Can Germany Ever Say “All for Germany” Again?
Norway’s new king can proclaim “All for Norway.” France has heard “All for France” from a former president. Americans have spent decades arguing over how to make their country “great again.” In Germany, however, three apparently ordinary words—“All for Germany”—can lead to a criminal conviction. The difference tells us something important not only about German law, but about Germany’s unresolved relationship with patriotism, memory and national belonging.
When Haakon VIII became King of Norway on August 28, 2026, following the death of his father, Harald V, he chose to continue a tradition stretching back through three generations of Norwegian monarchs. His royal motto would remain Alt for Norge: “All for Norway.” To Norwegian ears, there is nothing particularly provocative about those words. They express loyalty to a country and a people.
The same sentiment would hardly be startling in France. Nicolas Sarkozy entitled the book with which he announced his return to presidential politics in 2016 Tout pour la France—“All for France.” In the United States, Ronald Reagan used the aspiration to “make America great again” decades before Donald Trump made the phrase inseparable from his own political movement.
Different countries, different histories, different political traditions. Yet all three examples rest on an assumption that is remarkably difficult in contemporary Germany: that attachment to one’s country can, in principle, be expressed positively. In Germany, the words Alles für Deutschland — literally, “All for Germany”—present a very different problem.
When Three Words Become a Crime
The German politician Björn Höcke, chairman of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) parliamentary group in Thuringia, was convicted twice after using the phrase publicly. German courts regarded it as a symbol of the Sturmabteilung, or SA, the paramilitary organisation of the Nazi Party, and therefore prohibited under Section 86a of the German Criminal Code. Germany’s Federal Court of Justice allowed both convictions to stand in 2025.
For readers outside Germany, Section 86a requires some explanation. German criminal law does not merely prohibit incitement to racial hatred or advocacy of Nazi crimes. Because of Germany’s particular history, since 1968 it has also criminalised the use of symbols of unconstitutional organisations; the provision has subsequently been extended to cover certain terrorist organisations as well. The provision is the reason why certain Nazi insignia, slogans and gestures may themselves constitute criminal offences.
The underlying principle is understandable. Germany has chosen to place legal boundaries around the public reappearance of National Socialist symbolism. But the Höcke case raises a more difficult question. German law itself recognises that context matters. Section 86a incorporates the exceptions contained in Section 86, including uses serving civic education, scholarship, research, teaching, art, reporting on current or historical events and similar purposes. German courts have likewise recognised that even the use of a prohibited symbol may fall outside the scope of criminal punishment where the surrounding circumstances make sufficiently clear that the use runs counter to the symbolic meaning associated with the prohibited organisation.
The difficult question, therefore, is not simply whether Germany should prohibit National Socialist symbols. It is whether the contextual safeguards built into the law are applied consistently, particularly when political speech is involved. If identical words or symbols can acquire a different legal significance depending upon who uses them, in what setting and for what communicative purpose, then the decisive issue becomes the quality and even-handedness of that contextual assessment.
The Canadian comparison is interesting precisely in this respect. Canada’s Combatting Hate Act, which received Royal Assent in June 2026, criminalises the public display of specified Nazi and terrorist symbols only where the display is used to wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group. The legislation therefore places considerable weight on what the person is actually communicating through the symbol rather than treating historical association alone as determinative.
The constitutional traditions of Germany and Canada are, of course, profoundly different, and the two legal regimes should not be equated. Yet the comparison points to a broader rule-of-law question that goes beyond the wording of either statute: how can a legal system ensure that restrictions on politically sensitive expression are applied according to consistent principles rather than according to the political identity of the speaker? In such cases, context is not merely an exception at the margins of the law. It may be essential to distinguishing the glorification of an unlawful organisation from quotation, criticism, provocation or political speech.
Who Owns a Phrase?
The history of Alles für Deutschland is more complicated than its present legal status might suggest. In 1848, King Ludwig I of Bavaria concluded a proclamation with the words Alles für Mein Volk! Alles für Teutschland!—“All for my people! All for Germany!”
During the turbulent final years of the Weimar Republic, the expression appeared in radically different political environments. German nationalists used Nichts für uns! Alles für Deutschland! —“Nothing for us! All for Germany!” But the phrase was also used by the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, an organisation created by supporters of the democratic Weimar Republic to defend it against its enemies. Its co-founder, the Social Democrat Otto Hörsing, referred to it as “our old slogan.”
The SA subsequently adopted Alles für Deutschland and engraved it on its daggers. That association ultimately became decisive for German criminal law. The organisation’s own history, however, was strikingly short-lived at the centre of Nazi power. In the summer of 1934, Hitler had Ernst Röhm and much of the SA leadership murdered in the purge later euphemistically called the “Röhm Putsch.” Röhm’s ambition to turn the millions-strong SA into the nucleus of a new national army had brought him into direct conflict with the Reichswehr and with rivals within the Nazi movement, particularly the rising SS. After the purge, the SA rapidly lost political significance, while the SS emerged as an increasingly powerful and independent instrument of Hitler’s regime.
Yet the phrase did not disappear completely after 1945. At a Christian Social Union party conference, former Bavarian Minister-President Alfons Goppel used “All for Germany” while speaking in support of Franz Josef Strauß. Few would seriously suggest that Goppel was thereby declaring allegiance to the SA.
This history raises a problem that reaches far beyond one controversial politician. Can a dictatorship permanently appropriate otherwise ordinary words? And if so, what is required before democratic society can reclaim them?
The question is not whether National Socialist history should be forgotten. It must not be. Nor does acknowledging the earlier and later uses of a phrase diminish the crimes committed under National Socialism. The question is instead how historical memory should interact with present meaning.
Before the controversy surrounding Höcke, many Germans probably did not know that Alles für Deutschland had been associated with the SA. As recently as 2023, even the German news magazine Der Spiegel published a commentary under precisely those words, initially without addressing their association with the SA; the headline was later changed. The magazine was not prosecuted for using the phrase.
In Höcke’s case, by contrast, the courts concluded that he knew of the historical association and deliberately used the words. The different consequences raise an important rule-of-law question: to what extent may the identity and political affiliation of a speaker influence the interpretation of the same three words?
The question matters particularly in relation to the AfD. For years, the party and many of its representatives have been treated in large parts of German public discourse as though their democratic legitimacy were somehow conditional. Yet the party has continued to attract increasing numbers of voters and has brought into parliament politicians from a wide variety of professional and academic backgrounds. Its parliamentarians have increasingly distinguished themselves through serious and well-prepared parliamentary work.
They have pressed particularly strongly for a thorough examination of the political decisions taken during the Covid period. In 2025, the parliamentary group sought the establishment of a formal committee of inquiry with extensive investigative powers, rather than limiting the process to the enquiry commission favoured by the parliamentary majority.
In foreign policy, too, the AfD has pursued a distinctive course. While much of the German political establishment has drastically reduced political and economic contacts with Russia, AfD representatives have continued to argue for dialogue and to maintain channels of communication. They have linked this approach both to the search for a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine and to Germany’s economic interests, including affordable energy and the preservation of an internationally competitive industrial economy. For a country so dependent on international trade and energy imports, keeping channels to Russia open can serve both diplomatic and economic interests.
The result of the September 2026 state election in Saxony-Anhalt makes it increasingly difficult to treat the AfD as a political phenomenon at the margins. The party received 43.8 percent of the second votes and won 39 of the 83 seats in the new parliament. More than 575,000 voters chose the party in a single German state.
A confident democracy should respond to such an electoral result through the democratic process itself: through open political competition, parliamentary responsibility, scrutiny and accountability. Its representatives and voters should be judged by what they actually propose and do, rather than reduced to historical labels or placed outside the boundaries of respectable democratic debate.
The same principle must apply in criminal law. Whether a party or politician is regarded as “controversial” by the political and media mainstream is legally beside the point. Criminal liability attaches to an act, not to the political reputation of the person who commits it. The same words must therefore be assessed according to the same legal principles whether they appear in one of Germany’s leading news magazines or in a speech by a prominent AfD politician.
If political identity begins to determine how an otherwise ambiguous expression is interpreted, criminal law risks moving away from judging the act towards judging the presumed political attitude of the speaker. Equality before the law matters most precisely when the person concerned challenges the prevailing political consensus.
Yet the intensity with which three seemingly ordinary words can become a matter for criminal courts cannot be understood through legal doctrine alone. Behind the controversy lies a deeper question: Germany’s unresolved relationship with expressions of national belonging. Why can words that sound unremarkable in Norway, France or the United States become politically—and even criminally—charged when spoken in Germany?
Germany’s Special Relationship With Patriotism
The answer inevitably begins with history. Germany has compelling reasons to approach nationalism differently from Norway, France or Canada. National Socialism led to aggressive war, systematic persecution and the Holocaust. Any serious discussion of German patriotism must acknowledge that history rather than attempt to escape it.
Yet Germany’s complicated relationship with national belonging predates National Socialism. Germany emerged comparatively late as a nation-state. For centuries, people identified primarily as Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Badeners, Hamburgers or members of numerous other territories. A sense of German belonging existed long before political unification, but it was rooted largely in language and culture. In 1813, Ernst Moritz Arndt famously asked, “What is the German fatherland?” and answered: wherever the German language was spoken.
Even then, however, German patriotism was contested. Heinrich Heine mocked narrow-minded nationalism while remaining deeply attached to Germany, while Goethe, Schiller, Wieland and Herder combined a sense of cultural belonging with a universalist conception of humanity. German identity therefore did not begin as a simple story of nationalism leading inexorably to 1933.
The years between 1933 and 1945 nevertheless transformed Germany’s relationship with the nation fundamentally. After Auschwitz, patriotism could no longer possess the same innocence it once had. That rupture was necessary. But eight decades later, does historical responsibility also require a kind of permanent emotional homelessness? Or can a responsible engagement with Germany’s past coexist with a positive attachment to the country itself?
But acknowledging history does not settle another question: Must the rejection of aggressive nationalism also entail permanent suspicion toward positive national attachment? The distinction between nationalism and patriotism matters.
One may feel affection for a country without believing it superior to others. One may value a language, landscape, culture or historical inheritance without wishing to exclude those who come from elsewhere. And one may accept responsibility for one’s political community without believing that the interests of every other community are irrelevant. Germany has often struggled with precisely this distinction.
Former Green politician and Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck provided a striking example of how far this estrangement from national attachment can go. In his 2010 book Patriotismus: Ein linkes Plädoyer (Patriotism: A Left-Wing Plea), Robert Habeck provocatively wrote that “Patriotismus, Vaterlandsliebe”—patriotism, or love of the fatherland – had always made him “want to vomit.” He used the remark as the starting point for an argument in favour of a different, left-wing understanding of patriotism.
Habeck went on to argue that patriotism should not simply be “left to right-wing populists.” But this hardly resolves the problem; in a way, it reinforces it. The formulation itself insinuates that love of country belongs naturally, or at least primarily, to the political right—as though those who openly express affection for their homeland must first be placed under ideological suspicion.
That is an unnecessary and deeply polarising political reflex. Patriotism is neither right-wing nor left-wing. A Social Democrat can love his country, as can a conservative, a liberal, a Green or an AfD voter. To associate Vaterlandsliebe reflexively with “right-wing populists” does not reclaim patriotism; it helps stigmatise it. And it creates precisely the division it purports to overcome: respectable constitutional attachment on one side, suspect emotional attachment to one’s country on the other.
Why should affection for one’s country have to be rescued from anyone in the first place? Why should it require political classification, justification or translation into constitutional language before it becomes respectable? Love of country is not synonymous with nationalism, still less with contempt for other nations. It is one of the most ordinary forms of human belonging.
There is nothing wrong with constitutional patriotism. Democratic institutions, fundamental rights and the rule of law are achievements worth defending. But a nation is more than its constitution. People belong through language and memory, landscapes and music, folk dances, food and customs, regional traditions and family histories. A constitution establishes the legal order of a country; it does not exhaust the reasons why people experience that country as home.
Other countries show that national belonging need not be singular or uncomplicated. Canada, for example, encompasses different and sometimes overlapping forms of identity rooted in language, region, culture and, for Indigenous peoples, relationships to land and traditions that long predate the Canadian state. Its Truth and Reconciliation Commission also demonstrates that confronting historical injustice need not require abandoning attachment to one’s country; it can instead broaden the understanding of whose histories and memories form part of it.
The Burden—and Achievement—of Memory
If different forms of memory and belonging can coexist, why, then, should Germans have to choose between historical responsibility and belonging? Germany’s post-war culture of remembrance is not merely a burden. It is also an achievement.
The Federal Republic has paid compensation to victims of National Socialism. Memorials confront Germans with the crimes committed in their country’s name. Small brass Stolpersteine embedded in pavements return individual names to people who were persecuted and murdered. The majority commemorate Jewish victims of the Holocaust, although the project also honours members of other groups persecuted by the Nazi regime. Willy Brandt’s spontaneous kneeling at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial became one of the most powerful political gestures of the twentieth century. None of this needs to be weakened for Germans to develop a less anxious relationship with their country. Indeed, perhaps the opposite is true.
A mature national identity should be capable of holding contradictory parts of history together. Germany can remember Auschwitz and celebrate the peaceful revolution of 1989. It can honour the victims of German crimes while taking pride in the constitutional democracy constructed after those crimes. It can remember dictatorship without assuming that every expression of attachment to Germany leads back to dictatorship.
But this democratic inheritance should never be taken for granted. The lessons of dictatorship are not learned once and for all; they have to be defended anew, particularly when freedom of expression protects views that are unpopular, provocative or deeply at odds with the prevailing political consensus.
There are reasons to ask whether Germany is always succeeding in this respect. Section 86a itself provides a troubling example. The American author and satirist C. J. Hopkins, who lives in Berlin, was prosecuted after posting images in which a swastika could be seen through a medical face mask. He had used the image in the context of his criticism of the authoritarian tendencies he believed he saw in the political response to the Covid pandemic. A Berlin district court initially acquitted him, accepting the fundamentally critical context of his use of the symbol. In September 2024, however, the Berlin Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) overturned that acquittal and found him guilty of using the symbol of an unconstitutional organisation.
The case illustrates the danger inherent in separating a symbol from the message for which it is being used. Hopkins was not attempting to rehabilitate the swastika or to make Nazi symbolism socially acceptable. His stated purpose was the opposite: he invoked the imagery of National Socialism as a warning against what he regarded as the return of authoritarian methods.
Hopkins challenged the decision before Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, arguing, among other things, that his constitutionally protected freedoms of expression and artistic creation had been violated. In 2026, the court declined to hear his constitutional complaint, without providing reasons. For a court whose historical authority rests to a considerable extent on its role as guardian of the fundamental rights created in response to dictatorship, such cases raise uncomfortable questions.
This was precisely the kind of case in which a clear signal from Germany’s highest court would have mattered. The use of masks bearing swastikas was not an endorsement of National Socialism, but an unmistakably critical use of its most notorious symbol as part of a political and artistic statement. A substantive decision could have made clear that Germany’s historical responsibility does not require every depiction of the swastika to be treated as a threat to the constitutional order, and that its manifestly critical use may instead fall within the protection of freedom of expression and artistic freedom.
A constitutional court does not diminish the importance of Germany’s historical responsibility by protecting provocative speech; it demonstrates the strength of the constitutional order that emerged from that history.
Whether the Hopkins case represents an exceptional misjudgment or points to a more lasting narrowing of the space for dissent in Germany remains to be seen. But it serves as a reminder that the most important lesson of Germany’s twentieth century cannot merely be that certain symbols and words must disappear. It must also be that state power requires limits, that dissent requires protection, and that fundamental rights matter most when their exercise is inconvenient.
Historical responsibility need not mean reducing a country’s entire past to the history of its crimes, or allowing other sources of cultural and historical belonging to disappear from collective memory. Nor need patriotism depend on a belief in national innocence. A mature relationship with one’s country should be able to hold both: an honest recognition of historical guilt and responsibility, and an attachment to the language, culture, traditions and memories that make a country feel like home. Neither remembrance nor democracy, however, can survive if either is treated as a finished achievement rather than a responsibility renewed from generation to generation.
Learning to Belong Again
Germany has spent eight decades learning how not to forget. Perhaps the next challenge is learning that remembrance and belonging need not be opposites.
Perhaps that is the more important lesson. A country need not choose between confronting the darkest parts of its past and remaining a place its people can love. A mature form of belonging may begin precisely there: in the ability to acknowledge historical wrongs without reducing a country to those wrongs, and to value what has been inherited without pretending that the inheritance is innocent.
Love of one’s country need not require contempt for another. Historical consciousness need not require emotional distance from one’s own. And a democratic society may eventually become mature enough to ask not only where words once came from, but what, in a particular time and context, a person is actually using them to say.