Growing international instability of our present days takes different forms and ways and according to the geographical location. Africa, and in particular the Sahara-Sahel sub-region, sees growing activism, where the hegemonic dynamics and dreams of the classic global, pan-regional and regional powers are at odds. But in this sub-region, alongside the USA, Russia, China, France, Germany, Turkey, India, UAE, EU, NATO, new but determined actors are emerging, who are trying to expand (or defend) their influence; this in a context where the dynamics connected to the energy market, from exploitation to transport.
The war in Ukraine caused the EU to reduce its imports of Russian gas, from 45% to 15% in just two years. This situation has highlighted the need for energy diversification in the European Union, which has increased the purchase of liquefied natural gas (LNG) at higher prices from countries such as the US and Qatar. Given this situation, Africa, although already a supplier of gas to the EU through Algeria and Libya, emerges as a viable solution for energy diversification. The African Atlantic side, especially Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea, as a strategic scenario for the supply of hydrocarbons to many European countries, among them, Spain. However, Europe requires considerable investment in infrastructure to be able to integrate African gas into the European energy market. In this context, Spain hopes to becomes a strategic link between Africa and Europe, thanks to its geographical position and its storage and regasification capacity, while Italy run breathlessly to be as much as possible another hub for energy, in competition with Madrid and become a energy reference for the European continent. These factors highlight the importance of a long-term strategy that includes new gas pipeline connections. Based on this premise, the relations of the EU with Algeria and Morocco, as well their mutual dynamics are more and more critical as well as the politics of Algiers and Rabat in the Sahel.
In this light, Nigeria is on the radar of Morocco and Algeria. It is a matter of fact that Abuja, known as the “African giant”, is not only the most populous country in Africa – with more than 220 million people – but it is also one of the most dynamic economies on the continent – (at least in terms of nominal GDP). The country benefits from its abundance of natural resources, particularly its natural gas reserves, estimated at 5.918.220.937.728,001 cubic meters (!), which stand out as a crucial source for its economy and development. However, despite its vast reserves that include hydrocarbons and minerals such as lithium, gold or bitumen – valued at some 700 billion dollars (628 billion of euros) – the Nigerian leaderships have not managed to realize the potential income from exploitation and export at benefit of the population, which still suffer serious problems of economic and social underdevelopment. In this sense, pointing to Nigeria as an exponent of the so-called “resource curse” may be risky, however, the paradox of abundance reflects a situation that has persisted over time in the country worsening the above-mentioned distortions, affecting the political stability and undermining her regional role. Nigeria’s position as a potential hydrocarbon exporter has sparked interest in Morocco and Algeria, which have seen the African country as a priority energy partner for developing their gas infrastructure and support their political leadership programs. As said, while Nigeria has embraced these initiatives, the country faces structural problems that could affect the development of these projects, such as the proliferation of conflicts involving non-state actors — such as Boko Haram — or cases of piracy and sabotage in the Niger Delta or the re-born of separatist movements in the former Biafra and Ambazonia.
The so-called “Atlantic gas pipeline” was born in 2016 with the announcement of the Nigeria-Morocco project, formalised in 2017 through a cooperation agreement. Although the project is expected to be completed in 2045, it faces challenges of a primarily economic nature, which raise questions about its materialisation. In this regard, Morocco has assured that it has various financial backers, such as the UAE and the Islamic Development Bank, the arm of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference, in other words, the Gulf states financial wing). The latest information indicates that Rabat has begun topographical studies of the northern section of the land and sea-based gas pipeline (Mauritania-Senegal) through the company in charge of the project, the Moroccan ETAFAT, would stretch along the West African coast, connecting Nigeria to Morocco and Europe through Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, and Senegal and connecting the new line with the already functioning WAGP (West Africa Gas Pipeline, natural gas pipeline to supply gas from Nigeria’s Escravos region of the Niger Delta area to Benin, Togo and Ghana. It was the first regional natural gas transmission system in sub-Saharan Africa). Upon completion, it would connect to the existing Europe Maghreb Gas Pipeline (a.k.a. EMG or Enrico Mattei Gas Pipeline). In the Algerian case, the idea of the trans-Saharan pipeline was first proposed in the 1970s. On 14 January 2002, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Algerian national oil and gas company Sonatrach signed the MoU for preparations of the project. In June 2005, NNPC and Sonatrach signed a contract with Penspen Limited for a feasibility study of the project. The feasibility study was completed in September 2006, and it found the pipeline to be technically and economically feasible and reliable. On the meeting on 20 February 2009, NNPC and Sonatrach agreed to proceed with the draft Memorandum of Understanding between three governments and the joint venture agreement. The intergovernmental agreement on the pipeline was signed by energy ministers of Nigeria, Niger and Algeria on 3 July 2009 in Abuja. In reality the pipeline, according the plans of Algerian leadership should one lane of a multifaced project (with road, rail lines) which have the aim to establish a multiple link between the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. Currently, this project, even if appear less technically and financially challenging than the Moroccan-backed one (little bit more than 4.000 kilometres length against of more than 6.000) face various diplomatic challenges- due to the tense relations between the countries involved – and security challenges – such as the instability of Niger – which hinder regional collaboration. In addition, it should be remembered that the Nigeria has under construction an important gas pipeline, AKK (Ajaokuta–Kaduna–Kano Natural Gas Pipeline, planned to transport natural gas from Ajaokuta, in Kogi State to Kano, in Kano State), with important Chinese financial support, and would be included in the Trans Sahara Gas Pipeline (the construction of the AKK commenced in July 2020) faces security problems and lack of investment, with 30% of its construction still pending due to the paralysis of the project. In economic terms, the TSGP will be built and operated by a partnership between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Algerian state-owned company Sonatrach (a real state within the state). The TSGP, is expected to eventually connect with MedGaz – via Spain and Trans Mediterranean (Italy) when completed, with GALSI, via Italy and continental Europe.
The Geopolitical Pulse of the Maghreb: The Rivalry between Morocco and Algeria
The Maghreb is immersed since the late’50s in a regional conflict which remain constant with period of apparent calm and tense moments. This is especially true for the two major powers of the region, Morocco and Algeria which engaged since their independence (1956 for Morocco from a French-Spanish protectorate set up in 1912, 1962 after a stiff colonial dominance from France started n 1830) in a struggle to be the dominant power in northwestern Africa, with tensions reached a peak since 2020.
The rivalry between Morocco and Algeria is ancient and dates back to the classical era. The greatest change, however, occurred after the Second World War. The first sovereign of independent Morocco, Mehmet V, was an open supporter and friend of the Algerian independence movement; his son Hassan II instead inaugurated an aggressive and vindictive policy towards Algeria (but also towards Spain for Western Sahara, Mauritania and even Mali, for Tombouctou, which for less than a hundred years in the 16th century was a possession of one of the various sultanates that led Morocco) arriving at open conflict, the so-called ‘war of the sands’, unleashed in 1963, a real stab in the back of a nation that had supported a very hard fight against French colonialism. Since then, the disagreement between Algiers and Rabat has had brief parentheses, as Morocco, which has never accepted the concept of the immutability of the borders inherited from the colonial era (the only one, together with Ethiopia), has always claimed important portions such as the regions of Tindouf, Bechar and now also Tlemcen. The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco is also ideological and symbolic. Morocco is an autocratic monarchy, defined by Moroccan constitutionalists as an ‘executive monarchy’ (a concept that does not exist in universally accepted constitutional law doctrine), with a democratic facade and considers itself a power equal to France (at least, sic) and acts accordingly with cynicism and determination, not hesitating to use any means, even illegal ones; press sources have often accused Morocco of being the real financier of MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa/Al-Mourabitoun, a fraction of Al AlQead Islami Maghreb), an Islamic terrorist movement operating in the Sahel, or the use of the Pegasus trojan (of Israeli construction) to spy on the phones of President Macron, Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez and very high-ranking French and Spanish officials, leading Paris and Madrid to openly support the theses of Rabat’s claims towards the former Spanish Sahara (now Western Sahara). Press sources have also accused Morocco of financing MEPs and journalists to support its theses, alongside endless legal persecutions and denigrations of other media operators considered hostile (abroad, giving that those inside suffer heavy prison terms).
Furthermore, Morocco pushes with all the means of public diplomacy, such as hosting free courses for African journalists, financing development programs, selling fertilizers derived from phosphates (also extracted from occupied Western Sahara) at symbolic prices, without considering the religious element; the Moroccan monarchy attributes to itself the titles of religious spiritual guide for the followers of the Malekite rite and defender of Islam (and of being a friend and ally of Israel since the 1960s, when his son Hassan II came to the throne) and being funded at the bottom of the list by the Gulf monarchies. The crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia between 2017 and 2021 was a source of great problems for Rabat, which lives on their aid, pushed to mediate for the solution of a crisis that could have forced Morocco to choose one of the two and lose the aid of the other. This while Algeria, very rich in hydrocarbons, is a republic, secular and socialist (even if the Algerian communists have always had a difficult life in Algiers) and uses its means to oppose Morocco by all means, adding an ideological edge to a conflict of power. Faced with an independent Algeria that has traditionally built its economic and military relations in line with Russia and classified as a oil/rentier state due to its wealth in hydrocarbons, there is Morocco that try to presents itself as a preferred ally of the West in the region, but with a strong diversification in its foreign relations with occasional but heavy oscillations with Moscow and Beijing (a flag showed as sign of protest again the alleged lack of support from the West for its claims on Western Sahara), and whose dependence on hydrocarbons is favoring the transformation of its productive sectors – with special emphasis on renewable energy. After the suspension of diplomatic relations in August 2021, the tension between the two countries remains latent and ready to blow. Among the main points of contention, the following stand out: Algerian support for the Western Sahara self-determination and independence, influence in the rest of the countries that make up the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union, a velleitarian regional group of states established in 1998 and included, other than Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), and the increased Moroccan diplomatic offensive in the Sahel to the detriment of Algerian diplomatic relations with its southern neighbors – especially with Mali, undermining the so-called ‘safety belt’ of Algiers, already threatened by the instability of Tunisia and the Libyan chaos. It is worth highlighting the relationship of both Maghreb countries with hydrocarbons; this is a critical one especially after Algeria closed, in order to punish Spain for the more visible leaning with Rabat, the EMG pipeline in November 2021 – a cut with which Morocco not only lost the royalties collected as a fee for rights of passage, but also increased Rabat energy dependence – and after the war in Ukraine, with Europe seeking to diversify its gas dependence.
At this point, Algeria has been one of the great beneficiaries of the conflict in Ukraine, perceiving an increase in gas demand, as a result of European sanctions against Russia (despite that, Algeria continue to maintain solid ties with Moscow, but not becoming a client state like Belarus). The economic benefits obtained from this demand gave Algeria the capacity to increase its military spending by 76%, reaching 17 billion euros. In comparison, its strategic rival, Morocco, has only reached 4.8 billion euros in 2023. Between the two countries, they represent 82% of military spending in North Africa and 45% of the continent, which could contribute to increasing the spiral of tension between the two. Added to these points of friction is the fight to gain control of the first Nigerian gas pipeline to Europe, which reflects an issue that has much to do with economic benefit, but also with image, status and national pride. Both rivals – and to a lesser extent Nigeria — have exploited the pipelines not only in their internal communication, but also in the search for and consolidation of alliances with third parties, as part of their diplomatic projection strategies. In this context, the conflict is not limited only to the eventual completion or cancellation of the projects, but is focused on the competition to be the first to complete it. In this game of influence, the information environment plays a key role in the dissemination of narratives that praise the national project, to the detriment of its adversary. Given the target audiences of the Sahelian countries, with a predominantly young population, characterized by strong feelings of patriotism and anti-colonialism, the Maghreb powers have presented these projects as a symbol of integration and independence of African nations in the face of possible Western interests that do not benefit the local population.
Over the past decade, the geopolitical dynamics of the Sahel have witnessed a significant transformation, marked by the growing presence and influence of external powers such as China and Russia, and the declining role of Western countries. This vacuum has created a window of opportunity for Morocco and Algeria to step up their diplomatic, commercial and geopolitical activities in the region. Rabat is a new presence in the Sahel region and promote initiatives, as said above, meant to undermine the traditional influence of Algiers. In this light, the recently launched ‘Atlantic Initiative’, in which Morocco offers the Atlantic side and an outlet to the sea to the land-locked Sahelian countries, stands out as a disruptive element. Further, in this complex environment that a new regional bloc, the Sahel States Alliance (AES in French) has been created to the detriment of ECOWAS – from which the SAA members withdrew in January 2024, weakening seriously an already weak sub-regional group. Given the importance of the position of the Sahel countries in shaping the regional geopolitical chessboard, gas projects starting in Nigeria take on significant relevance.
In this chess game, emerge, the pivotal role of Mali. Bamako’s strategic decisions have positioned the country as an example to follow for its neighbours in the Sahel. In addition to being one of the founding member countries of the AES, it stands out for having consolidated itself as a country free of Western presence. The internal challenges that Mali must face, such as governance problems or the reactivation of the Tuareg conflict in the north of the country, require solutions that the governing junta seem unlikely to face, also in the medium term. Mali’s relations with North Africa have been redefined based on recent diplomatic actions, the most notable being the offer of the Atlantic Initiative to the Sahel countries by Rabat. This move irritated Algeria; on 19 December, the Algerian president, Tebboune, received the influential imam Mahmoud Dicko and leaders of the armed groups of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA, the ensemble of Touareg tribes which look to set a Sahelian state with the northern parts of Mali, Niger and Chad) —considered hostile by the transitional government of Mali—. The Malian authorities were quick to denounce this event as direct interference in their internal affairs. The diplomatic crisis between Algeria and Mali escalated on December 22, 2023, when both countries withdrew their ambassadors respectively.
In this context, on December 23, Morocco confirmed, through a meeting with the foreign ministers of Mali, Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso, their interest in the Atlantic Initiative. Tensions between Mali and Algeria reached a climax following the New Year speech of the leader of the Malian junta, Assimi Goita, in which he announced a new strategy of internal dialogue without foreign intervention to resolve the conflict in the north. This shift towards nationalizing the peace process reflected a distancing from the Algiers Agreement, which increased tensions with Algeria, which has been the main mediator in the conflict between Bamako and the Touareg for 34 years. In early 2024, Mali adopted a narrative highlighting the benefits of access to the Atlantic through the Moroccan initiative. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Mali is the only AES country to recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, the statal entity proclaimed by POLISARIO, the independentist movement which fought against Morocco and it is a firm allied of Algiers. On 25 January 2024, Mali definitively and officially withdrew from the Algerian Peace Agreement, reflecting a turning point in regional dynamics. As a result, the international community – including the UN and ECOWAS – urged both sides to resume constructive dialogue, but the Malian junta did not hesitate to criticise Algerian efforts to maintain UN sanctions against the junta. This while the security situation in Mali, despite the presence of Russian regular ‘advisors’ and contractors of former Wagner group, worsening constantly, as witnessed by the massive attack of armed elements in Bamako (On 17 September 2024, gunmen attacked several locations across the capital of Mali, including police and military installations and taking the control of the airport for a short time. At least 77 people were killed and more than 255 others were injured. The Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Islamist militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility).
But not only Mali it in a critical phase, also Niger is at a crossroads. In July 2022, Niger expressed its commitment to the development of the TSGP by signing the Memorandum of Understanding. However, following the coup d’état in Niger (July 2023), a distancing between the country and its Algerian neighbour progressively emerged. Initially, the Nigerien regime had expressed its desire to maintain good relations of friendship with Algeria (October 2023), following the Algerian proposal for a transition phase to civilian rule, Niger also rejected the six-month transition phase proposed by its Algiers neighbour – considering it as interference in its internal affairs. Similarly, following the adhesion to the Moroccan Atlantic initiative of the Sahel countries, Algeria announced the cessation of loans to these countries.
As tensions mounted, in February 2024, Algeria proposed the creation of free trade zones between its country and the countries of the Sahel. To date, Niger has never recognized the SADR or supported the POLISARIO Front, and in consequence of it which Rabat has established strong relations with Niamey. This approach is justified by Niger, having observed how Morocco, unlike Algeria, remained neutral in the face of the country’s internal problems – following the coup d’état – which has generated greater confidence in the Alawite kingdom. From April 2024, a turning point occurs between Niger and Algeria, considered the second bilateral crisis with a country in the Sahel. This escalation of tensions occurs due to the deportations of Nigerien immigrants from Algeria, which led to protests by the Nigerien authorities. Faced with this situation, Niger will have to face difficult decisions in the medium term. The country plays a crucial role in the competition between Morocco and Algeria for influence in the Sahel, as both countries vie for Niger’s favour. Despite the great benefits of the Algerian pipeline, factors such as the country’s endemic insecurity, tensions with Algeria and the Moroccan diplomatic offensive have led Niger to declare its support for Morocco’s initiative, which may lead to it reconsidering its position and sacrificing its support for the TSGP in pursuit of a different approach. This could lead to add another element of crisis with the neighbour Nigeria, which was very hostile to the coup and the military junta. Abuja, which play with Algeria and Morocco in order to get both gas-pipeline projects implemented, look to reinforce its power and have free hand in distributing the gas flow. Niamey would have to choose between the primacy of geopolitical considerations over economic ones in the region.
But the Algeria and Moroccan rivalry it is reflected also on the smaller state of the newly established AES, Burkina Faso. The junta in Ouagadougou, in January 2024, expressed support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara, combined with Rabat’s diplomatic offensive – seeking the favour of the Sahel countries – reflect a geopolitical alignment of Burkina Faso with Morocco, this without a visible reaction of Algiers as of now, also in consideration that Burkina has not direct border with Algeria. Some analysts expressed surprise for the alignment of the junta with Rabat, giving the strong alliance that the ousted president Blaise Compaoré, considered the killer of the charismatic leader Thomas Sankara, had with Morocco, where he currently live.
Another element of the Sahel charade is Mauritania, which has established itself as one of the countries that arouses the greatest degree of interest to Morocco and Algeria. Regarding relations with Morocco, despite traditional differences, both countries have experienced some recent disagreements, such as the increase in tariff rates at the Guerguerat crossing point (between Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara and Mauritania. Nevertheless, Morocco it is obliged to recognises the importance of maintaining and improving relations with Nouakchott for two main reasons: to prevent Algeria from developing a closer relationship with Mauritania and to try to get its support in the process of consolidation of Western Sahara occupation. This country’s neutral stance before the UN and its participation in the Atlantic Initiative are crucial for Morocco, especially since access to the port of VillaCinseros/Dakhla from the Sahel requires transiting through Mauritanian territory. For its part, Algeria, aware of the progressive distancing of some Sahelian countries and the Moroccan constant pressure for Western Sahara, seeks to isolate Morocco by offering incentives to Mauritania – an example of this is the project to build a road connecting Tindouf (Algeria) and Nouadibouh (Mauritania). The main problem is the not fully erased annexationist ambitions of Morocco. In the Mauritanian leadership the is still obvious fact that Hassan II did not acknowledge for more the ten years (1960-1970) the independence of Mauritania, labelled by Rabat as an artificial entity established by France focused to ‘deprive the millenary kingdom from its historical lands’: Only with the perspective of incoming annexation of former Spanish Sahara, occurred in 1975, Morocco normalized with its chameleonic approach normalized the ties with Nouakchott. After that Mauritania is at the center of and endless ‘tit for that’ warfare between Algeria and Morocco; the improper statements of the Islamist former prime minister of Rabat, Abdelilah Benkirane, who called a ‘union’ between the two countries, only reinforced the suspicions of Nouakchott leadership about the ambition of Morocco; this shifted once more Mauritania towards Algeria, but always without pushing it too much. In mid term perspective Mauritania will continue to be at the center of the ambitions of both invasive neighbours trying (like Nigeria as example) to getting as much as possible economic and political profit.
The last element. Senegal’s recent accession to the GEFC (as Exporting Countries Forum) in March 2024, reflects the country’s strategic importance in the energy sector of Western Africa and its growing influence on the global gas market. According to recent discoveries of large gas reserves, Senegal is emerging as a key actor in the African energy sector. Its integration into the GECF not only strengthens its position in the export of natural gas, but also provides it with a platform to collaborate with other gas producing countries. Participation in the Forum could facilitate multilateral discussions and bring about necessary changes for the construction and operation of the TSGP, since, as a member of the GECF, Senegal can influence negotiations on aspects crucial to the economic viability of the gas pipeline (price, production, distribution…). In reference to its relations with the Maghreb, the Senegalese posture is firm. Morocco has consolidated itself as Senegal’s main economic partner. Combined with this strong economic relationship, there is a significant political advantage. Senegal remained as the firm defender of the black project for Western Sahara, including through the political change in the month of March 2024. However, the confirmation of Senegal as client state of Morocco, as strongly hoped by Rabat, after the end of the presidency of Macky Sall, is not really clear (especially about the Western Sahara issue, the ‘national cause’ as set up in almost 80 years of hysteric nationalist propaganda) with the new presidency of Bassirou Diomaye Faye. This created a strong concern in Morocco, which use Western Sahara as a prism of its general policy (foreign and domestic). In a broader perspective the same concern is for Chad, where the influence of Morocco appears to be far and weak, as well the Russian influence seems growing.
Traditional challenges — such as extreme poverty, terrorism or poor governance-related conflicts — under the mark of current economic development — with the rise of power such as China, Russia or Turkey — in the Sahel region have contributed to generating a wave of opportunity so that Algeria and Morocco could try to fully takes the space left free after the Western withdrawal. As of now, it is complex to see that these projects may be materialized. The combination of energy initiatives — like gas pipelines — or infrastructure — like the new major harbour planned for Villa Cisneros/Dakhla — allows regional powers to gain support among the Sahelian countries. In this sense, the broad competence for the control of gas pipelines reflects a lot of power and hegemony in the region which will continue favouring the strategic realization of the actors involved. The Sahel has become a battleground for influence in countries historically aligned with Algeria — such as Mali or Nigeria — which will require decisions that will determine its regional position. On the other hand, the Sahelian countries have accepted to move from a passive role to participate actively in the diplomatic sphere, with the aim of promoting their national interests in the context of energy projects in play. The poor governance and the intrinsic instability and weakness of those country does not allow to foresee a clear view and action also in the short term. Remain enigmatic the weak answer of Algeria, which have in the hand important cards and the strategic necessity to avoid to be surrounded in the south by countries close to Morocco. Informal sources reported that, after the re-election of President Tebboune (widely expected, btw), the Algerian diplomacy would be re-animated on Western Sahara and Sahel. The competence for energy projects is not limited solely to infrastructure, as it also involves the creation of narratives and the projection of soft power.
These countries refer to underlying interests, such as the pursuit of brown sovereignty over the Sahara, which reflects the primacy of geopolitical issues in the face of the economy. Countries such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad have shown their proximity for the Moroccan initiative, reflecting an important change in regional power dynamics. The paper of Niger stands out due to its recent proximity to Morocco, to the detriment of Algeria. This diplomatic turn, combined with the potential problems of insecurity that could hinder the construction and/or maintenance of the pipeline, could lead the country to sacrifice its traditional support to the TSGP. If this decision materializes, it will reflect a broad-based strategy with broad repercussions in the geopolitical table of the region. Looking into the potential effects of the Moroccan pressure and the, till now, limited Algerian reaction, this new configuration of allies not only undermines the status quo, but reflects a strategic realization resulting from disappearance of external influence and growing regional ambitions. The inclination of the Sahelian countries towards the one or another initiative would have large implications for the region, as in the European energy market, becoming a determining factor in the geopolitical and economic future of Africa.
