Iran has a serious foreign agent problem. It is because of these agents that Israel’s recent Operation Rising Lion had such success in targeted assassinations of Iranian military leaders, nuclear scientists, and hitting critical infrastructure. Israel was able to leverage both human intelligence and artificial intelligence to plan and execute strikes.
Needless to say, foreign agents operating inside Iran—and against Iran—are a significant and ongoing security threat for the Iranian government.
Israel is widely reported to have an extensive network of intelligence operatives and local collaborators inside Iran, estimated at 30 to 40 cells, most of which consist of Iranian collaborators rather than Israeli nationals.
These cells engage in activities, such as intelligence collection, sabotage, smuggling of weapons (including drones and precision-guided missiles), and even launching attacks from within Iranian territory.
Such infiltration has been an ongoing problem for Iran. Notably, in January 2018, fewer than two dozen Mossad agents entered a secret warehouse in Tehran, seizing tens of thousands of documents and electronic files related to Iran’s nuclear program. This operation involved real-time transmission of images to Mossad headquarters and the smuggling of materials out of Iran, likely via Azerbaijan. Iranian intelligence has struggled to fully counter these operations, partly due to infiltration by double agents within its own ranks.
More recently, on June 13, 2025, Israeli intelligence reportedly deployed hundreds of Mossad agents inside Iran and utilized Iranian operatives working for Mossad to facilitate attacks on Iranian military and nuclear sites. These efforts included positioning guided weapons near Iranian missile launchers and establishing a drone base inside Iran to destroy ballistic missile targets, significantly crippling Iran’s counterstrike capabilities
Two countries—Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates—provide the ideal staging points for Mossad operations targeting Iran. Both countries provide Israel with strategic advantages due to their proximity or influence in the region.
Azerbaijan shares a direct border with Iran, making it a key location for intelligence gathering and covert operations. Mossad has reportedly established a significant presence in Azerbaijan, using the country for recruiting informants, gathering intelligence, and facilitating the movement of operatives and materials into Iran.
Israel has gained access to airbases in Azerbaijan, which are used for both surveillance and potential military operations against Iran.
The border between Azerbaijan and Iran is porous, allowing for relatively free movement of people and information, which Mossad exploits for intelligence collection and covert infiltration.
Azerbaijan and Israel also share a notably close and strategic partnership that has deepened significantly since the early 1990s, when Azerbaijan became independent from the Soviet Union and established diplomatic relations with Israel. Their relationship is built on shared interests in energy, defense, intelligence, and regional security.
Thus, Azerbaijan supplies a significant share of Israel’s oil needs—reports indicate between 50% and over 60% of Israel’s oil imports come from Azerbaijan. Since Israel is a major buyer of Azerbaijani oil, the two countries have also signed agreements for natural gas exploration and other energy projects. The partnership is often described as an “energy-for-arms” relationship, with Azerbaijan providing oil and Israel supplying advanced military technology.
Israel is a primary arms supplier to Azerbaijan, with nearly 70% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports coming from Israel between 2016 and 2021. Azerbaijan has relied on Israeli defense systems in its conflicts, notably during the 2020 and 2023 wars with Armenia. The two countries also cooperate extensively in intelligence sharing and have a strong security partnership that is central to both nations’ regional strategies.
Azerbaijan is one of the few Muslim-majority countries to maintain close ties with Israel, and it has been described as Israel’s “second closest friend” after the United States. For example, during the ongoing Gaza genocide, Azerbaijan is the only Muslim-majority country supporting Israel, despite pressure from other Muslim nations. To that end, Azerbaijan will soon join the Abraham Accords, which would further formalize its normalization of ties with Israel.
Of course, this partnership is also part of Israel’s strategy to “move closer to Iran” by strengthening ties with neighboring states, which means that Azerbaijan serves as a base for Israeli intelligence and operations.
The UAE is also cited as a partner in providing logistical support for Mossad activities in Iran. This includes offering safe havens, facilitating the movement of operatives, and possibly providing technological and financial resources for covert operations.
The UAE’s diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, which have strengthened in recent years, create additional opportunities for intelligence cooperation and joint operations against shared adversaries such as Iran.
These partnerships have enabled Mossad to conduct a wide range of operations inside Iran, including assassinations, sabotage of nuclear facilities, and the extraction of critical intelligence, often with minimal risk to Israeli operatives, by leveraging local networks and remote technologies. The use of Azerbaijan and the UAE as staging grounds has significantly enhanced Israel’s ability to infiltrate and disrupt Iranian security and nuclear programs.
Catherine Perez-Shakdam, a French journalist and political analyst, who has been widely reported in recent media as a Mossad spy who infiltrated Iran’s inner circles under the guise of a Shia convert. According to these reports, she allegedly used her access to top Iranian officials—including Ayatollah Khamenei and the late President Ebrahim Raisi—to gather intelligence for Israel, which was then used in successful Israeli operations against Iranian targets.
However, Perez-Shakdam herself has publicly denied these allegations, stating that she is not a Mossad spy and that the accusations are absurd. She has described herself as a Zionist and a Jew (no doubt, to clarify where her loyalty lies). Despite her denials, Iranian authorities have erased her presence from state media and launched a crackdown on suspected Israeli spies, citing her as a key example.
Iran is also holding a British couple, Craig and Lindsay Foreman, for alleged spying, as well as several other Europeans, whose identities and nationalities are not fully disclosed by Iranian authorities.
However, Iran believes Mossad agents disguised as locals carried out attacks because multiple lines of evidence and official statements point to foreign operatives embedding themselves within Iranian communities, using forged identities and local cover to conduct covert operations. For example, Iranian officials have reported that individuals posing as truck drivers and using fake identities infiltrated the trucking industry for years, gaining access to sensitive areas and transporting weapons or drones for attacks.
Iranian authorities have also uncovered workshops and facilities allegedly used by Mossad agents to assemble and launch drones inside Iran, and have seized vehicles loaded with explosives, small drones, and advanced communications gear during arrests of suspected operatives. According to Iranian state media, these agents used local knowledge and social camouflage to avoid detection, sometimes even training for years before executing their missions.
Furthermore, Iranian officials claim that Mossad operatives employed by Israel—sometimes with the help of local collaborators—smuggled weapons and drones into the country, positioning them near key military sites for coordinated strikes. The discovery of these operations, combined with arrests and publicized raids, has led Iran to conclude that Mossad agents are not only operating within its borders but are doing so under the guise of ordinary citizens.
So, why is Iran so vulnerable?
Iran explains the success of Mossad infiltration within its borders by highlighting several internal vulnerabilities and strategic oversights, as well as external factors exploited by Israeli intelligence.
Mossad is said to recruit from Iran’s ethnic minority groups—such as Kurds and Azeris—who may face socioeconomic challenges and marginalization. These individuals bring local knowledge and access, making them valuable assets for intelligence gathering and operational support. Iranian officials claim that Israeli intelligence leverages these divisions and the grievances of marginalized communities to build networks of local collaborators.
Iran acknowledges that Mossad uses sophisticated technology, encrypted communications, and cryptocurrency for secure transactions and information relay, complicating detection efforts by Iranian security forces. Mossad’s investment in surveillance, AI, and robotics allows for operations that minimize direct physical presence and reduce the risk of detection.
Despite Iran’s extensive security apparatus, it suffers from bureaucratic fragmentation, corruption, and inefficiencies that allow Mossad to exploit blind spots. These vulnerabilities lead to compromised officials, while fragmented intelligence agencies sometimes fail to coordinate, creating opportunities for infiltration.
Iran points to the use of regional allies, such as Kurdish militias in Iraq and Baluchi groups near the Pakistan-Iran border, for smuggling routes and logistical support. Countries like Azerbaijan and the UAE are also accused of providing staging grounds or access for Mossad teams.
Mossad is said to cultivate relationships with Iranian dissidents and opposition groups, both inside and outside the country, to facilitate intelligence gathering and recruitment.
All this means that Iran will have to increase its vigilance.
Iran’s counter-espionage measures are executed through a sophisticated and multi-layered intelligence apparatus, primarily led by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), each with distinct but overlapping roles.
Thus, the MOIS is concerned with counter-espionage, including monitoring and neutralizing foreign intelligence activities within Iran. Its activities include identification and disruption of hostile organizations (such as the CIA and Mossad), surveillance of domestic opposition, and suppression of internal dissent.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) primarily prevents armed attacks, monitoring disruptive elements, and conducting preemptive actions against threats. It focuses on dealing with direct confrontation with armed groups, force projection, and intelligence gathering, often in collaboration with MOIS. The IRGC’s Cyber Electronic Command specializes in cyber-attacks, phishing, and intelligence gathering, especially against foreign targets.
Iran’s counter-espionage measures are characterized by a blend of traditional intelligence work, cyber operations, and covert actions, executed through a complex interplay between MOIS and the IRGC. This approach allows Iran to address both domestic and international threats while maintaining plausible deniability and expanding its regional influence.
Mossad agents are actively operating inside Iran, conducting espionage, sabotage, and facilitating Israeli military strikes. Iran continues to respond with mass arrests, executions, and intensified counterintelligence efforts, reflecting the deep and ongoing covert war between the two nations.
The initial success of Israel’s Operation Rising Lion also means that Iran needs to carefully scrutinize and correct how and why things went so terribly wrong.
