social price and with enormous corruption, to lift the country from conditions of extreme poverty, opened important collaboration with large foreign industries, thanks to a very low-cost workforce. This undoubted result, however, left great weaknesses, shown by the continuous flow of migrants (which went to India and elsewhere in the world), social discontent, space for Islamist radicalization and the first commercial frictions with New Delhi for the defense of production and export spaces (India also being a large exporter).
Furthermore, the network of privileges enjoyed by former combatants of the 1971 war (and the guerrilla warfare of the previous years) had created very strong discontent, which was the spark of an economic, social and institutional crisis, which had been simmering for years. Sheikh Hasina (daughter of the country’s founder Mujibur Rahman), the Prime Minister (PM) left the country on 8 August 2024 amidst strong protests, riots and hundreds of deaths and arrests. Protests against the PM, who had been in office since January 2009 (and she also served as head of government from 1996 to 2001) were led by the opposition to the National Party, which pointed out the alleged frauds in the elections in early 2024, again won by Awami. The trigger issue of the protests was quotas for access to the civil service for the veterans of the independence war (and their relatives). Demonstrations against Hasina’s government began in the traditionally active student movement, which soon turned into riots and later into a full- fledged rebellion and the clashes with the police caused (estimated) 400 people to be killed. The struggle against Hasina (and the Awami Party) took a more violent turn after the prime minister, during a public address, called the protesters “razakars” or descendants of “razakars” (a pro-Pakistan paramilitary force, created in the then East Pakistan during the 1971 War of Independence, who committed many atrocities against the Bangladeshi insurgents and population). Later, Hasina’s residence and several statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were vandalized.
A Difficult History
Bangladesh has experienced a series of military coups, over the years, including the one that led to Mujibur’s assassination—along with most of his family—in 1975. Two years later, General Ziaur Rahman, a leading strategist in the War of Independence and founder of the National Party, consolidated power. Ziaur would reestablish democracy by opening the system to multi-party politics, but was also assassinated in 1981, ushering in another government under General Hossain Ershad, like Ziaur, another veteran of the War, who remained in power until 1990. In short, between 1975 and 2011 the country experienced twenty-nine military coups of varying scope; and thirty years after independence, Bangladesh remained trapped in persistent political instability, with the military establishment still overseeing the democratic process. Awami regularly won the elections amid promises of regeneration and social measures, but without any real change and implemented measures that instead entrenched the party in power and the electoral victories were constantly labelled as fraudulent and with allegations of human rights abuses against the political opposition. By 2023, the poor economic situation and deteriorating democratic framework increased discontent and protests against Hasina and the Awami League. Increasingly reliant on international support—particularly from India and China—as well as on law enforcement and military approval, Hasina sought another term in the January 2024 elections. At 76 years old, Hasina ran for a fourth term; however, the low voter turnout of 41 percent and the massive boycott of the other major political party, the Nationalist, showed the disaffection of the people of Bangladesh towards Awami.
Poverty and Weather
Undoubtedly, the country’s poor economic situation accelerated the discontent and rejection of Hasina’s government with a staggering 80 percent of Bangladeshis survive on less than two dollars a day. On a large scale, the country’s economy relies on the export of garments—accounting for 74.5 percent of total exports—a sector often associated with grim realities such as the brutal exploitation of workers.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh is heavily dependent on imports of essential resources like oil and gas from China and India, which remain subject to fluctuating prices. Although Bangladesh went from being a state of perpetual famine and extreme poverty to some development during the early years of the Awami governments, moving the country away from the risk of food insecurity, since 2022, the global crisis as a result of the Ukraine war and rising commodity, worsened the situation and impacted the country, and thus worsening the allegations of corruption and incapacity of the Hasina government.
In addition, historically, the country is particularly sensitive to the ravages of weather, increased because of climate change. By 2030, an estimated 150 million Bangladeshis will be living below sea level, making it one of the most at-risk countries globally for climate-induced humanitarian crises. The two main reasons are extreme rainfall during the monsoon season and the rapid melting of the Himalayan snowpack, which overflows riverbeds, with increasingly recurrent and damaging episodes, such as the May-August 2024 floods, the worst in many years with a hundred deaths and thousands affected.
As mentioned, a trigger element of the crisis, on 5 June, the Bangladeshi Supreme Court legalized a system of quotas for one-third of civil service posts reserved for descendants of fighters in the 1971 War of Independence, which was equivalent to reserving them for Awami members. In July, the first protests against this measure were launched by university students at the state-run University of Dhaka, who saw their chances of working in the administration curtailed. The protests degenerated into heavy clashes as the police cracked down with the support of activists of the student wing of Awami. With violence unleashed and hundreds killed and arrested, Hasina asked army Chief General Waker-uz-Zaman to mobilize the armed forces against the protesters, which he refused, confirming the heavy political role of the armed forces in the political management of the country. Without military support, Hasina, resigned and fled to India on 5 August.
Bangladesh President Mohammed Shahabuddin dissolved Parliament and announced the formation of an interim government, while the army took control of the country until the arrival of the man chosen to preside over it, the controversial but famed economist and Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, himself a victim of Hasina’s repression, who was named Chief Advisor to a 25-member council consisting of civil society representatives and student associations, it being relevant that there are none from political parties, not even the National Party. The speed of Yunus being chosen and the enormous powers assigned to him, however, have left open the door to speculations regarding a long-planned and clandestine “white coup” to impose, in an emergency context, a new direction on the regional positioning of Bangladesh and its alliances in a legislative vacuum (new elections are not expected before the end of 2025 or in 2026). The instability of the country apparently was re-established under the military iron fist, but only occasionally reported by the international media. There has been a wave of retaliatory violence against activists and officials of Awami, as well Hindu and Christian minorities, pushed by Muslim radicals.
Bangladesh and the International Scene
Traditionally, Bangladesh had a firm non-alignment policy on the international scene, based on Mujibur Rahman premise of non-alignment: “friendship to all, malice to none.” The foreign policy during Hasina’s long rule respected multilateralism and Bangladesh’s document ‘Indo-Pacific Outlook’, published in 2023, highlighted key principles, such as noninterference in the internal affairs of other states and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN. As mentioned earlier, India has played a key role in Bangladeshi policy making, but given the geographical position, Dhaka cannot ignore the role and weight of China. For India, Bangladesh poses a challenge with a shared history and 4096 kilometers of a loosely controlled border, making irregular migration and cross-border criminal activities, religious-inspired terrorism a security concern.
In addition, there are concerns about attacks on the Bangladeshi Hindu community, especially at a time when India has a Hindu nationalist government and the risk of a massive influx of Bangladeshi refugees to India fleeing persecution is an already grim reality. Indian leader Narendra Modi had a good personal relation with Hasina; in 2015, the two had put an end to the centuries-old Indo-Bangladesh border disputes and official visits back and forth were common over the past decade and she was one of the few foreign leaders present at Modi’s inauguration for his third term on 9 June 2024. Under Modi, India revived a more ambitious policy of engagement with Bangladesh to counter China’s influence and the New Delhi “Neighbourhood First” policy document, obviously put Dhaka as one of the priority countries for building strong trade, economic and political relations, embodied in initiatives such as the Bay of Bengal and the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal Connectivity Initiative. The two countries were in negotiations for an economic partnership agreement, the use of the Indian rupee as the currency in Bangladesh, and greater connectivity with the development of high-speed rail and port infrastructures.
However, the Bangladesh crisis disrupted these projects and, even temporarily, halted cargo movement from India to Bangladesh’s key ports in Chittagong and Mongla. Despite good relations with Modi, Hasina worked to make China the first trading partner with the country, surpassing India and providing two-thirds of the total of military sales, and joint military exercises were also common. In addition, a fully Chinese-built submarine base was inaugurated in Pekua in 2023, which is the largest in South Asia and was christened, quite symbolically for understanding the current Sino-Bangladeshi relations, as BNS (Bangladeshi Naval Station) Sheikh Hasina. As with India, China reacted cautiously to the overthrow of the Hasina government and the Awami, and continued to monitor the situation, watched with increasing concern by New Delhi, due to the risk of a further increase in political, economic and military influence of Beijing, and transforming Bangladesh into another pearl of the “necklace” to surround the subcontinent (a ring composed by Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh) and limiting Indian power, influence and projection capabilities.
Despite an initial positive period of relations with the USA, Bangladesh kept a strategic ambiguity, with Dhaka maintaining its non-aligned stance, witnessed by the position adopted vis-à-vis the conflicts in Middle East and Ukraine, with the refusal to condemn Moscow and refusing the recognition of Israel. Bangladesh’s multilateral foreign policy, as seen from the West, was reflected in its firm commitment to the peace processes of global conflicts, with Bangladesh being the first country in the world with the most troops deployed in various UN missions (in 2023, Bangladesh was contributing nearly 7300 personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions, the most of any country. Nepal contributed the second most personnel, totalling 6300, followed by India and by Pakistan), which is also a means of financing and modernizing its armed forces. Where Bangladesh has come under most pressure from the US is with its position in the Indo-Pacific and its tensions, especially its proximity to China.
Following her departure to India, Hasina indirectly accused the US government of being behind her overthrow by refusing days earlier to authorize the establishment of a US airbase on the island of St. Martin in the middle of the Bay of Bengal. In the complex regional and international scenario, the relationship with Myanmar/Burma derves to be mentioned, a country which is currently involved in a severe crisis and ravaged by civil war. The cultural and social connections are strong, but Myanmar has become increasingly problematic, as fighting between the rebel alliance and the military junta’s army has been raging for the past four years in the border region of Rakhine in Myanmar/Burma. On a border no less porous than that of India, hundreds of fighters from both sides, rebels or deserters, make their way into Bangladesh, forcing the already overstretched Bangladeshi military, which faces the challenge to support the police, to mobilize other forces against this growing threat (it should be remembered that Bangladesh is home to more than a million Rohingya).
A Major Shift?
The recent history of Bangladesh is marked by a dramatic cut, the separation from Pakistan; a cut till now not yet explained, including in popular culture, with the legacy of the bestial violence of Islamabad troops and their local collaborators against civilians. But the new government led by Yunus made a significant change. Last April, Bangladesh and Pakistan held their first quasi ministerial-level talks in 15 years in Dhaka, marking a significant step toward resetting bilateral ties. Bangladesh’s Deputy FM Mohammed Jashim Uddin and his peer Amna Baloch (Pakistan) led the consultations, which covered a range of issues, including trade, economic cooperation, regional matters, and historically unresolved disputes. Among these, there is a demand from Bangladesh of public apology from Pakistan for the atrocities committed during the 1971 War of Liberation; the return of $4.52 billion as its share of pre-1971 assets from undivided Pakistan; repatriation of stranded Pakistanis; the transfer of foreign aid funds related to the 1970 cyclone (which was a trigger for the uprising of 1971 against Islamabad due to the Pakistani corruption and inefficiency). Uddin emphasized resolving these issues to build a “solid foundation” for relations, while Baloch described the talks as “constructive” and focused on harnessing bilateral potential, while acknowledging the existence of “outstanding issues,” but did not confirm commitments to Bangladesh’s demands, in public statements. The talks also explored ways to boost trade, with Bangladesh highlighting investment opportunities in jute and textiles.
Both sides noted a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in January 2025 for rice procurement from Pakistan. As a sign of goodwill, Bangladesh has eased visa restrictions for Pakistani nationals and launched direct shipping links, while Islamabad approved a Pakistani low-cost airline to operate between the two countries. FM Baloch met Yunus and his Foreign Adviser, Touhid Hossain, discussing the revival of SAARC (Southern Asia Association of Regional Cooperation) and regional cooperation. In this framework, Pakistan’s Deputy PM and FM, Ishaq Dar visited Dhaka at the end of April 27-28, 2025, marking the first such visit since 2012, with the signature of agreements to further strengthen ties. But diplomatic interactions have surged since August 2024. Yunus and Pakistan’s PM Shehbaz Sharif have already met twice—on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 and the D-8 (the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation, also known as Developing-8, is an organization for development co-operation among Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey) Summit in Cairo in December 2024—discussing trade, cultural exchanges, and regional cooperation, including reviving SAARC. A symbolic Eid al-Fitr phone call in March 2025 between the leaders underscored goodwill. For over five decades, the relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh has been defined by estrangement, rooted in the traumatic 1971 War of Liberation, when East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh with India’s military backing. As said, the war left deep scars, with Bangladesh accusing Pakistani forces of committing genocide, which resulted in an estimated 3 million deaths and widespread atrocities. Under the Hasina governments (2009–2024), ties remained frosty due to her government’s focus on war crime tribunals and alignment with India. However, the ouster of Hasina in August 2024, following a student-led uprising, marked a turning point also in the foreign policy. Under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh and Pakistan have embarked on a path of pragmatic engagement, driven by diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. Unanswered questions include the drivers of this thaw, the challenges ahead, and the implications for South Asian geopolitics, particularly for India.
A Difficult History
The 1971 war remains the defining fault line in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. Bangladesh’s narrative emphasises Pakistani military atrocities, including mass killings and the rapes (at least 200.000), claims Pakistan disputes. Following independence, Bangladesh’s early leaders, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, sought to balance ties with Pakistan, attending the 1974 OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) summit in Lahore. However, relations deteriorated after Mujib’s assassination in 1975, as subsequent Bangladeshi governments oscillated between secularism and Islamic identity, complicating reconciliation. During Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh pursued anti-terrorist trials, executing figures like Jamaat-e-Islami (a terror muslim group) leader Motiur Rahman Nizami in 2016, prompting Pakistan’s condemnation and further straining ties. Visa restrictions, lack of direct flights, and minimal trade underscored the diplomatic freeze, with Pakistani goods often rerouted through third-party ports.
What change(s)?
The regime changes of August 2024, which forced Hasina to flee to India, created a window of opportunity for reconciliation between Bangladesh and Pakistan. The interim government under Yunus adopted a “friendship to all” foreign policy, distancing itself from Hasina’s India-focused approach and opening doors to Pakistan and this significant shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy has the potential to reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics. Yunus-led leadership reduced anti-Pakistan rhetoric, as the Awami had leveraged 1971 grievances for political legitimacy, prioritizing economic and diplomatic diversification, straining the ties with India. The unpopular Hasina’s is exiled in India and Bangladesh’s demand for her extradition (frozen by New Dheli) have fuelled anti-India sentiment, amplified by the “India Out” campaign in 2024, that find terrain on the historical influence of New Dheli in many aspects of country politics and economy. This has pushed the new Bangladesh leadership to seek alternative partners like Pakistan to counterbalance India’s influence.
The new situation has an economic dimension; both nations face economic challenges, including high inflation and global trade uncertainties which may worsening further the ties. Bilateral trade increased by 27% between August and December 2024, with both nations aiming to reach a $3 billion trade volume within a year, more than four times the current level. In November 2024, direct sea trade resumed after a 53-year break with easing the customs policies; an agreement signed on January 2025 established a joint business council to boost private-sector ties. Bangladesh eased strict security clearances for Pakistani travelers, while Pakistan waived visa fees for Bangladeshis. In this new season, there is also military cooperation with ties that have seen unprecedented growth, signaling a strategic shift. In January 2025, a Bangladeshi delegation visited Pakistan, meeting with Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir to discuss joint exercises, training, and arms trade. Pakistan described the nations as “brotherly,” aiming to reshape South Asia’s security landscape. Bangladesh’s Navy ship participated in Pakistan’s “Aman 2025” naval exercise in February 2025, focused on countering piracy and illegal fishing (this was the first major Bangladeshi warship deployment to Pakistan in over a decade). Between September and December 2024, Bangladesh ordered 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition, and 40 tonnes of other explosives from Pakistan, tripling the previous year’s volume. Pakistan military delegation will begin training Bangladesh’s army units in February 2025. Finally, media reports suggest that Bangladesh is interested in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, co-developed by Pakistan and China, to support its “Forces Goal 2030” modernization (which are accredited by Pakistani Air Force to surpass the performances of the recently acquired Rafale of Indian Air Force and Naval Aviation).
Implications For India
As said, this new season between Bangladesh and Pakistan it is saw with growing concern by India in consideration that it could reshape South Asian geopolitics and affect the national security. Given its ties with both nations, it may strengthen China’s regional influence, potentially forming a new landscape that concerns Indian security. Unresolved 1971 issues and India’s security concerns may limit the depth of this alignment. India, a key player in Bangladesh’s 1971 independence and a close ally under Hasina, views this rapprochement with alarm. The warming ties threaten India’s influence in South Asia, particularly given concerns over the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow twenty km wide strip connecting India’s northeast (Assam region) with the rest of the country. In a large perspective, the potential collocation of Bangladesh it is saw as future threat to the integrity and security of IMEC (Indian Middle East Corridor) as rival of the BRI led by China (to which Bangladesh takes part). China’s strategic partnerships with Islamabad and Dhaka both countries, including Bangladesh’s participation in the BRI and Pakistan’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, encourage a trilateral alignment, raising concerns in India about the potential shift in power dynamics in the region. PM Narendra Modi met Yunus at the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, comprises Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand). Summit in Bangkok in April 2025, where he raised concerns about the safety of the Hindu minority and Hasina’s extradition and emphasized a “people-centric” approach, advocating for a “democratic and stable” Bangladesh. In this light India has provided Bangladesh $7.862 billion in credit to support infrastructure projects. However, it recently terminated transhipment facilities for Bangladesh’s cargo, signalling displeasure. India bolstered its side of the border with Bangladesh, deploying technology and increasing Border Security Force (BSF) personnel and inspections to counter infiltration and smuggling. Fears persist that Pakistan’s powerful intelligence service (ISI) could transfer weapons to insurgent groups via Bangladesh, threatening India’s northeastern states.
Conclusion
The recalibration of Pakistan-Bangladesh ties since August 2024, appears to be an unexcepted consequence of the regime change in Dhaka, marks a significant shift from estrangement to engagement, driven by political changes, economic imperatives, and strategic realignments. Diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation, underpinned by cultural ties, reflects an approach to overcoming historical animosities. However, unresolved grievances, public sentiment, and India’s wary response pose challenges to sustained progress. For India, the new situation requires a recalibrated strategy to maintain influence in Bangladesh while addressing regional security concerns. As South Asia navigates this evolving dynamic (as part of the global reshuffling), the Bangladesh-Pakistan rapprochement underscores the region’s complex interplay of history, geopolitics, and pragmatism. The coming years will test whether this engagement can transcend tactical gains to foster lasting reconciliation. Unfortunately, the difficult time of the Indian-Bangladeshi relations coincide with the worsening of the relations between New Dheli and Islamabad following the terrorist attack in the Indian-administered Jammu &Kashmir on 22 April in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam claimed the lives of 26 people, mostly Indian tourists. This is the deadliest attack in the disputed territory since 2019 when a car bomb targeting a convoy of buses carrying Indian paramilitary soldiers killed 40 people in Pulwama. More alarmingly, it is the biggest attack targeting civilians in over two decades. The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy for Lashkar-e-Taiba – a Pakistan-based terrorist organization – has claimed responsibility for the attack, while the civilian government in Pakistan has denied any involvement. Beyond the impact on Kashmir and India–Pakistan relations, this incident will also have broader regional implications, including the Indian-Bangladesh ones. South Asia is among the least economically integrated regions of the world. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not held a summit in over a decade, attributed in large part to mistrust in the India–Pakistan relationship and this regional organization could be a useful tool to normalize the relationship, but it should be accompanied by a coordinated international, responsible, action of partners, like the other members of SAARC, EU, UN, USA, China, Russia.
