On April 17, 2025, at the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Supreme Court of Russia removed the Afghan Taliban movement from the list of terrorist organizations. What will now change in Russia’s relations with Afghanistan?
Islamic Emirate spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said: “We consider this step very important. In the future, Afghanistan and Russia will undoubtedly establish good relations in the economic and diplomatic spheres. The Russian president is pursuing the right policy towards Afghanistan.”
The news was long-awaited: despite their “banned status,” Taliban delegations had previously visited Russia regularly to participate in various forums and high-level political meetings.
Therefore, formal recognition of the Taliban as a political force, just like various ruling parties in other countries acting within their sovereignty and deciding issues of their state and society, was only a matter of time.
And if we look at it from the pragmatic perspective of Russian interests, this opportunity was missed. Immediately after the expulsion of the US occupation forces, other major players quickly began to work in Afghanistan, seeing it as a promising place for all kinds of projects.
For example, Chinese companies are already actively developing mineral deposits in Afghanistan. Oil and gas giant CAPEIC signed a 25-year oil production contract with the Taliban in early 2023, under which it will invest $150 million annually in the Afghan economy.
Iran is also actively developing cooperation, as it shares a long border with Afghanistan, and Afghanistan needs Iran’s seaports for import and export operations.
Transport Routes
It is significant that just before the decision to change the status of the Taliban, a high-level Russian government delegation visited Afghanistan and held talks with the Taliban, in particular with Public Works Minister Ashraf Khakshenas.
It is known that, in addition to general issues of expanding economic and trade cooperation, the talks focused on the repair of the tunnel on the Salang highway, the construction of new tunnels in mountainous areas, and the development of Afghanistan’s railway network with the supply of relevant components and necessary equipment.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has also expressed interest in the construction of railways, and the Afghan side has confirmed that it is interested in expanding ties with the Central Asian republics. Earlier, Kazakhstan openly proposed that the Taliban be removed from the list of terrorist organizations.
As for the interests of the Taliban themselves, the Islamic Emirate plans to expand its railway network from Khairatana to Herat, and from there to Kandahar and Spin Boldak. This will connect Central Asia with South Asia, as well as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Pakistan.
Overall, the Taliban want to reduce Afghanistan’s economic dependence on Iran and Pakistan. Currently, they use trade routes passing through these countries to organize imports and exports. Most Afghan commercial goods are transported from these countries to China.
Some neighboring countries use Afghanistan’s trade dependence as a political tool. For example, during the harvest season, they block trade routes, causing Afghan farmers to lose millions of dollars.
The Taliban’s railway project is part of a broader plan to connect Afghanistan with China and Russia via Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The new road will reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on its neighbors while making the trade route faster and more profitable.
Currently, Afghan goods transported through Iran and Pakistan take at least 40 days to reach China, while the new route will reduce this time to 12-15 days. In addition, transportation costs will be reduced by 15-20 percent.
The Trans-Afghan Railway project, which will connect Pakistan and Uzbekistan, has been in the works for a long time. Back in February 2021, the three countries signed a roadmap in Tashkent for the construction of the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway. After the change of power in Afghanistan, the Taliban also supported this initiative.
Taking advantage of new logistical opportunities, Kazakhstan joined the work on the route through Afghanistan in 2024. However, cargo is still being transported by road through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the port of Karachi. Once the railway line is operational, delivery will be much easier.
In November 2024, at the Transport of Russia international forum, it was announced that “the multimodal North-South route to Iran will be expanded by an eastern branch through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to Afghanistan. From there, the route will continue to the ports of Pakistan or India.”
Russian interest
In addition to cooperation with Afghanistan on infrastructure projects, the extraction of various minerals appears promising. Soviet geologists conducted research in this country in the 1950s–1970s, i.e., even before the introduction of Soviet troops.
Last year, research resumed and showed good results. It was noted that samples of precious and rare earth metals exceeded forecasts. Afghanistan has abundant reserves of silver, gold, platinum, palladium, lithium, tantalum, niobium, cesium, rubidium, beryllium, cadmium, and other minerals.
Therefore, participation in the local mining industry could be quite attractive and promising for Russia.
Moreover, with the changing situation, energy cooperation also looks quite attractive.
In addition to the long-standing unrealized TAP (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project, there was also a project for a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan. However, Islamabad suspended construction of its section due to force majeure circumstances.
Given the swap agreement between Russia and Iran, energy cooperation would also be useful for Moscow. Although, in terms of strategic planning, it is probably necessary to consider building its own gas and oil pipelines to energy-vulnerable Pakistan via Afghanistan.
To this can be added the CASA-1000 energy network project for Central Asia, as well as the possibility of building nuclear reactors in the future.
In addition, cooperation between our countries in the field of security is also of great importance.
Sergey Naryshkin, Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, said at an international conference in Baku on April 21, 2025: “We are all aware of Afghanistan’s important place in the geopolitics of Greater Eurasia. This country has enormous potential as a link between the north and south, east and west of the continent. It is in the common interest of our countries to promote the restoration and prosperity of the Afghan people.”
He added: “Information received by the SVR allows us to say with confidence that the main problem is the desire of Western countries to maintain instability in Afghanistan in order to achieve their own selfish geopolitical goals. It is the Western, most often British, special services that are linked to the terrorist attacks of the so-called Vilayat Khorasan, also known as ISIS-K or ISKP (designated as terrorist by Russia).
This terrorist organization is a local branch of ISIS, which attracts those who are dissatisfied with the Taliban. The problem is that there is a kind of Pashtun nationalism within the Taliban, and for this reason, representatives of other ethnic groups who are prone to radicalization are easily recruited by ISIS.
This is followed by terrorist attacks within Afghanistan and their planning outside the country. Given the identified links with Western intelligence services, this factor appears to be extremely important.
Meanwhile, the “legal fork” remains due to the fact that the UN continues to consider the Taliban an organization guilty of human rights violations, especially discrimination against women and religious minorities, in particular the country’s Shiite community.
Thus, UN Secretary-General spokesman Stéphane Dujarric, after Russia removed the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations, said that “this is a sovereign decision of the Russian Federation, and the status of the Taliban movement at the UN, as established by member states, remains unchanged.”
The Russian Foreign Ministry clarified that this step does not change Moscow’s commitment to the UN Security Council sanctions against individuals and entities associated with the Islamic Emirate.
However, these sanctions are unlikely to hinder economic cooperation, as both Moscow and Kabul have learned to circumvent them using various mechanisms.
Courtesy: Geopolitka.
