Is a multipolar world necessarily a peaceful world? This is a question that is little examined by those that wish to promote multipolarity.
In fact, there is significant evidence and opinion that the transition to a multipolar world—where power is distributed among several major states rather than concentrated in one or two—increases instability and uncertainty.
Multipolar systems in history, such as the pre-World War I era, have often been marked by heightened competition, security dilemmas, and conflict, as multiple powers jockey for influence without a single overarching authority to constrain them.
The shift from a unipolar or bipolar order (like the Cold War) to a multipolar one is itself a source of volatility. As old power structures weaken and new ones emerge, uncertainty grows, and both state and non-state actors may exploit the resulting vacuum.
Multipolarity intensifies security dilemmas, economic competition, and strains on global institutions, all of which can fuel instability and conflict. The lack of a clear leader or set of agreed-upon rules makes cooperation more difficult and increases the risk of miscalculation.
The rise of multipolarity is accompanied by deepening ideological divides, not only between major powers but also within countries. This polarization further complicates efforts to find common ground on global issues.
History also points to problems with multipolarity—because Multipolarity significantly contributed to the outbreak of World Wars I and II, by creating an unstable international system marked by shifting alliances, competition among multiple great powers, and ambitions to alter the global balance of power.
In a multipolar world before 1914, the relative equality of power among major states (such as Germany, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, and Russia) created a complex web of alliances and mutual dependencies. Each power sought to maintain or enhance its position, leading to aggressive alliance-building and a security dilemma, where one state’s efforts to increase its security were seen as threats by others, prompting further armament and distrust.
A key theoretical concept linked to multipolarity is chain-ganging: states became tightly bound to their allies, fearing that the defeat or defection of a major partner would upset the balance of power and leave them vulnerable. As a result, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, Germany felt compelled to support Austria-Hungary, which in turn triggered Russia’s mobilization to support Serbia, drawing in France and ultimately Britain. This process turned a localized conflict into a continental and then global war.
Chain-ganging is contrasted with buck-passing, where states try to avoid direct confrontation by shifting responsibility to others—a behavior more common in later periods. In the 1910s, however, the perceived offensive advantage (that quick, decisive victories were possible) encouraged states to commit fully to their alliances from the outset, believing that hesitation could lead to catastrophic defeat.
While multipolarity and chain-ganging did not alone cause the war, they created a system in which the web of alliances and mutual fear made the rapid escalation of a local crisis into a world war much more likely. Other factors—including nationalism, militarism, imperial rivalry, and immediate events like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand—combined with multipolarity to make war almost inevitable by 1914.
Then, two decades later, multipolarity again led to the Second World War.
Multipolarity—as noted, defined as an international system with several major powers—played a significant role in the complex web of factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War. In the interwar period, the global order was marked by multiple centers of power, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan, and the United States, each with its own ambitions and insecurities. This environment created a volatile mix of shifting alliances, competing interests, and opportunities for revisionist powers to challenge the status quo.
Scholars note that multipolar environments can foster periods of relative peace and prosperity, but they also increase the risk of systemic conflict, especially when one or more powerful states seek to expand their influence or territory. The 1930s saw such dynamics at play, as Germany, Italy, and Japan pursued aggressive expansionist policies, exploiting the lack of a unified counterforce and the reluctance of other major powers to confront them directly. The policy of appeasement by Britain and France, for example, was partly a product of the multipolar context, as these powers hesitated to act decisively against Germany, hoping to avoid war or to shift the burden of confrontation elsewhere.
Furthermore, the absence of a clear hierarchy or overarching authority (anarchy in international relations terms) meant that states were left to their own devices to ensure security, leading to arms races, mistrust, and miscalculation—all of which heightened the risk of war17. The rise of revisionist regimes—such as Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and militarist Japan—was facilitated by this fragmented international landscape, allowing them to challenge the global order with limited initial resistance.
While multipolarity was not the sole cause of the Second World War, it created a structural context in which the ambitions of revisionist powers could flourish, alliances could shift unpredictably, and collective security mechanisms could fail, thereby contributing to the outbreak of the conflict.
Furthermore, multipolarity is a type of power distribution within an anarchic international system. The anarchic system in international relations means there is no overarching authority above states; each state is sovereign and responsible for its own security.
If there is to no authority above the state, then any state can do what it likes to protect itself. Notice, this is exactly the logic of Israel in its genocide of the Palestinians. Israel recognizes no international law above it, and acts accordingly. So, in a multipolar world, nothing can be done to stop Israel.
Thus, the case of Israel demonstrates how states will behave in a multipolar world, when they know that there is nothing that can stop, because only the individual state is paramount.
In international relations theory, as noted, “anarchy” refers to the absence of a central governing authority above states, meaning each state must fend for itself. Israel’s foreign policy and security posture are often analyzed through the lens of political realism, which assumes that states act rationally in an anarchic international system, prioritizing survival and power above all else. Israel invests heavily in military strength, seeks regional dominance, forms shifting alliances, and takes preemptive actions when it perceives existential threats—behaviors that are consistent with the realist expectation of how a state should act in a self-help, anarchic world. This does not mean Israel itself is anarchic, but that its behavior fits the classic realist model of how states operate in an anarchic international environment. Which is to say how states behave in a multipolar world.
As the world moves towards multipolarity, it also moves into greater instability and greater potential for conflict, as states which recognize no authority above them proceed to act as they wish.
