1.1. French Society in the War
Before the First World War, France, like many other states that were members of the opposing blocs, lived in anticipation of it, but the outbreak of war was unexpected and untimely, although the country’s leadership allowed the possibility of war and made preparations for it.
The French, who experienced the shame of defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, in which they lost Alsace and Lorraine—”the two most French of the French provinces” (in the words of Georges Clemenceau), despite the forty-odd years that had passed since this war’s end, did not internally come to terms with the shame of military defeat and territorial losses, which was a serious psychological factor that predetermined the mood of the entire nation. The popular belief that the announcement of mobilization caused a wave of patriotic enthusiasm in France, that the soldiers with a light heart and “flower in the muzzle of the rifle” went to the front, is very distant from actual reality. The announcement of a general mobilization did not surprise the Parisians, who were well informed about events on the international scene. But in rural areas, the news of war took villagers, engaged in agragrian work, by surprise. A declaration of war is never a happy occasion, but the people of eastern and northern France took the news with particular alarm, as they feared an enemy invasion. According to eyewitness accounts, in all regions of France, the inhabitants were generally calm, courageous, and dignified. Historian Marc Bloch testified, “The men were not joyful, they were resolute, which is better.” In the big cities, the reaction was different. In Paris, for example, crowds marched down the boulevard shouting insults at Wilhelm II, while chanting, “We need Alsace.” In Rouen, Montpellier, and Lyons, crowds of young people filled the streets. In Toulouse, orchestras in many cafes played the “Marseillaise” a hundred times. Especially emotional were the inhabitants of the southern cities. In Bordeaux residents shouted: “Long live Russia!”, in the south-west of France, in the city of Pau, people did not sleep all night. In the central regions, the event was received with restraint. There were also isolated instances of protest behavior, when French citizens shouted anti-war slogans and sang the Internationale. Overall, however, there was unity among the people of France, who were suddenly attacked by their longtime adversary.
There were manifestations of Germanophobia, spy-phobia, fear of sabotage. Rumors circulated that Germans were distributing poisoned candy to French children. People from other countries who looked like representatives of the opposing countries were often attacked by the local population. Sometimes Alsatians and Lorraineans became unwitting victims of such violence because of their similarity to Germans and their peculiar accent similar to German. There were manifestations of chauvinism on the part of the crowd in the course of ransacking of stores, businesses, etc. Many demanded the renaming of streets and goods that bore Germanic names (e.g., cologne, Munich beer, Viennese buns, etc.).
At the same time, the population did not forget about everyday affairs: people withdrew significant amounts of money from their accounts, tried to exchange securities for cash, housewives bought foodstuffs in advance. All this caused shortages and price increases . It can be said that the war began in a relatively favorable environment. The treaties concluded with the Allies had a calming effect on the French; the General Staff was confident in the adequacy of the offensive military doctrine and the strength of the armed forces of France. Everyone hoped that the conflict would be short and victorious. By the beginning of the war, France was in a state of aggravated economic, social, political and class contradictions.
Mobilization hampered party activities, as many cadre party figures and activists went to the front. There was no unity in the left-wing parties about attitudes to the war. Some intellectuals did not succumb to the nationalism that surrounded them. The most prominent were pacifist supporters Romain Rolland and Henri Barbusse. The socialist party SFIO (French Section of the Workers’ International, Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière—SFIO) massively supported the war, and only a small part of it insisted that the government seek a peaceful settlement. The General Confederation of Labor also followed the path of support for the war and cooperation with the state. But there was still a small anti-war opposition within it. Trade unions lost more than 50 percent of their members to mobilization for the army, and some small unions and federations broke up. Thus, the rise of the labor movement was halted by the outbreak of war; the strike movement declined and almost ceased. Thanks to the conciliatory position of the socialists and the leaders of the trade union movement, especially after the assassination of the French anti-militarist and anti-war campaigner Jean Jaurès, the general mobilization was carried out without much difficulty. Only 1 to 3 percent of the conscripts failed to show up at the assembly stations. The pacifists, often called “defeatists” by political opponents, were a small group in 1914; but from 1916 this minority became larger and more influential.
The majority of those mobilized were peasants, as they had fewer grounds for deferment and exemption from military service than other categories of Frenchmen. The shortage of laborers led to solidarity among the peasants. But this, and even the two-week furloughs of soldiers to take part in sowing work, did not solve the problem. To replace those who went to the front, the labor of citizens who had been deferred from conscription and immigrants (about 150,000), as well as prisoners of war (about 40,000) was used. Prisoners of war often lacked appropriate qualifications and often escaped. But those of them who worked for a long time in the places where they were sent created a positive impression with their employers, which helped to reduce hostility in general. Peasants expressed dissatisfaction with the pricing of agricultural products and price increases—compared to 1914, they paid twice as much for workers’ wages, three times as much for large machinery, and five times as much for fertilizer. Nevertheless, thanks to higher prices for agricultural products and the black market, where some sold their products, producers were able to make a profit. Many were able to pay off debts in this way. Farmers and sharecropper tenants turned into owners. The war also contributed to the exodus from the village. Farmers, smallholders, agricultural workers, and women left the village in search of better wages in defense enterprises.
On August 5, 1914, France passed a law restricting freedom of the press. In such a situation, reliable news from the front became impossible. Soldiers warned their families not to trust official reports. Sometimes the Germans became the source of information about the actions at the front. Censorship made the slightest criticism of the General Staff’s actions impossible. Propaganda taken to the extreme turned newspapers into a source of nonsense and lies .
During all four years of the war, ten provinces (departments), with a population of 125,000 inhabitants, were subjected to the hardships of occupation. The occupation authorities, together with collaborators, pursued a harsh policy towards the population. A census was conducted, a strict curfew was imposed, residents had to carry identity cards at all times, movement from town to town was forbidden, crops, metals, bicycles, telephones, textiles, etc. were methodically requisitioned, and machine tools were exported to Germany. Compulsory labor conscription was imposed on persons aged 14 to 65 , for city cleaning, field work, trench digging, etc. Unruly citizens, who read newspapers outside the control of the German administration, were severely punished, up to and including the death penalty.
The inhabitants of the occupied areas were malnourished because the requisitions extended to foodstuffs. Food rations distributed by the United States and Spain, through humanitarian organizations with German permission, met only one-third of the caloric needs of working Frenchmen; that is, the bare minimum. French society experienced deepening inequality. As a result, people had a sense of injustice. The war increased the incomes of some and led to the destitution of other citizens. The nouveau riche often led a defiant lifestyle, which built up resentment and contempt among the poorest, the soldiers who risked their lives, and the families who lost breadwinners. Among the direct and indirect victims of the war, refugees found themselves in the most unfavorable conditions. During the war, 4-5 million people suffered the fate of becoming refugees in unfamiliar conditions, not adapted to new professions, often without information about their families, with abandoned property.
Part of the middle classes suffered materially from the war: employees, pensioners, rentiers. Their well-being depended on prices, as their money supply did not increase, or only marginally increased. Women who had never worked, who had lost their husbands, had to live on a modest pension from the state or acquire a profession.
The situation of workers was not equal. Those who worked in the factory earned more than home-based workers. This, beginning in 1916, led to discontent. In 1917 there was a wave of major strikes, leading in some cases to wage increases, but the increasing cost of living reduced the value of the benefits gained. Immigrant laborers, including those from the colonies, lived and worked under different conditions. Some free laborers were self-employed and lived wherever they wanted; others, collectively hired, often lived in barracks near military factories and were subject to almost military discipline. The food was satisfactory, but the pay was low, and they suffered from the unfamiliar climate and the bad attitude of the French, who saw them as competitors.
From 1917, France introduced a card system—first for sugar: 750g, then 500g. per month, per person. In the same year, cards for coal were introduced, and in 1918—for bread, which was of poor quality. Increasingly, stoves in houses had to be heated with wood and even surrogate fuel made from wet magazines mixed with ash and then compressed into briquettes and dried. Local authorities urged residents to limit the use of everything. Municipalities reduced street lighting. Gas was supplied for several hours a day. Vegetables were grown in public gardens. The state encouraged price controls in cooperatives and municipal stores. Charitable societies distributed free food and groceries to the least socially protected sections of the population. There were cases when dishonest merchants profited from the sale of low-quality goods.
During the war years, crime increased in France as a result of serious changes in society. The number of robberies increased, fraud in the charitable sphere became widespread, and begging spread. The unprecedented rise in juvenile delinquency was caused by social factors: the absence of fathers, the employment of mothers at work, the drafting of teachers into the army, school absenteeism. Prostitution also increased over the years. The authorities tried unsuccessfully to fight it. The army, for its part, organized brothels for soldiers near military units, but this did not solve the problem. The movement of French, colonial and allied troops led to the spread of venereal diseases.
Changes in the life of the country led to the accelerated emancipation of French women. They took on the responsibilities of husbands who had gone to the front. The shortage of labor, from 1914 onward, contributed to the entry of women into the labor market. They worked as clerks in administration, banks, insurance companies, transportation, agriculture, defense plants, and in the army as secretaries, typists, and orderlies. In 1918, 425,000 French women worked for the army. Working conditions for women were difficult, and their wages were half that of men. On April 22, 1916, the first law limiting abuses in the use of female labor came into being. Albert Thomas, Minister of Armaments, prohibited the use of women under 18 years of age to work at night in defense factories. However, this did not prevent women from actively participating in strikes in 1917. Women were being drawn into social life, becoming more liberated. Women’s fashion also changed towards more modesty and functionality.
Although the social situation had remained relatively calm since the beginning of the war and the number of strikes was insignificant, society was deeply fatigued by the protracted conflict. Ordinary people resented the enrichment of merchants, the high cost of living, and the decline in real purchasing power, which had fallen by 10.5 percent between 1914 and 1917. From January 1917, workers in Parisian garment factories stopped work, followed by workers in armament, construction, transportation, and gas plants. Outside the trade unions, the number of strikers in the Paris region totaled 100,000 and 300,000 in the provinces. Women were active in demanding higher wages and fighting for the “English work week.” Most strikes ended with the establishment of a minimum wage and compulsory arbitration procedures. The social movement of 1917 was largely corporate and political slogans were absent.
The evasion of the Americans from entering the war caused some French people to have a sharply negative attitude towards them. It came to the point that Americans who were in France sometimes appealed to the authorities to ensure their safe stay in the country. From February to October 1917, American aid was exceptionally vague and its forms poorly defined. To be clear, the U.S. was not preparing to intervene in a “European war.” Americans took up arms without enthusiasm. They were willing to make any sacrifice if it served their interests. American politicians saw Britain, not France, as their partner in thinking about post-war Europe .
After the end of the First World War, the social environment in France changed dramatically. As contemporaries argued, “the conflicts of emotion that had prevailed before 1914 gave way to conflicts of social order after the end of the war.” Under peaceful conditions, the spirit of military fraternity, which at first the veterans sought to uphold, was replaced during the financial and economic crises by an atmosphere of social conflict between an increasingly active working class and capitalists, who were in no mood to make concessions to the social demands put forward by the workers.
There were strikes, factory takeovers, affecting the whole country and quickly reaching a maximum scale, giving the working class in the social field tangible results; then, after a short period of détente, activity resumed, but with less intensity. Divisions arose; the masses, carried away by extremist elements, wanted to build on their success, while the leaders of the trade union organizations declared the need for a return to a normal state and appealed unsuccessfully for moderation.
At the same time, the French, in moral terms, received compensation for which they had paid dearly. In the international arena, the country acted as the main “creator of victory.” Indirect recognition of France’s merits in the war was not the fact that the peace conference was held in Paris and the treaties that forced the losing side to sign were named after those “chateaux” in the suburbs of the capital where they were signed: Saint-Germain, Sèvres, Trianon and, especially, Versailles, where on June 28, 1919, Germany recognized its defeat. In addition, in the period between the two wars, French diplomacy played an important international role for the reasons mentioned above.
Gradually, beginning with the ceremonial burial of the remains of the unknown soldier at the foot of the Arc de Triomphe in January 1921, a tradition of memorializing the victims of the Great War took shape in France. Monuments to the dead were created in every French village. On them in gold letters were written the names of the inhabitants who had given their lives for France. Some even bore pacifist slogans such as “Let war be damned.”
Overall, the effects of the war on French society were as follows:
The war overturned all the traditional attitudes of French society—it was divided into new groups that opposed each other—those who benefited from the war and those who suffered from it. Starting in 1918, under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia, a wave of strikes began in the country.
The rural-urban divide widened. Due to inflation, wages of hired laborers fell, profits of rentiers and all citizens who had fixed incomes decreased. Some of them were completely ruined due to the non-repayment of the Russian loan.
Demobilization in France lasted until the spring of 1921 before it was successfully completed. Soldiers returning from the war were not well integrated into civilian life. Many needed psychological and other rehabilitation.
Some of the front-line soldiers could not adapt to peaceful life, as they felt acute nostalgia for the heroic period of the war, military camaraderie and solidarity among fighters.
The return of soldiers to the family home did not always correspond to the way trench soldiers envisioned it, as for some the absence from the family lasted seven years (three years of conscription and four years at the front).
France proved that it was a nation in the full sense of the word. Its citizens showed tremendous effort because, despite the contradictions that existed, they represented a unified society.
The psychological effects of the war are difficult to assess, but they are undeniable. After the hardships of the Great War, France showed fatigue and a lack of readiness for a new military confrontation.
A serious problem was the presence of tens of thousands of disabled people (gas attack victims, amputatees, jaw and face wounds, etc.). In total, about 1.1 million people, for whom rehabilitation and inclusion in post-war life was very difficult. To them were added about 3 million people with less severe wounds. Since war-crippled people experienced inexpressible suffering because of their plight, associations, organizations and even a ministry for war veterans were established to meet this social need.
France experienced the greatest demographic collapse. It suffered the heaviest percentage loss of all participants, with 1,375,800 troops (10.5 percent of the active population), affecting all aspects of national and social life. The demographic problem became a concern and, albeit belatedly, gave rise to legislation to protect the family and promote fertility.
The position of women in society changed. It was not uncommon for a husband returning from the front to encounter a situation where his wife had become an active woman, who had managed to replace him during the war in the factory and in the field, thus raising her social status. The number of divorces increased.
The war provoked a revolution of manners. After the war, people made up for lost time—balls, nightclubs, dancing the tango and the Charleston, jazz, movies. There was a desire to celebrate being alive, to spend rapidly depreciating money, etc. All of this came to be known as the “crazy years.”
Fashion also changed—men, who before 1914 wore a black tailcoat and top hat, after 1918 switched to a gray bowler and black jacket; women were freed from the corset, changed the dress to a skirt, began to wear a short hairstyle. “Ladies'” hairdressers came into existence.
Intellectuals realized that the world had entered a new era in which Europe and France would play a smaller role.
The colonial system underwent changes towards greater autonomy and, in the long term, independence for a number of countries. The beginning of the process of formation of national consciousness of oppressed peoples was laid.
1.2. The Evolution of Views on the War in France
In the preface to the book by André Tardieu, a famous French politician and author of works on the history of diplomacy, Georges Clemenceau wrote: “There is no more pronounced international crime than the German attack on France on August 2, 1914. And it has never been more willful. Within 34 hours, without a declaration of war, German troops violated the French border and seized French-owned land. This invasion had been nurtured for half a century.”
France anticipated the war and prepared for it. But, as experience shows, despite the famous statements of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and other famed thinkers about the changeability of war, warring parties usually prepare for the “past” war. The French understanding of the coming war did not coincide with the reality that the French army and, in general, the entire French society had to face. In 1914, they saw the war as fleeting and victorious. But this illusion was quickly dispelled during the first battles. Anticipating the nature of the future war, the French, in opposition to the von Schlieffen plan, which they perceived as unrealistic, put forward Plan XVII, adopted by the French command on April 15, 1914.
The appearance of this plan was preceded by a long work of the French General Staff, which since 1872 had begun to develop the actions of French troops in case of conflict with Germany. From that time until April 1914, seventeen versions of the plan were developed. The last of them, with the beginning of hostilities in 1914, became a guide to action for the French command. The plan had an offensive character, which was unexpected for the Germans, who had not anticipated such strategic audacity on the part of the French. This was quite a justified reaction of the German command, as they were familiar with Plan XIV, approved in 1898, and provided for the exclusively defensive actions of the French. The goal of Plan XVII was the return of Alsace and Lorraine, ceded to Germany as a result of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, enshrined in the Frankfurt Peace Treaty, and this implied a decisive offensive and mastery of these territories.
France’s task was quite difficult, because of its demographic peculiarities (low population growth rate and inferior size to Germany); it was unable to create a large army necessary for offensive warfare. To address this problem, the French government, in 1905, passed a law on universal military duty, which established a two-year military service period. This was a palliative solution, however, as the French General Staff calculated that even the number of armed forces thus increased remained insufficient to successfully fight against the German army in the event of war.
In 1911, Chief of the General Staff, Michel-Joseph Monury (December 17, 1847—March 28, 1923) began to develop a new plan, based on the use of reservists in the event of war. He believed that by using reserves, to deploy a significant number of troops along the border with Belgium and Germany, which would allow, if necessary, to put French troops into the territory of Belgium in wartime. The French officer corps, which had a strong negative attitude toward the institution of reservists, who had performed poorly in the Franco-Prussian War, rejected this proposal. Right-wing parties, which had a negative attitude to the principle of an “armed nation,” also opposed the plan and contributed to the general’s resignation when a right-wing government came to power. In addition to these reasons, it was believed that mixing reservists with active duty soldiers would create a “decadent army” that lacked the will to win. The left-wing parties had a different point of view on this principle, because they had unpleasant memories of the role of General Boulanger in the political life of France; in addition, they associated the image of the army with coups d’état. They therefore favored the use of reservists and resisted increasing active service to three years. Despite heated debates on this issue, the law on three-year active service was adopted in 1913, not without the active influence of army circles.
In October of the same year, the government adopted a new Field Manual, which was the basis for training and leading troops. The main idea of this document was the apologia of the offensive. The Manual began with the words that the French army, returning to its tradition, recognized no other law than the offensive.
Joseph Joffre, the new Chief of the General Staff, who in 1912 replaced Michel-Joseph Monury, was an exponent of the ideas of the new school of warfare, which emphasized offensive operations abroad, so he did not take into account the developments of his predecessor, but focused on the idea of offensive as the main type of combat operations.
The conceptual basis of Plan XVII was the strategic plan previously drawn up by Ferdinand Foch, the main idea of which he formulated as follows: “We must get to Berlin by passing through Mainz.” In contrast to the Schlieffen Plan, Plan XVII was a kind of general idea, which did not contain a clearly expressed directive and a precise schedule of operations. It was not an operational plan, but was a plan for the deployment of troops with an indication of possible directions of attack for each army, depending on the situation, but without a specific goal. Nevertheless, it envisioned two offensives, one in Lorraine and the other in the Ardennes . The French command expected to win by applying the doctrine of “offensive until victory,” one of the main theorists of which was Colonel Grandmaison. Infantry, according to the French, considered as the main branch of the army, was supposed to attack, not counting losses. Having come into contact with the enemy, it went to hand-to-hand combat, using bayonets. Machine guns and heavy artillery, capable of slowing down the offensive, were given a secondary role. Only the proven light 75mm cannon was trusted to support the infantry in its advance. Although Plan XVII was imbued with an offensive spirit, it was essentially a plan to respond to the anticipated German offensive, the direction of which the French could not foresee in advance. The plan was finalized in April 1913, and together with the Field Manual, it was adopted by the Supreme Military Council. The plan was prepared for distribution to each commander of the five armies as it applied to them.
The plan was strictly classified. All generals were familiarized only with a short general directive. The plan was subject to unconditional execution and was not subject to discussion. The directive informed the executors that the actions of French troops would consist of two major offensives—on the left and right of the German stronghold Metz-Tionville. This plan envisioned the deployment of five French armies to cover one-third of the Franco-Belgian border. One of the controversial issues that caused censure on the part of opponents of Plan XVII, was the question of involvement in active operations of reservists. In Germany, in 1913, reservists began to be recruited as soldiers for use in the active army. Information about this became known to the French command, but the supporters of the offensive concept did not find it necessary to abandon their plans and move to the defensive option. They persistently convinced themselves and others that they were right.
At the beginning of the war, the French army relied on an offensive strategy, although the condition of the troops was ill-suited to this type of fighting. Well armed with individual and collective weapons, it nevertheless lacked light machine guns; the famous 75-mm gun, easy to handle and designed for maneuvering on the battlefield, had a limited field of fire; and it lacked heavy artillery, allowing for medium and long-range fire, which was quite sufficient in the Germans (600 guns). In the field of creation and production of the hand-held machine gun, the French lagged behind the major belligerent countries. To compensate for the shortage of heavy artillery, the French got inventive, by mounting ship guns onto railroad platforms. In 1918, heavy artillery on railroad platforms (ALVF) played a major role. The calibers of the guns reached unprecedented sizes , e.g. 520mm.
The war industry had made tremendous strides in the development of new means of warfare and military technology: motorized units, new means of communication, aviation, shells, tanks, and machine guns appeared. This was the first industrial warfare, which greatly influenced the development of new ways of warfare. The transition from mobile warfare to positional warfare sealted the fate of the cavalry. The French also had to part with their red pants, as they served as an excellent target for the enemy. Although some high-ranking officials were opposed to the replacement with another (less French) color, the heavy casualties among the military pushed the government to a reasonable solution. The new bluish-colored uniforms (“bleu horizon“) for the French army, adopted in 1915, marked a slight turnaround in views on military uniforms, in line with changes in the conduct of warfare.
The transition to positional warfare also changed the nature of warfare and the way terrain was used to create defensive structures. It was during this period that the term “trench warfare” was coined. This war pushed inventors, scientists and industrialists to develop specific weapons adapted for close combat, when enemy trenches were sometimes several meters away from their positions . Trenches were dug to a depth of up to 2 meters, protected by a barrier of earth or sandbags, with barbed wire in front. Sometimes the walls of the trenches were reinforced with boards or other improvised materials.
Maneuver warfare in the initial period of fighting caused the French army losses equal to 300,000 men. After the front stabilized, between the winter of 1914 and the spring of 1917, each advance of one meter cost approximately one life. This period is also called the “war of attrition” because the conditions the belligerents faced were horrific—filth, rats, lice, starvation, physical deprivation, prolonged artillery fire, the sight of the dead and the cadaverous odor. The natural results of the war of attrition in the later stages were fraternization at the front, and mutinies in the French army. For the first time, French soldiers refused to obey orders on April 17, 1917, which set off riots that increased in frequency in May and June.
During the war, the French felt the unjustified cruelty of the Germans. They spoke and wrote about this already in wartime. They cited documented facts to support their perceptions. For example, the prefect of the Oise department, Mr. Raux, cited the following statistics in his report :
- number of villages with completely destroyed houses—14;
- the number of homes completely destroyed is 2,880;
- partially destroyed—3,360;
- number of destroyed or severely damaged factories—22;
- the number of destroyed or severely damaged schools belonging to the mayor’s office (mairie-école)—66;
- number of destroyed or badly damaged churches—11 (2 are historical monuments);
- number of felled fruit trees—1/5 approximately;
- thefts—very numerous, everything was looted;
- deportation of residents—all residents of both sexes between the ages of 15 and 60 were taken into captivity;
- all the captured communes have been liberated.
The French considered such actions to be premeditated. They argued that the German army used (in accordance with the doctrinal guidelines of the German General Staff) particularly brutal methods, not only on the battlefield, but also towards the civilian population, in order to win more quickly. But the brutal conduct of the war pursued, in their opinion, another goal—to eliminate on the battlefield tomorrow’s competitor, in order to provide German industrialists, and in general the entire German economy, more favorable conditions for development in peacetime. Much of the destruction was carried out systematically, outside the conduct of hostilities, in order to prepare for the long-term devastation of the occupied territories and the future benefit of German production.
The French, sensitive to the demographic factor, especially in war, counted on the help of the Russians. They pinned far-reaching hopes on their ally, bound to them not only by a military-political treaty, but also by financial loans that had to be repaid. Their reasoning went something like this: “If France is not defeated at once, Germany, however fine its army may be, will eventually find itself sunk by the Russian masses, which will ultimately make Emperor Nicholas the supreme decider of the destinies of Europe.”
The Russian Expeditionary Corps, which was in France at the request of the French government, arrived in the country in 1916, consisting of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, which remained in France, and the 2nd and 4th Brigades, which were sent to the front in Macedonia. Although the situation of the Russian soldiers was extremely difficult, they fought very steadfastly on the most difficult parts of the front near Reims. After the storming of Bremont, where more than 70 percent of the brigades’ personnel were killed, the remaining Russian soldiers were transferred, on June 18, 1917, to La Courtine camp, where an uprising broke out on September 3, which lasted until September 19 and was drowned in blood.
Assistance from Russia was vital for France. It was not without reason that France constantly demanded help from its ally with human resources. Already at the beginning of the war, the French government put pressure on the Tsarist government to immediately launch diversionary military actions in order to weaken the German offensive on Paris, which could lead to the defeat of the French and their withdrawal from the war. Although the mobilization of the Russian army was not yet complete, on August 17, 1914, Russia launched a major offensive in East Prussia, which forced the German command to transfer two corps and one cavalry division from the Western Front to the east, and to prepare to transfer another corps. This significantly weakened the German troops’ blow to the French army, preventing, at the cost of thousands of Russian soldiers’ lives, the defeat of France and its withdrawal from the war.
On the eve of the war, the government of Raymond Poincaré (January 1912—January 1913), which paid great attention to military problems, adopted a naval program of February 13, 1912, according to which the French Navy, by January 1, 1920, was to have 28 battleships, 10 squadron scout ships and 52 destroyers . But these plans were not destined to be realized. Fortunately for France, the outcome of World War I was decided on land, not at sea. Having moved from the second place in the world in the 19th century to the fourth, in the last five years before the war, France tried to make up for lost time, but it failed. The German navy firmly held the second place in the world table of ranks, second only to Great Britain. Therefore, France was assigned a rather modest role in the naval theater of operations during the First World War. In this regard, all shipbuilding programs were frozen for the period of the war. The country continued to build only submarines and small escort ships. By the end of the war, the French Navy, with minimal superiority over the Italian Navy, was inferior in power not only to Great Britain and the United States, but also to Japan.
The country’s leadership paid serious attention to the development of aviation. On March 29, 1912, the law on reorganization of the air fleet was adopted, which played a positive role for its improvement. French aviation proved itself in the course of military operations. It performed the functions peculiar to the aviation of that period—reconnaissance, bombing and extermination of enemy aircraft. French pilots showed ingenuity in improving the design of aircraft. They also made a tangible contribution to the development of aviation tactics, practicing new methods of air combat in front-line conditions. At the same time, strategic bombing of Germany was impossible due to the lack of France’s multi-engine aircraft. The urgent need to produce fighter planes and lagging behind world standards in engine building and other reasons hampered the creation of strategic bombers in France, capable of striking objectives in Germany. However, by 1918, the French managed to create several types of heavy bombers (including the Farman F. 60 Goliath, which was characterized by its good capabilities); but they did not have time to use them.
The country, which had the second largest fleet of airships in the world, actively used them for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as for bombing enemy targets. But the insufficiently high technical and flying qualities of these devices led to the fact that since 1917 their use was limited to patrol service in the Navy.
France had a pro-Russian policy for centuries. It had always sought to maintain close relations with the Russian autocracy. However, the 1917 revolution in Russia destroyed this agreement between the powers. This event was negatively perceived by the French ruling elite and bourgeoisie. The subsequent collapse of the Russian army left a depressing impression on the French. The French bourgeoisie was in a state of complete confusion. Journalists (Reinach, Pertinax, Varenne, etc.), deputies (Labroux), politicians (Clemenceau) gave sharp assessments of what had happened. Only a few (for example, French right-wing publicists Jacques Benville, Charles Benoit and some others) managed to keep their assessments sober. In Action francaise, the famous historian Benville gave his point of view on the causes of the revolution, arguing that for Russia, the war had lasted too long and had turned gloomy and aimless, overflowing with hatred for Germany, that it had run out of steam, and that Slavic brotherhood was no longer felt.
After the First World War, it was a time for rethinking the experience gained during the four-year war that changed the world and views on war. One of those who contributed to the development of French military thought was Charles de Gaulle, a participant in the Great War, who endured the hardships of German captivity, and who was a participant in the battles in Volhynia and near Warsaw in 1919, a professor at Saint-Cyr, and the author of the draft curriculum of the Higher Military School. He was aware of the lack of a coherent plan for national defense. He predicted the defeat of France in a future war. Most valuable were his thoughts on the use of motorized formations in modern combat. De Gaulle believed that success in the future war would not be predetermined by the professionalism of the army, which he wrote in his book, The Edge of the Sword (1932). Studying the question of the effectiveness of defensive fortifications in northeastern France, he was the first to question the ideas of the French command about the impregnability of the Maginot Line. He sharply criticized the doctrine of passive defense. In the book, France and her Army, de Gaulle argued that France was not ready for the impending war, as it did not have the necessary technical potential. He called for the creation of tank forces and aviation. He was considered a proponent and theorist of lightning warfare, which was rejected by routine French military thought and successfully applied by the German command at the beginning of World War II.
The experience of the First World War did not yield positive results in terms of the development of French official strategy and military art. The government did not pay sufficient attention to solving military issues, which led to the dominance of concepts that prevailed until the end of the First World War. The strategy was based on the idea of positional warfare, which determined the organization of troops, their training, armament and the entire military doctrine as a whole .
The French Navy during the war was involved in secondary tasks. In the pre-war period, the incompetence of the politicians responsible for the state of the Navy had a detrimental effect on the state of the French Navy. The difficult economic situation of the country during and after the war had a negative impact on the development of the navy, causing a major blow to the prestige of the once second maritime power of the world.
France joined the ranks of the victorious countries, gaining the satisfaction of national pride from the victory over its “enemy,” but lost a loyal ally in the person of Russia, which subsequently affected its fate a few decades later and continues to be felt to this day.
During the First World War, new technologies and solutions were applied for the first time, which later gave an impetus to the development of military affairs. This was a reflection of industrialization, technologization of armament production processes and military activity in general. The French managed to contribute to the development of aviation, creation of the first prototypes of anti-aircraft installations, and the creation of successful models of light small arms. Significant successes were achieved in the field of military medicine, prosthetics, maxillofacial surgery, etc.
The First World War showed the French (as well as the whole world) that the civilization of the enemy does not protect from treachery, cruelty, the use of inhuman means of armed struggle.
As France suffered heavy demographic losses, it experienced a shock from which it had difficulty recovering in the decares that followed, which probably influenced its behavior in the Second World War.
France before the Great War, during that war and after the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty did not stop believing in its messianic destiny. However, the country’s ruling elite were far from always matching the claims that France itself put forward and cultivated, as the French intellectual Ernest Wickersheimer stated: “The gaze of all peoples who aspire to freedom, or who have found it, is turned towards France, which carries high the dazzling light of civilization.” Perhaps this is partly why France underestimates the historically undeniable help that Russia gave it during the most trying years of the trials of the First World War.
The Treaty of Versailles, concluded on June 28, 1919, drew a concluding line across the First World War. Its terms were obviously too harsh for the defeated side. Based on the damage Germany had inflicted on French society, Clemenceau insisted that the German side make the maximum possible reparation for the damage caused to France by the war effort. Restrictions were placed on Germany’s armed forces. The terms of the treaty were seen by Germany as overly onerous. When Hitler came to power, reparations were stopped. There are opinions that the treaty contributed to the aggravation of contradictions between the signatories and led to a new crisis, which resulted in a new world conflict.
France, as one of the countries most affected by the war, sought to ensure peaceful conditions of development in Europe and in the world as a whole. Therefore, it initiated the treaty on the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, which was signed on August 27, 1928 and was named after the initiators—French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, that is, the Kellogg–Briand Pact.
For conplete references, please consult the original:
Featured: Retour d’un vol de nuit sur avions “Voisin” de bombardement (Return from a night flight on “Voisin” bombing planes), François Flameng; painted in 1918.
