Lebanon is often described as “the most successful failed state of the 21st century.” This ironic phrase perfectly sums up the reality of a country that has a wealth of life forces and remarkable economic and cultural potential, but which has suffered extreme and inextricable violence for two centuries. Since the 19th century, Lebanon has been constantly buffeted by external interventions from the Ottomans, the Iranians, the Syrians, the Israelis, the British, the Americans, not to mention the French, who continue to play a prominent role there.
Although this gateway to the Middle East has managed to survive and heal its internal divisions, in recent years it has been hit by a succession of unprecedented crises that have caused the departure of many Lebanese and the massive arrival of Syrian migrants—representing half of the indigenous population—driven by the war in their own country. To top it all off, the destructive confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah devastated entire parts of Lebanon.
Like a thriller writer whose hero is a state condemned to constant struggle, Fouad Khoury-Helou brilliantly tells this fascinating story. He also develops the various scenarios on the horizon and tries to provide solutions that would enable the country of the cedars to get out of its predicament.
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The Need for International Commitment to Stabilize Lebanon Today
For its part, Lebanon seems to be experiencing a major political shift. After decades of war and political stagnation, punctuated by an economic collapse in 2019 that brought the country to its knees economically and socially, Iran’s retreat accompanied by the weakening of Hezbollah, which had held the upper hand in Lebanon since 2008 (without ever having been in a position of total monopoly), seems to be ushering in a new phase, where a new pact could be forged between the Lebanese, setting in motion the indispensable financial, economic, social, judicial, administrative and political reforms needed to turn the page on half a century of crises. Political reforms that should be fair to all communities (Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, Druze), and reassure them (notably through administrative decentralization), while paving the way for the future establishment of a deconfessionalized citizens’ state.
For this “optimistic” scenario to become a reality, however, a number of conditions need to be met. We can highlight three in particular. Firstly, the internal situation must be clarified, particularly with regard to Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah was forced to back down in the face of Israeli firepower, it nonetheless retains a strong foothold internally and within the Shi’ite community. In addition, the question of Hezbollah’s weapons— the only Lebanese group to possess both heavy weapons and a military organization—has yet to be settled definitively, as these weapons are to be handed over to the Lebanese state in accordance with UN Resolution 1701. This issue can be resolved in several ways: either by force, which nobody in Lebanon seems really in a position to do—and which would, in any case, involve further fighting and cause a new rift in the country. Or through internal political pressure, i.e. to isolate Hezbollah, pit other Lebanese formations against it (notably within the Shiite community) and try to weaken it among its political and electoral base—the next parliamentary elections will take place in 2026. But this would mean several months, if not years, of infighting and maneuvering that would poison the climate in the country and between Lebanese communities, with no guarantee of results. Or, finally, through a global agreement under which Hezbollah would give up its weapons in exchange for a modus vivendi and a new political agreement establishing a better understanding between the Lebanese communities, who today fear—each for different reasons—for their survival and their identity. Obviously, the third option is preferable. But what would be the price of such an agreement, and who could exert sufficient pressure on the “Party of God” to bring it about? Would such an agreement be conditional, in essence, on agreement between the various regional and international forces that could influence the course of events in Lebanon?
To stabilize Lebanon, we need to ensure that the balance between the three main Middle Eastern powers—Turkey, Iran and Israel—remains under control, and that none of them tries to upset it, once again using their local political clients to do so. Yet the main meeting point of these three powers and their respective influences is Syria, the real center of gravity in the Middle East, from which Iran has just withdrawn, while Israel and Turkey have been advancing their pawns, The Israeli air force massively bombed the Syrian army’s infrastructure and barracks after Bashar al-Assad’s departure, to prevent the latter from repositioning itself vis-à-vis the Hebrew state (at the same time depriving Turkey, an ally of the new Syrian government, of this pressure card vis-à-vis Tel Aviv). It is therefore essential that the situation in Syria remains stable, and that the country does not once again become the scene of regional rivalries and fighting. This also implies clarifying the issue of Russia’s presence in Syria (with several observers raising the possibility of a Russian withdrawal, or a drastic reduction in its presence, in exchange for a settlement in Ukraine). Moreover, the situation in Lebanon is closely linked to that in neighboring Syria, given the close geographical, historical, social and human links between the two countries. This situation is exacerbated by the presence of almost two million displaced Syrians in Lebanon, whose longterm survival would upset the country’s demographic map. For these displaced persons to return to Syria, the latter must at the very least remain stable, and Lebanon must maintain good relations with it.
Last but not least, it is vital to avoid a resumption of clashes on the Israeli-Lebanese border, given their destructive effect on Lebanon. This means, in any case, that Iran should refrain from inciting its allies to confrontation again. What’s more, if Lebanon is to regain long-term stability, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be brought to an end, as further escalation could destabilize all neighboring countries, including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, especially as Lebanon itself hosts a large number of refugees as well as armed Palestinian formations. If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were to escalate any further, would there not be a risk of one of these formations again striking Israel from southern Lebanon, provoking a large-scale Israeli response, as has been the case for decades? Last but not least, we need to understand what the Israeli government really wants: will it push for an immediate settlement of the Hezbollah weapons issue? Will it seek to exert pressure on Lebanon to obtain a peace agreement and full normalization as quickly as possible, which would risk provoking inter-Lebanese tensions between those who would have no objection to such normalization and those who would reject the prospect today?
If their arrival in power signals the start of a new era, Lebanon’s new leaders will have their work cut out for them. The President of the Republic, Joseph Aoun, elected in January 2025, has held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army since 2017. An institution supported by the United States, particularly since the Lebanese economic collapse (which began in 2019 and whose consequences continue to this day), during which they will contribute to the salaries as well as the logistical needs of the troops. In fact, the new president, who has declared his reformist ambitions, enjoys the support of Western countries as well as the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia—while always taking care not to arouse the adversity of Hezbollah. This is also the case for the new Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, who enjoys a great deal of external support, even though Hezbollah, which has long opposed his candidacy, did not support his nomination. The Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is close to Hezbollah, even questioned whether his appointment was not a “complete coup d’état by the United States.” And yet, Nawaf Salam is known for his support for the Palestinians, which Hezbollah cannot ignore, since it itself entered the war on October 7, 2023 in “support” of Gaza. Nawaf Salam is also a committed reformer who wants to change things in Lebanon. The first government of the new term will reflect this desire, with a majority of pro-reform ministers, and two ministers from Hezbollah. A World Bank report8 estimated the total material and economic losses resulting from the war between Israel and Hezbollah at 14 billion dollars, for a country whose current economic size (gross domestic product) is between 20 and 25 billion. The scale of the losses is therefore colossal, and gives an idea of the mission awaiting the government. All the more so as the security situation, in Lebanon as in neighboring Syria, will remain a constant concern, at least in the period ahead.
