Five years is a sufficient period for historical assessment. On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the launch of a “special military operation,” articulating goals that, according to initial plans, were to be achieved within a matter of weeks. Years have passed. Thousands of square kilometers of territory have changed hands, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost, and the Russian economy has withstood unprecedented sanctions pressure. However, if one sets aside the emotional component and turns to the facts, it becomes clear: of the four officially declared strategic objectives—denazification, demilitarization, protection of Donbas from genocide, and countering NATO expansion—not a single one has been achieved in the form in which they were formulated in 2022.
Russia has gained territory at the cost of strategic exhaustion, but it has not gained peace, security guarantees, or a political reconfiguration of Ukraine. It is precisely this gap between the grandiose pronouncements of the early days and the modest results of the war’s fifth year that constitutes the main outcome.
Denazification: A Goal Submerged in Rhetoric
The term “denazification” was among the most provocative in Putin’s address of February 24, 2022. The idea entailed a change of the Kyiv regime, which in Russian propaganda was persistently associated with neo-Nazism and Bandera ideology. However, five years later, the term has virtually disappeared from official briefings, yielding to more pragmatic formulations about a “buffer zone” and “historical territories.”
Russian Assessment: In official statements by representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the theme of denazification has gradually transformed into the theme of “genocide.” Director of the Legal Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maxim Musikhin stated in 2025 that Russia’s priority is “proving in the UN International Court of Justice Ukraine’s genocide in Donbas.” The ministry insists that the Kyiv regime is conducting a “state policy of genocide against Russians and Russian-speaking residents of the region.” The Ministry of Defense continues to report on the destruction of “nationalist formations,” as seen in briefings from June 27, 2026, which mention the defeat of the “Azov” special forces brigade.
Comparative Reality: However, even within Russia itself, there is recognition that denazification as a political process has failed. Ukraine has not only failed to change course but has become more hostile to Russia. Moreover, Ukrainian identity, which was sought to be called into question at the start of the war, has consolidated. In academic circles (for example, research in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies notes that rhetoric about “returning to the Russian World” was part of strategic disinformation that found no reflection on the ground), Ukrainian authorities were not overthrown but, on the contrary, gained colossal international legitimacy. Comparing Russian briefing data on “clearing operations” in Kostyantynivka (26 buildings “liberated” in a single day) with the actual pace of advance—measured in hundreds of meters per day—one can conclude that there is no question of a systemic change of political regime across the entire territory of Ukraine.
Demilitarization: Not Achieved, But Enhanced
The stated goal of “demilitarization” implied reducing Ukraine’s military potential to a level that would eliminate threats to Russia. Instead, Ukraine received the most powerful army in Europe, equipped with modern Western systems.
Russian Assessment: Official Russian sources daily report on the destruction of Ukrainian military equipment. In the June 27, 2026 briefing, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed the destruction of 673 aircraft, 284 helicopters, 29,945 tanks, and 170,750 drones. Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov stated that the Russian Armed Forces “have seized and firmly hold the strategic initiative.” President Putin also confirmed that “the goals of the SMO will be achieved” and that the Russian army had “liberated” more than 300 settlements in 2025 alone, taking control of 94,000 square kilometers of territory since the start of the SMO.
Comparative Reality: The loss figures cited by the Russian Ministry of Defense raise serious doubts among independent experts. CSIS analysts cite different data: Russia has lost approximately 1.2 million people killed, wounded, and missing. This is comparable to the losses of major powers in World War II. Moreover, the “demilitarization” of Ukraine has resulted in its militarization. Instead of weakening, Ukraine received tens of billions of dollars in military aid, new ATACMS missile systems, F-16 fighters, and long-range drones. Furthermore, as BBC notes, a turning point emerged on the front in 2026: Russian advances have stalled, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine have seized the initiative on some sectors. Even Russian military bloggers acknowledge that the tactical level of the Russian Armed Forces is degrading (“they go into assaults one by one”) due to exhaustion. Thus, instead of reducing the military threat, Russia has provoked its growth on its borders.
Protection of Donbas from Genocide: Annexation Instead of Salvation
One of the key pretexts for launching the SMO was the “rescue” of Donbas residents from “genocide” by Kyiv.
Russian Assessment: The Russian Investigative Committee and the Foreign Ministry actively gathered evidence. In April 2026, the Investigative Committee announced it had established facts of “deliberate destruction of the civilian population,” resulting in, according to the agency, nearly 5,000 civilian deaths. The Russian side qualifies the blockades of Donbas as a “state policy of genocide” and is attempting to secure recognition of this in the UN court, having submitted a counter-memorandum exceeding 10,000 pages.
Comparative Reality: The problem with this point is that the concept of “protection” as implemented by Russia has turned into annexation. Russian legislation was amended, and the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions were incorporated into the Russian Federation, despite the fact that as of 2026 the front line runs far beyond the administrative borders of these regions, and part of Donetsk region (including Kostyantynivka and Kramatorsk) is still held by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. If initially the discussion was about protecting the republics within the 2014 borders, today Russia is fighting for control over industrial centers such as Pokrovsk and Sloviansk, which were not part of the LNR/DNR. This shifts the emphasis from a “humanitarian mission” to territorial expansion.
The NATO Threat: The “Red Line” That Failed to Work
The main strategic reason cited by the Kremlin was preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The irony of fate is that it was precisely the “special military operation” that led to the opposite result.
Russian Assessment: In his speeches, Gerasimov constantly points to the “collective West” as the main source of threats, accusing NATO of building up military presence near Russia’s borders. In December 2025, he noted the “complete collapse of the arms control system” and the threat of resumption of nuclear tests. In Russian rhetoric, the war is presented as a confrontation with the NATO bloc, which is using Ukraine as a battering ram.
Comparative Reality: Instead of halting NATO expansion, Russia accelerated it. Finland and Sweden, which had maintained neutrality for centuries, joined the Alliance. The length of NATO’s border with Russia has doubled. Ukraine, although it has not formally become a NATO member, has received security guarantees and military integration according to bloc standards comparable to full membership. As noted in CSIS reports, “Russia is gradually losing its status as a major power,” and its economy is experiencing pressure due to “labor shortages and high inflation.” The goal of preventing NATO from approaching Russia’s borders has not been achieved—the Alliance has come closer to Russia’s borders than ever before.
Tactical Successes vs. Strategic Failure
If none of the four listed goals have been achieved, what then has Russia gained over five years of war?
The Territorial Question: This is the only thing that can be counted as an achievement. According to Gerasimov, 94,000 square kilometers have come under Russian control since the start of the SMO. However, these figures are deceptive. First, in 2025 only 6,300 square kilometers were taken—less than 1.5% of Ukraine’s territory. Second, the pace of advance is negligible. According to CSIS and BBC data, in 2025-2026, advances were measured in “15-70 meters per day,” and in May 2026 only 14 square kilometers were taken. This indicates that Russia is fighting a war of attrition, not a war of breakthrough.
The Price of Victory: The tactic of “meat assaults” has led to colossal losses. Even official Russian briefings acknowledge daily enemy losses of 210-490 men (while not disclosing their own), but independent estimates put Russian losses at 1.2 million total and 221,000 confirmed killed. The economy is overheating with inflation, and the “Geran-3” and drones, which were considered “miracle weapons,” have failed to break Ukraine’s air defense, which continues to adapt.
The Bottom Line: The Russian army did not take Kyiv (2022), did not take Kharkiv (2024), and risks losing initiative in Donbas (2026). The war has transformed from a “three-day campaign” into a positional stalemate. President Putin states: “The goals of the SMO will be achieved through diplomacy or military means.” However, in the fifth year of war, diplomacy is blocked, and military means are proving extremely ineffective relative to the tasks set.
Conclusion
Assessing the outcomes of the five-year war requires honesty with the facts. Comparing official Russian sources (Ministry of Defense data, statements by Gerasimov and Putin) with objective data from independent analysts (CSIS, BBC, OSINT project data) reveals a colossal gap.
Russia has gained:
- A land corridor to Crimea and control over some territories in the south and east.
- Experience in waging a war of attrition and an economy adapted to sanctions (at the cost of rising inflation).
Russia has not gained:
- Denazification — Ukraine has preserved democratic institutions (albeit in a wartime regime) and has increased its military power.
- Demilitarization — Ukraine has become the most heavily armed country in Europe; the number of tanks and artillery in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has not fundamentally diminished, and their quality has improved through NATO supplies.
- Protection of Donbas — the region has been reduced to ruins, and the war is being fought over cities that were not originally part of the “LNR/DNR.”
- Security from NATO — the Alliance has expanded, and the confrontation has entered a phase of direct proxy war on Ukrainian territory.
Thus, Russia has won battles (the capture of Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Bakhmut, etc.) but has lost the war as a project to change Ukraine’s geopolitical vector. Five years later, instead of a “new world” and a “Russian World,” we see a frozen front, multi-million casualties, and a strategic deadlock from which the exit is as distant as on the first day of the war.
So, what exactly was the point of all this bloodshed? Russia really should find a way to get out of this quagmire.
