The recent BRICS Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, was apparently marked by the absence of two of the group’s leaders, Russia’s Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. In reality, it was much more than that. As the world is stormed by geopolitical and economic tensions, the group seeks to strengthen its position as an alternative scheme to Western powers. The challenges and opportunities associated with these plans were at the heart of the discussions. Established in 2009 around Brazil, India, Russia, and China, and joined in 2011 by South Africa, this kind of international organization aimed to bring together the main emerging powers as an alternative to other international organizations and groups influenced by Western powers, primarily the G7. While not constituting either an alliance or a homogeneous bloc with unified positions, as evidenced by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the BRICS countries are trying to work together to overcome heavy internal contradictions and serious disagreements. In January 2024, BRICS underwent their first enlargement with the integration of Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia, in the attempt illustrating the economic developments underway on the African continent and confirming the rise of the Gulf region.
Indonesia joined the group in January 2025, while Saudi Arabia after a declaration for joining, did not finalized the accession to the group. Argentina withdrew in 2023 the demand of joining BRICS; Algeria, which expressed the will to join and withdrew in 2024, together with Türkiye, was invited to join the bloc as observer (but both have not yet confirmed that status as of mid-January 2025). These enlargements apparently strengthen the idea of BRICS’ influence on world affairs, representing nearly half of the population and more than a quarter of global GDP. In the energy sector as well, their combined capabilities make them essential in the oil, gas, and mineral production sectors. The BRICS still benefit from a strong appeal among the countries of the so-called Global South. In response to several requests to join the group, and with the aim to not worsen the already existing splits, it was established the status of “partner” state at the Kazan Summit in Russia in November 2024. Other 30 nations have expressed interest in participating in the BRICS, either as full members or partners (now are considered partners Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan).
However, these developments could contribute to a dilution and multiply divisions, which are in some cases, like between India and China, very deep and always on the edge to explode into a military conflict. Some founding states, such as India and Brazil, remain very reluctant to expand this circle, fearing in particular a loss of influence, especially as China’s pressures seems uninterrupted. As said above, the 17th Summit, whose theme was “Strengthening South-South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance,” Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin were not physically present. The Chinese leader was represented by PM Li Qiang, and the Russian President participated via videoconference due to the arrest warrant issued against him by the International Criminal Court (and not to embarrassing Brazil like it was for South Africa, forced to pathetic contortions in 2023) and FM Sergei Lavrov was there. Presidents Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt and Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran were absent too due to the situation in Gaza and the Israeli and US strikes. However, discussions focused on trade, investment, financial cooperation, artificial intelligence, global health, and climate action, a theme on which UN Secretary-General António Guterres spoke, calling on BRICS members to mobilize for the next UN Climate Conference, COP30, which will also take place in Brazil at the end of the year.
Apparently, everything went well, with the final joint declaration summarize the outcomes and reaffirmed many of the BRICS group’s long-standing priorities. The leaders among these were the vocal calls for the reform of multilateral institutions, including the usual call for Brazil and India to become permanent members of the UN Security Council. There was also, as widely expected, a call for reform the voting power scheme in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to be readjusted to reflect a changing global order and the new economic powers.
As more tangible outcomes was the proposal for a technical financial body inspired by the World Bank’s MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency). This new institution would be aimed at facilitating infrastructure and development investment across the ‘Global South’ by providing investment guarantees to reduce political risk. Still in its early phases, the plan signals the BRICS group’s continued interest in building parallel or complementary institutions to existing Western-dominated financial global governance frameworks. It also signals an interest in providing tools for riskier developing countries to attract needed investment, and there is no indication that these guarantees would be limited to investment from BRICS member countries and has been presented as the BRICS MIGA, which is likely to continue its development through 2025 and 2026. However, as widely expected, no substantial developments, in the direction to set up, or designate, a currency (or a basket of currencies) to be a formal rival of the dollar and the euro.
On climate, the group introduced a new framework for joint action, an important signal of the group’s coordinated position ahead of the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference, known as COP30, which will be held in Belém, Brazil, in November. On technology, the statement advocated for more inclusive global discussions on artificial intelligence governance, echoing concerns that Global South perspectives are often underrepresented in these debates. Among the more contentious points, the declaration also touched on ongoing conflicts, calling for peace in Gaza and condemning recent bombings in Iran and attacks on Russian civilian infrastructure by Ukraine.
At evident paradox of the situation, a significant aspect of the statement was the omission of the US by name. This omission likely reflects ongoing trade and tariff negotiations between Washington and several members of the BRICS. Despite some political rhetoric and public narrative to the contrary, many members of the group remain deeply integrated with the US market in consideration that the exports there represent a significant share of their total exports (firstly China, the second world economic power)—and, in many cases, a meaningful portion of their GDP. This underscores an important point and intrinsic economic (and political) contradiction: while the BRICS countries are often perceived as a counterbalance to Western power, their economies remain linked to the US and EU in crucial ways; however, much of the media debate was focused on the hysterical and confused rants of US President Trump against the member states of the group.
What comes next for this group of states? With New Delhi set to assume the BRICS chair in 2026, the direction of the bloc will hinge in part on Indian priorities and targets. For Brazil, thanks to the President Lula good diplomatic capabilities, the 2025 Summit offered a platform to elevate its diplomatic voice, reinforce its bid for global governance reform, and continue to position itself as a pragmatic leader among emerging powers. However, despite the hopes of Beijing (mainly) and Moscow (more and more the junior partner of China), the BRICS format is unlikely to become a geopolitical game-changer overnight, but it remains a platform where some aspects of the world’s diplomatic future are being negotiated. The test future for BRICS will be whether it can move from declarations to concrete action (such as with the BRICS MIGA) and whether the group could manage its internal contradictions to build something more solid than the simple sum of its parts.
Also, within the BRICS framework, the multiple alignment policy, persistent element of the contemporary international relations emerged, and just after the Summit in Rio, Indonesia, which is part of the group, signed a trade pact with the US (labelled by the President Trump with the usual immoderate and enthusiastic wording).
As said, the President Trump, even not present physically present at the Summit, was there with his uncontrolled ire and confused rants, saying that Washington will impose an additional 10% tariff on any countries aligning themselves with the ‘Anti-American policies’ of the BRICS group of states. With forums such as the G7 and G20 groups of major economies hamstrung by divisions and the disruptive “America First” approach of the US President, the BRICS try to present itself as a haven for multilateral diplomacy amid violent conflicts and trade wars.
But the group, despite a generic hostility against the West (US and EU) did not represent a solid block and there in dangerous fractures lines which undermining its cohesion, like the silent rivalry between India and China and the quasi open war between Egypt and Ethiopia about the grand dam of the Blue Nile (which is close to be completed); the firm opposition of Brazil to the demand of Venezuela and the recent self-exclusion of the Milei-led Argentina.
Preparing the way, the BRICS states issued an opening statement warning the rise in tariffs threatened global trade, continuing its not so veiled criticism of Trump’s tariff policies. As said, hours later, Trump warned he would punish countries seeking to join with the grouping saying: “Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy. Thank you for your attention to this matter!” (as usual in his hysterical way, Trump did not clarify or elaborated on the “Anti-American policies” reference meaning in his post and it deserve to be mentioned that also NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has issued a stern warning to India, China, and Brazil, stating they will face “consequences” if they continue significant trade with Russia, particularly in energy).
In opening remarks to the Summit, Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva drew a parallel with the Cold War’s Non-Aligned Movement, a group of developing nations that resisted joining either side of a polarized global order, underlining the relevance of the group, especially in a moment when the multilateralism is attacked, adding that BRICS nations now represent more than half the world’s population and 40% of its economic output, Lula noted in remarks on Saturday to business leaders, warning of rising protectionism.
The present and foreseeable expansion of the bloc has added in theory diplomatic weight to the gathering, which aspires to speak for developing nations across the Global South, strengthening calls for reforming global institutions such as the UN Security Council and the IMF.
However, there are questions about the shared goals of an increasingly heterogeneous BRICS group, which has grown to include regional rivals along with major emerging economies.
As usual, and like all the international organizations communique the Summit expressed solidarity, concern support accordingly (as well condemning and deploring); the leaders called attacks against Iran’s “civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities” a “violation of international law.” The group expressed “grave concern” for the Palestinian people over Israeli attacks on Gaza, and condemned what the joint statement called a “terrorist attack” in India-administered Kashmir. The group voiced its support for Ethiopia and Iran to join the WTO (World Trade Organization), while calling to urgently restore its ability to resolve trade disputes. The leaders’ joint statement backed plans to pilot a BRICS MIGA within the organization’s New Development Bank to lower financing costs and boost investment in member states.
In a separate statement following a discussion of artificial intelligence, the leaders called for protections against unauthorized use of AI to avoid excessive data collection and allow mechanisms for fair payment.
Brazil, which also hosts the COP 30 Summit in November, has seized the chance to highlight how seriously developing nations are tackling climate change (while Trump has slammed the brakes on US climate initiatives).
In this way China and the UAE signalled in meetings with Brazilian Finance Minister Fernando Haddad in Rio that they plan to invest in a proposed Tropical Forests Forever Facility, in the framework of funding conservation initiatives of endangered forests around the world.
Behind the charismatic leadership of Lula, the Summit was marked by a strong pressure, behind the curtain, of China, for that BRICS reach more possible concrete economic and political results. The commitment of Beijing into the successes of BRICS framework is, according several analysts of international relations and economy, not only to reinforce the global challenge against Washington, but also to support the national economy, which continue to suffer of a prolonged slowdown after the COVID pandemia and the insane policies adopted. Economic problems confirmed, few days after the Summit, by the Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, who wanted to appear optimistic at all costs, saying that China has a “plentiful” toolbox to avoid an economic slump in the second half of the year, as he admitted it faced a “very severe and complex situation”. With growth hit 5.2% in the second quarter (while the ideal should be between 7-8%), more must be done to boost sluggish domestic consumption as exports face the knock-on effects of global trade turmoil. Beijing is battling to shift towards a growth model propelled more by domestic demand than the traditional key drivers of infrastructure investment, manufacturing and exports. That desired, but controversial (due to the resistance of several groups of communist leadership, worried that a pushed economic consumes will open door to demands of political changes) transformation has become more urgent since Donald Trump came to office, and this new situation would make BRICS an efficient and supportive tool for the Chinese priorities more than necessary.
The Enemies Within: The Major Divide in BRICS
As said, the BRICS group of state, is marked by internal fractures; one of the major, even quite silent (and till now, silenced) is the one between the two major powers of this group, China and India. The geopolitical rivalry between China and India poses an important threat to both Asian and global security (and a massive embarrassment for Moscow, junior partner of China and major client of India), even if it receives much less attention than that between China and the US. The assertive stance of China and its increased presence in South and Central Asia, as well as in the Indian Ocean, have increased the risks of a confrontation with India, as said the other major weight of BRICS, and the only one that inside this group, could challenge (however to a certain extent, till now) Beijing. The security threats of this rivalry are sharpened by each country’s strategic positioning and partnerships: India with the US (even if not full, but increasingly important); and China with Pakistan, which is also India’s traditional adversary (and Pakistan, between the 1950s and 1990s, was the major partner of Washington in Southern Asia). India regard China as New Delhi’s principal rival, ranked above Pakistan, whereas China regard India as a lesser rival than the US and Japan. The Sino-Indian rivalry started almost immediately after the two countries’ emergence into the global arena in the late 1940s. New Delhi’s first PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, tried to promote India as the natural leader of Asia, a role that was contested by China, situation that worsened with the beginning of Moscow-Beijing split in the 1960s. This rivalry, as the strategic ones are, was multifaced: from disputes over borders and territory and related to each country’s position in the regional pecking order, and now, extended in the global map.
China constantly threatened Indian ambitions and security priorities. As example of it, India inherited from Great Britain the concept that Tibet it should remain a buffer state and protect the northern borders and territories. The Chinese occupation of Tibet (1950) and the war of 1962, showed the Chinese determination and the (then) Indian weakness. Focused on gigantic domestic problems of economic and social developments, India kept good relations with USSR, cold ties with US and remained marginal in the strategic games of the mega region of Indo-Pacific; this while China’s rapid economic development, make the material power gap with India became more important, but did not ease or reduced the magnitude of the bilateral crises (1967 Nathu-La; 1986–87 Sumdorong Chu; 2017 Doklam; 2020 Ladakh) keeping very high risk that border crises may spiral into inadvertent wars. The change of the Indian economic model, helped by a robust educational architecture, boosted India development (India today is close to bypass Japan and become fourth world’s economic power) with a growing impact on the external action of New Delhi, more and more assertive and present, not only in the Indo-Pacific. Elements that may drive conflicting elements between the two countries include India’s growing strategic alignment with the US, such as through the “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Japan and Australia), and Chinese global pressure under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Despite the mutual participation into BRICS, China has been working to narrow India’s strategic space by penetrating its neighbourhood. China is transforming Pakistan into its client state in South Asia, notably through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (sub-element of the BRI, Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through Pakistani-administered Kashmir, claimed by India) and try to do the same with many countries in the region, setting up what the Beijing strategists call “string of pearls,” through, at least initially, financial investments in ports across the region, particularly those in Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives (countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh can also exploit Chinese interest to undermine India’s regional leadership ambitions in South Asia with the hope to get a more independent stance in international politics). The prospects for increasing rivalry are important, also for the exploitation and management of water. As most of the major rivers in South and Southeast Asia have their origins in Tibet, China controls the sources of many Asian rivers, including five in India—the Indus, Brahmaputra, Sutlej, Kosi and Ghaghara. Both India and China already face water scarcity, which will only worsen in the future, despite efforts of New Delhi and Beijing to improve the management of waters. Another looming risk is the security of energy supply, much of which is imported via maritime routes in the Indian Ocean. As such, the Sino-Indian rivalry shows no signs of abating, if anything it seems to be intensifying.
But what risk to be a conflagratory element is the overlap and rivalry of the two major economic projects of Beijing, the BRI, and new Delhi, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Doubtless, BRI is the second harm of the global strategy project of China to take the world, where the first is the BRICS. Both have difficulties to be fully functional at the interests of Beijing. First, the growing resistance of US, the ambiguous stance of Europe and the multiple alignment of many actors’ states, which, while flirting with China, at the same time does not abandon or cut the ties with the hatred West. While BRI impact was already mentioned on these pages, it could be useful bring more details on IMEC and its impact on the China-India relations and impact on the BRICS dynamics too.
Largely promoted by PM Narendra Modi, IMEC establishment was announced on 9 September 2023, during the G20 Summit in New Delhi as part of the PGII (Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment). Intending to bridge infrastructure and logistic gaps in India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, and the US. These countries, with a combined GDP of $47 trillion and a consumer base of 2.25 billion people, account for around one-fifth of total global trade, presenting itself as a visible rival of BRI project, even if not into a worldwide dimension, but focused to the one highest potential area of the globe. The project has garnered strong political backing, including from the G-7, which reaffirmed its commitment to IMEC at the 2024 Summit.
IMEC is poised to deliver significant geostrategic and economic benefits. It will create faster, cheaper trade routes connecting India, the Middle East, and Europe, potentially reducing logistics cost by up to 30% and cutting transportation time by around 40%. IMEC will be beneficial for India, as about half of its total exports and almost four-fifths of exports to Europe pass through the Red Sea-Suez Canal route (this sector of the economic and logistic corridor, in order to be efficient and profitable will require that the Yemenite Houti threat to commercial navigation to be solved as quick as possible).
The corridor comprises two primary routes: the Eastern Corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf; and the Northern Corridor that links the Gulf to Europe via a rail network, enhancing cross-border ship-to-rail transit.
There is clear progress in the will of the participants, as example, India and the UAE (both part of BRICS) are collaborating on digital and financial frameworks, including linking their national payment systems. The India-UAE Virtual Trade Corridor will further facilitate trade by reducing transport costs and creating a robust digital logistics interface in unifying digital connectivity and trade portals.
During Indian commerce and industry minister Piyush Goyal’s visit to Italy this year, IMEC was an area of emphasis during discussions and Rome is likely to co-host a meeting of FMs of the member states later this year.
Saudi Arabia has committed $20 billion to support the project, while India is also planning an undersea power transmission line to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
IMEC presents various offerings to all the parties concerned. Strategically, it can become central to Europe’s and the US’s de-risking efforts to reduce dependency on China, particularly in critical minerals and manufacturing and pushing for the decoupling with Beijing. Germany’s “2023 China Strategy” and France’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy” (2018) underline this shift. IMEC also allows India to position itself as a competitive manufacturing hub within global supply chains while boosting investment flows among member countries.
Energy security is another key driver. IMEC could significantly enhance energy trade between the Gulf and Europe. For India, the corridor promises more reliable oil and gas supplies from the Gulf and aligns with clean energy ambitions. Existing projects like the EastMed-Poseidon pipeline (planned to run from the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, Crete and Greece and on to Italy) could integrate with IMEC’s infrastructure.
Another opportunity lies in the creation of hydrogen corridors, linking green hydrogen producers in India and the Gulf to European markets. Italy’s ongoing hydrogen partnership with Austria and Germany within the EU could eventually connect to IMEC’s hydrogen network. Digital connectivity is also important, with IMEC offering a chance to develop an alternate global fibre-optic cable infrastructure and enable secure, efficient data flow across borders.
However, there are also concerns like geopolitical instability in West Asia threatens the corridor’s viability. Security concerns were highlighted in June 2025 when Haifa Port was struck by Iranian air strikes, though there was no damage reported.
Infrastructure funding poses another challenge. The corridor requires an estimated $600 billion. Mobilising funds from multilateral banks, sovereign wealth funds, and the private sector is essential.
In fact, a recent interaction on IMEC saw wide interest among industry stakeholders, highlighting the corridor’s vast potential. Sectors such as submarine cables, green hydrogen, biofuels and digital infrastructure emerged as key areas of engagement and industry players will have to play an important role in each of these segments.
As seen, IMEC poses a transregional challenge to the BRI and may reinforce the worst economic and political nightmare of Beijing, decoupling China and reducing her pressure on the partners; this let imagine a strong campaign of China against the IMEC in all the fields and with all the means.
The general rivalry between the two major powers it is reflected within the BRICS framework, undermining furtherly the cohesion of the group and limiting the enlargement of the membership and the deepening of their effectiveness, firstly the establishment of global currency in condition to challenge the supremacy of the US dollar. Till now, both sides worked cautiously to avoid the worsening of the situation, but, internal dynamics, especially for China may push for a radicalization of the confrontation.
Conclusion
In essence, the BRICS Summit was a mix of internal tensions and external threats. In fact, more tensions and difficulties have emerged post-enlargement, involving countries from different regions and with different positions on different issues. In short, appear evident that there are some difficulties in consolidating. In a way, despite the Brazilian efforts to achieve visible results, it was somewhat “subdued” summit compared to previous ones. Xi Jinping’s absence, who sent his PM, weighed heavily, as did Putin’s digital presence, due to an arrest warrant, among other reasons. As said, tensions and difficulties also emerged post-enlargement, including countries from different regions and with different positions on various issues.
Appear clear that there are some difficulties in consolidation. Starting precisely with what it means to be part of the BRICS: Lula spoke of the legacy of the non-aligned countries and talked a lot about the Global South, while the Russian and Chinese idea (as well as that of other actors like Iran) is likely much closer to an explicit anti-American alignment.
Further, military conflicts involving Russia and Iran influenced the conference. The fact that Moscow and Teheran are BRICS members states implies that the organization it is obliged to take at least a verbal stand. Which it has done in part, because there was a fairly clear condemnation of Israel, both regarding Gaza and the escalation with Iran. And there is also a fairly clear position, albeit a little more understated, on the Russia-Ukraine issue, with a condemnation of Ukraine for the attacks on Russian railway infrastructure, and a refraining from condemning Moscow as the official instigator of the conflict, for obvious reasons of membership. But again, there’s some internal turmoil, related to the group’s recent expansion. Admitting more members increases management difficulties, as do conflicting interests, fragilizing the policy making of the organization.
Brazil, which enjoys greater prestige and visibility from BRICS membership as long as it remains a smaller and more manageable platform; a BRICS platform that expands significantly benefits other players, such as China, which promotes its leadership in the ‘Global South’ and silently confronting especially with India could not be a proper answer. All this with an enlargement that has only been successful to a certain extent. That, for example, Argentina initially wanted to be part of BRICS, before the election of Milei (who however continue to keep an ambiguous relation with China, despite his good terms with Trump) but then withdrew it, also due to the ideological hostility of Lula; but also Saudi Arabia, which is hesitating without trying to finalize its potential membership. It’s difficult to reconcile the interests of such a diverse group of large and small countries from different regions, and to pursue an agenda that ultimately leads to something concrete, and these difficulties are also encountered in the enlargement process.
But the expansion agenda is still there, as demonstrated by the recent innovation of establishing the category of partner countries (like Cuba and Vietnam) as acceptable compromise and avoiding to add friction points between the original member states and their divergent priorities. Definitely, external factors like the irresponsible Donald Trump’s declarations on tariffs, may play a role in possible consolidation of BRICS. This entire reaction of threatening further tariffs against BRICS countries, simply labelling them as anti-American, only fuels the fires of all those who want to create a decidedly anti-American coalition, like China, Russia and Iran and undermine promising good political and economic relations between India and US. Trump, in presenting himself as an external enemy only helps overcome internal BRICS obstacles and strengthen cohesion. And, more generally, the policy of tariffs and duties reinforces alternative proposals that, however, are often not particularly revolutionary in certain respects, such as when they advocate maintaining alive the Bretton Woods system (which instead Beijing aim to dismantle).
As mentioned above, the next rotation chairmanship of BRICS for 2026 will be entrusted to India and its political strategy and priorities. Just few days after the Summit in Rio, where member nations discussed the future prospects of the organization, New Delhi reaffirmed that India do not align with the BRICS de-dollarization agenda and will not ditch the US dollar for trade and cross-border transactions. The FM of India Randhir Jaiswal, confirmed that BRICS member nations discussed settling trade payments in local currencies. However, he stated that there were no talks about the formation of a new BRICS common currency. “De-dollarization is not something which is on the agenda,” he said, assuring that India does not align with BRICS ideology adding: “Cross-border payments, yes. BRICS have talked about local currencies, but de-dollarization is not something that is there on the agenda,” The remarks come after many developing countries are discussing advancing the de-dollarization initiative. Jaiswal revealed that India is not fully onboard with the US dollar either and plans to explore cross-border rupee usage. India wants to dim the lights on de-dollarization and BRICS currency by promoting the rupee on the international stage. However, the development is at its nascent stage and has a lot of parameters to go through before going live. The Minister claimed that the BRICS summit was successful as India’s Modi led the talks and refrained from using de-dollarization, concluding: “We had a highly successful BRICS summit. In the joint statement, there are several aspects that have been fleshed out that is there on the agenda,” he said.
India has time and again refrained from the de-dollarization agenda since Trump took office in January with a line that began to change since Modi met the US President in February. The country hosts several sectors jobs outsourced from the US firms, and its economy banks on it. The jobs fund many economic sectors and the Modi-led government does not want to risk it, especially giving that a complex negotiation between Washington and New Delhi is ongoing and would seal it between this summer and the autumn and Modi does not want to damage the talks for make happy Beijing. The future for BRICS is uncertain, at the end, as for the rest of the world.
