The recent Israel-Iran war points to an important reality—that supranational structures serve no real purpose—their “rules” and “laws” are ignored or sidestepped by the United States and Israel—two nations on this planet which can do no wrong, and therefore for whom laws simply do not exist.
So, what benefit has Iran derived from a supranational structure that it joined, namely, BRICS? Its war with Israel has shown that BRICS is weak and filled with contradictions.
BRICS, particularly its core members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), issued strong diplomatic condemnations of the US-Israeli strikes and called for peace and respect for international law. However, their collective action did not translate into tangible conflict resolution or deterrence on the ground.
In other words, when missiles are flying—a strongly worded letter is not much a of a help.
Some BRICS members, notably Russia, have significant internal or historical ties to Israel, and others (like Brazil and India) maintain economic or military relationships with Israel or its allies. This undermines the notion of a unified BRICS front against Western or Israeli actions. For example, Russian citizens in Israel and Brazilian oil exports to Israel illustrate complex, sometimes contradictory, relationships that belie BRICS’ ability to act as a cohesive counterweight.
BRICS has no direct influence over Israel or the United States, both of whom are not members. The bloc’s capacity to affect the outcome of conflicts involving non-members is inherently limited. Worse, when one of its members—Iran—is attacked by the USA and Israel, BRICS goes and hides. Sure, there are strongly worded condemnations and moral rhetoric—but nothing to actually defend territory.
BRICS’ inability to prevent or meaningfully respond to the conflict (beyond rhetoric) exposes its ineffectiveness as a geopolitical force, especially when compared to the hype and hope surrounding its rise. The bloc’s failure to enforce its own diplomatic positions or to provide alternative security guarantees is a sign of utter weakness.
While BRICS can articulate a vision for a multipolar world and challenge Western narratives, its practical ability to shape events like the Israel-Iran war is minimal. The conflict instead reinforced the perception that BRICS remains more of a symbolic alliance than a decisive actor in global security.
In other words, BRICS is a psychological support group, where those that feel aggrieved can show up and get their offended sensibilities tended to, while the world continues to be run by those they do not like—the United States of America and its extension, Israel.
This becomes more apparent when we take a closer look at the two key members of BRICS, namely, China and Russia.
China uses BRICS to project normative and economic power, but its strategy for direct security engagement is cautious. Beijing is mindful of political sensitivities within the group and avoids pushing for overt military cooperation. BRICS is not designed to intervene in regional conflicts or to act as a unified security bloc, which explains why its members—including China—cannot coordinate military responses to crises like the Israel-Iran war.
China’s silence during major international conflicts—such as the Israel-Iran war, or the genocide in Gaza—stems from a combination of strategic calculation, foreign policy tradition, and practical considerations.
China has long adhered to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, rooted in its own experiences and its desire to shield itself from external intervention. This principle was enshrined at the 1955 Bandung Conference and remains a cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy.
By not taking sides or intervening, China avoids being drawn into conflicts that could complicate its relations with key partners or expose it to criticism and pressures, especially regarding its own domestic affairs.
China maintains complex relationships with major powers (e.g., Russia, the U.S., and Europe) and often seeks to avoid alienating any side. For example, staying silent on Russia’s actions in Ukraine allows China to protect its economic and strategic partnership with Moscow while not antagonizing Western trade partners.
Chinese leaders are wary of being pulled into conflicts that could have unpredictable outcomes or force Beijing to take a clear stance, potentially undermining its carefully cultivated image as a neutral and stabilizing force.
While China has grown into a global economic and military power, its influence in certain regions—especially in the Middle East and Eastern Europe—remains limited. Engaging directly in conflict resolution could expose these limitations and invite criticism if efforts fail.
China prioritizes stability for its economic projects and investments abroad. Its approach is often to wait out conflicts—and then engage with whoever emerges victorious, rather than risk its interests by taking sides.
China seeks to portray itself as a responsible global actor, but not one that imposes its will or values on others. This aligns with its narrative of a “peaceful rise” and “win-win” cooperation, rather than interventionism. Plus, silence allows China to avoid criticism from both domestic and international audiences, especially on issues where taking a stand could be domestically divisive or internationally contentious.
Russia has not provided Iran with meaningful military or material support during its confrontation with Israel and the United States, despite close diplomatic and economic ties and a 2025 strategic partnership agreement. While the Kremlin issued strong rhetorical condemnations of Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran and offered to mediate, it did not deliver promised weapon systems such as the S-400 air defense or Su-35 jets, nor did it intervene militarily or offer direct defense assistance.
Russia’s approach has been shaped by its own military and economic constraints, particularly its ongoing war in Ukraine, and a long-standing reluctance to overcommit to any single partner in the region. It must be noted that the Russian-Iranian alliance is not a mutual defense pact, and Moscow prioritizes its own interests and avoids being drawn into conflicts that could further strain its resources.
As a result, Iran’s confidence in Russia as a dependable ally has been undermined, and Russia’s failure to support Iran in its time of need has weakened the relationship between the two countries.
Despite Iran’s recent BRICS membership and its expectations of geopolitical support against Western pressure, the bloc did not provide military backing or concrete diplomatic action on its behalf.
BRICS did issue a joint statement condemning the military strikes against Iran, calling them a violation of international law and urging de-escalation and peaceful resolution, but refrained from naming Israel or the US directly. This cautious, consensus-based approach underscores the group’s lack of a unified military doctrine or binding defense obligations. As noted, Russia, Iran’s closest strategic partner within BRICS, strongly condemned the attacks but explicitly ruled out any military intervention, citing the absence of a mutual defense clause in its agreements with Tehran. Other BRICS members—China, India, Brazil, and South Africa—also avoided involvement, each prioritizing their own strategic interests.
BRICS had a twofold purpose: a platform for economic cooperation and a counterbalance to Western dominance. It has failed in both.
On the economic front, recent ministerial meetings have exposed deep rifts within BRICS, such as disputes over United Nations reform and trade protectionism. Foreign ministers failed to agree on a joint communique, reflecting significant internal disagreements. Geopolitical tensions—such as those between China and India—further complicate cohesive policy-making.
While BRICS has established institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), these have not delivered substantial results in terms of large-scale economic integration or crisis management. Actual loan disbursements from the NDB have been low, and governance issues persist.
The BRICS bloc includes countries with vastly different economic sizes, priorities, and development models—ranging from China’s economic might to South Africa’s more limited resources. This imbalance hampers the formulation and implementation of unified economic policies.
Efforts such as creating a new global reserve currency (de-dollarization) or building alternative global financial infrastructure have not materialized as intended. The dollar remains dominant, and progress toward a common BRICS currency is slow and faces major technical and political hurdles.
BRICS’ main unifying factor is a shared desire to counterbalance Western dominance, rather than a robust, shared economic agenda. The recent expansion of BRICS has added new members with varying degrees of alignment with the West, further complicating any cohesive strategy. Some members, like India and Brazil, maintain strong ties with the United States and Europe, undermining the bloc’s potential as an anti-Western alliance.
BRICS summits frequently end with grand statements and little concrete action. Leaders often make ambitious pledges—such as increasing intra-bloc trade or creating new institutions—that are not backed by binding agreements or follow-through.
Despite rhetoric about reforming global governance, BRICS has not fundamentally challenged the dominance of Western-led institutions or neoliberal policy frameworks. The group’s actions are often described as conservative, focusing on incremental gains rather than systemic change.
As for Israel’s genocide in Gaza, there is a notable gap between BRICS’s strong rhetorical support for Palestinian rights and Gaza’s reconstruction and the bloc’s concrete actions on the ground in 2025. BRICS nations have consistently emphasized multilateralism, respect for international law, and the necessity of a just and lasting political resolution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They have issued joint declarations expressing “serious concern” over the humanitarian situation in Gaza and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops, a ceasefire, and the entry of humanitarian aid. Brazil, as BRICS president in 2025, has been vocal in condemning the resumption of Israeli bombardment and the obstruction of aid, urging a peaceful resolution.
However, despite these statements, there is little evidence of BRICS taking substantive steps to directly challenge the blockade of Gaza, enforce international law, or pressure Israel in a way that would compel a change in policy. Their influence is largely diplomatic and rhetorical, lacking the kind of concrete measures—such as sanctions, arms embargoes, or direct interventions—that could force Israel to lift its restrictions on Gaza. BRICS has discussed the potential for Gaza’s reconstruction and the rebuilding of its port, but any such projects are contingent on Israel easing its blockade, a condition BRICS has not been able to secure. BRICS lacks the institutional mechanisms or collective will to directly challenge Israel or the United States, whose continued support for Israel remains a significant obstacle.
In fact, most of the important members of BRICS have very strong relationships with Israel (Russia, China, India, South Africa and Brazil). Once the rhetoric is dispensed with, BRICS has nothing to offer the poor people of Gaza.
Iran’s BRICS membership has not provided immediate or substantial benefits, particularly in the areas where Tehran most urgently needs support—such as military cooperation and economic relief from sanctions. Despite expectations, Iran finds itself largely isolated during military escalations, as BRICS members like Russia, China, and India have not committed to military support or robust diplomatic backing, highlighting the bloc’s absence of mutual defense commitments and its informal, consensus-based nature.
Economically, while BRICS membership offers potential for increased trade, investment in infrastructure, and access to the New Development Bank, these benefits remain largely hypothetical or gradual, hampered by institutional deficiencies, slow decision-making, and the continued impact of U.S. sanctions. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister has suggested that Iran could benefit from joining the New Development Bank, but this would be a long-term prospect rather than a quick fix for Iran’s economic woes. In other words, it is all pie in the sky. A lot of great speeches—zero substance.
Which brings us back to the Israel-Iran war, during which Russia did not provide Iran with military support, despite the two nations’ deepening strategic partnership and Iran’s previous—and substantial—military aid to Russia. While the Kremlin strongly condemned Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran and offered diplomatic backing—including at the United Nations—Russia refrained from any direct military intervention or the transfer of advanced weapons, such as the S-400 air defense system.
The 20-year strategic partnership agreement signed by Russia and Iran in January 2025 did not include a mutual defense clause, allowing Russia to avoid any obligation to militarily assist Iran during the conflict. Iranian officials and analysts have expressed frustration and a sense of betrayal, noting that Russia’s support was limited to rhetoric and diplomacy, not material aid.
Experts and analysts note that Russia’s reluctance to help Iran stems from its own military overextension in Ukraine, its need to maintain relations with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and a desire to avoid further conflict with the U.S. or Israel. Moscow’s actions—or lack thereof—have led to perceptions in Tehran that the alliance is increasingly one-sided and unreliable
BRICS is largely a failed effort in global economic cooperation because it lacks a clear, unified vision, struggles to implement major initiatives, and is hampered by internal divisions and a tendency toward symbolic rather than substantive action. And it has no military benefit whatsoever. In other words, all the anti-West rhetoric is just that—rhetoric.
Iran just learned a very hard lesson—it is isolated. The friends it thought it had, it does not have. The treaties it signed are pointless, because there are no mechanisms to enforce them. If Israel wants to slaughter and bomb its neighbors, the world can do nothing about it—because the USA says so. There is no force, yet, in this world that can counter this brutal fact.
