Introduction
Recently, there has been an avalanche of attention paid to the role of philosophy in the modern world. Especially in the context of the observed attempts to “abolish” Russian culture by the collective West, by the “golden billion” of Euro-Atlantic countries. But the effect, as in economics, is exactly the opposite. It is impossible to “cancel” Russia. And the negative consequences of sanctions were created by their initiators. In addition, as we know, “forbidden fruit is sweet,” and interest in Russia, despite all the bans, is only growing. And this is really true, because in the history of culture of Russia, starting from the earliest monuments of Russian literature (Nestor the Chronicler, Cyril Turovsky, Hilarion, Daniel the Worshipful and Daniel Zatochnik, Philotheus and many, many others) and up to the present day the tradition continues, when people of different ages and ranks, sometimes in heated disputes, discuss “fateful questions” of the existence of the world, Europe in general and the fate of the Fatherland, Russia, in particular. This is precisely the philosophy of cultural history, of artistic, poetic and religious nature. Especially here we would like to pay attention to the work of L.A. Tikhomirov. And therefore, it is a philosophy that has always been and remains to this day, regardless of the fact that it is a philosophy of the history of culture.
Philosophy now in spite of everything, is of special interest, in Russia, in Europe, and in the whole world: As E Émile Durkheim said—“fabulatory” culture. And despite the fact that there is a constant and universal call, which echoes everywhere, to return to historical and cultural origins, traditions, values, spirituality, patriotism, there yet is a paradoxical policy, in fact—a policy to reduce philosophy as a discipline, which becomes evident in terms of courses, lecture hours, conferences, and even philosophical faculties and departments in the institute of higher education as such. The experience of history shows that as soon as difficulties are created for philosophy by mankind, difficulties begin at once for mankind itself, which, contrary to its fundamental interests, creates difficulties for its comprehension (first of all, philosophical and strategic). This includes economic, social and even technological difficulties. This is due to the fact that philosophy has, first of all, an educational and a general, cultural function of common hermeneutic perception of any creative knowledge, including natural-scientific knowledge.
On History and Philosophy
Thus, the need was, is and will be, let us even say, in an increasing progression of almost geometric propensity, and the possibilities of satisfying this need, strange as it may seem, are more and more limited, up to being almost private inquiry. Meanwhile, R.M. Rilke, O. Spengler, F. Brodel, S.F. Huntington, M. Weber, A.J. Toynbee, and K. Jaspers spoke about Russia as a special cultural-civilizational formation in history. And F.I. Tyutchev, and A.S. Khomyakov, and A.S. Pushkin, and F.M. Dostoevsky, and N.Y. Danilevsky, and L.A. Tikhomirov—“our own;” as well as many, many other Russian and foreign philosophers, historians and cultural scientists.
Questions, precisely “fateful,” philosophical questions, fateful both to philosophy on the part of society, first of all, and to philosophy, more precisely, to its representatives, to society and the state, secondly, have accumulated in abundance.
Some of them are encouraging and pleasing, and some of them (especially on the part of philosophers themselves) are frankly alarming, upsetting, frustrating and even disappointing, because they give reason to interpret them as defending the right to exclusivity and so-called freedom to live in an “ivory tower,” with unclear responsibilities in connection with the implementation of certain philosophical ideas in history and culture and in relation to society. And here, the main thing, as they say, is not to confuse true nobility with false reason. Here it is important, as V.S. Solovyov said, not to confuse the true metaphysics of universality, which is understood as a way of organizing existence, “in which unity exists not at the expense of all or to their detriment, but in favor of all” [9, p. 74], and not at the expense of all or to the detriment of all. [9, p. 74], with the false, as they say nowadays, hybrid, proxy-, pseudo-, etc. pseudo-metaphysics of “all-unity,” a negative unity that suppresses or absorbs its constituent elements. As opposed to the true omnipresence, which protects and enhances these elements, “being realized in them as the fullness of being” [Ibid.]
The philosophy of liberal-democratic unity, as history and modernity attest, defends freedom. But what kind of freedom? The freedom to plunder the whole world according to its “rules,” i.e., at its own arbitrary will. In fact, this philosophy is based on a colonizing, hegemonic, plantationist, slave-owning, expansionist project. This philosophy of liberal permissiveness in its essence has been very accurately and strongly criticized by many philosophers and historians: e.g., Plato, Xenophontes, Thucydides. But the most indicative here are the New Nietzscheans, i.e., the Holy Theological Eastern Christian tradition of Orthodoxy. Following them are E.N. Trubetskoy, A.S. Khomyakov, S.N. Bulgakov, P.A. Florensky, N.O. and V.N. Lossky, S.L. Frank, L.P. Karsavin, P. Sorokin, B.N. Chicherin, P.I. Novgorodtsev, N.A. Berdyaev. But there is also Russian classical fiction—inn fact, philosophical literature, which can be called “pop-patristics” with good reason. This is F.I. Tyutchev, A.K. Tolstoy. But especially A.S. Pushkin, especially F.M. Dostoevsky. But also N.V. Gogol and L.N. Tolstoy.
Thus, let us note:
- There is a historical-cultural split or confrontation, in fact, it is a conflict of philosophical, or rather, philosophical-religious nature.
- If there is a conflict, then who and with whom, and what is the reason? At the same time, there is a traditional historical, cultural and civilizational confrontation, which is either fading or in the stage of activation. To be more precise—militant expansion, not of transatlantic Europe against Russia, but of paganism in relation to Christianity, which still exists in Russia and whose position in the West in the face of paganism is weakened. Today, as in the old days, there is a struggle between the theistic humanism of Christianity and the atheistic humanism of paganism. The struggle is only with canonical Orthodoxy. I would like to quote the words of the Apostle John the Theologian about those or other apostates-heretics who, as it happened many times in history, made a “civilizational choice” in favor of apostasy: “They went out from us, but they were not of us. For if they had been of us, they would no doubt have remained with us; but that they may be manifest, that they are not all of us” (1 John 2:19).
- 3. Why do temptations of this kind arise? Because Western Christianity is paganism with Christian symbolism. The “here and now” of postmodernism is the old idea of the cult of the present in paganism and in the philosophy of liberalism. And this cult has in charge Liber, with its rituals (“orgiastic liberals”—especially in the gender sphere) in the form of the “here-and-now” gratification.
- Further, let us not close our eyes to another clear and related issue and if we call things by their proper names, that is, to the traditional, historical and cultural bias, even dislike of foreigners, mostly by Europe, towards Russia. What is the reason for this?
- No less important is the issue related to self-hatred, which reaches the point of self-humiliation and self-abuse, starting from Marfa Posadnitsa and V.S. Pecherin (“how sweet it is to hate Russia and greedily wait for its destruction”—these are his very words), and all the way to those currently “relocated.” This question is connected, according to N.Y. Danilevsky, with “Europeanization” as a special negative property of our culture. It is based on myth and idolatry before the earthly paradise of paganism. In this case—in the form of the collective West. What is the reason for this?
- In this regard, it is very important to give a philosophical assessment of the real qualities of the West, both positive, and they are known since the times of the Petrine reforms and Herzen’s philosophical views, and negative. What approaches can there be here, including those of historical-civilizational and cultural nature? We can name a number of authors who sought an answer to this question, as, for example, A.S. Khomyakov did, but also Gogol, Dostoevsky, Antisthenes, Montaigne, Spengler, and many, many other thinkers. And even the same Herzen—one of the strongest, by the way, denouncers of the Western cult of “bourgeois idiocy.”
Culture and Philosophy
As for A.S. Khomyakov, the most exemplary author in this respect, he saw the following features generating all kinds of conflicts, crises and confrontations in history in general, and on all sides (not only between Russia and Europe) in particular. It is just that some traits, he believed, are particularly peculiar to Western nations. These are, for example:
I. Pride, spiritual and mental, historically found most often among nations from actual, outward successes and glory.
II. The West has acquired this pride by reason of its historical limitation of the trials and tribulation that have fallen to the lot of other nations, and especially to Russia. Hence the Western excellence in the development of sciences, arts, and citizenship. Let us add, not because of any industriousness, enterprise, class struggle or thanks to the proletariat, the bourgeoisie, the “idle” or “middle” class.
III. Lack of gratitude and humility, without which neither man nor nation can wait for mercy and prosperity, is also a significant cause of turmoil in history. By the way, let us add, if Europe was saved by Russia from the Golden Horde, the United States was twice saved (under Catherine II and during the American Civil War) from England and continental Europe. But in the case of ingratitude and arrogance, according to A.S. Khomyakov, it is precisely necessary, as history has repeatedly shown, to intimidate other nations, to spread one’s views, sometimes without truth—such is the urge. To introduce judgment and truth, to tame the violence of the strong, to protect the weak and defenseless, to purify morals, to elevate the spirit seems useless. (For more details see: [12, pp. 472-497]). We dare to assert: in any case, when they say: we are the very best and the chosen and everyone owes us, otherwise there will be sanctions and military bombardments because of “authoritarianism,” “totalitarianism” and “lack of democracy,” or we are the worst and “no matter what we do, we do not do well;” and our fate is to imitate the best, “civilized” countries and “learn by looking to our betters;” the main thing here is neither “the best” nor “the worst.” The main thing here is “the very best.” This is the same pride as the cause of all kinds of mismanagement in history, both on the part of Western countries and on the part of their pro-Western supporters in other countries.
- Also important is the question, requiring, again, clear philosophical definitions, that we are indeed an “existential threat” for the West. Since we do not want to be a raw material appendage of the West. Thus, China does not want to be an industrial appendage now, and this “appendage revolt” is never without consequences. And here comes another fair philosophical question, which philosophers themselves look at as self-evident, not requiring proof, but in fact is of paramount importance and needs utmost clarity and elaboration: What is philosophy and what does it do, after all?
Now many philosophers, rightly noting the difficult and complex situation, as Max Weber used to say, “constellations,” assert only the right to free creativity, the generation of sublime ideas of the most diverse kind and that is all, a kind of avant-garde philosophy, as it once was, i.e., “art for art’s sake.” “Philosophy for the sake of philosophy” with the availability of the right or “other” to live in the “ivory tower.” The main thing is “freedom of doubt” without putting forward constructive options. The rest is not the business of philosophy at all. Any physicist, naturalist, not to mention ordinary citizens, would be horrified by such a methodology of scientific research.
But we should not confuse sophistry as a rhetoric with philosophy as a science of ultimate essences—causes that have strategic consequences, including historical ones. Otherwise, philosophy will indeed be abolished or returned to the bosom of fine literature, as has happened many times in the history of culture.
Religion, Philosophy and Culture
Let us recall St. John Damascene, in The Source of Knowledge, in chapter 67, there are six definitions of philosophy:
- Philosophy is the knowledge of things as such, i.e., the nature of things.
- Philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things.
- Philosophy is the thought of death, arbitrary and natural.
- Philosophy is the likening of God to the degree possible for man. In doing so, we liken ourselves to God through justice, holiness, and goodness. Justice consists in the right distribution, i.e., not to cause offense, not to judge anyone according to partial arbitrariness, but to reward everyone according to his deeds. Holiness is higher than justice and coincides with goodness, consisting in bearing injustice, yielding to offenders and even benefiting them in their victories, not giving oneself to what is called “defeatism” and defending one’s right to exist. Here, as is known, in polemics with N.A. Berdyaev, I.A. Ilyin and V.F. Ern continue the tradition of “courageous Christianity” as true in Orthodoxy.
- Philosophy is the art of arts, including the fine arts, including the verbal arts. For philosophy is not merely and only an art, but the beginning, as the basis of all art, since by it all art was invented.
- Philosophy is love of wisdom, and true Wisdom is God. Thus, love of God is true philosophy.
At the same time, St. John Damascene divides philosophy into theoretical and practical philosophy. The theoretical is divided into theology, mathematics and physiology. Another teacher of Orthodoxy, Luke Voyno-Yasenetsky, clarified this thought: medicine is the most exact science, but after theology. By the way, his works on purulent surgery were not only noted in science and politics, but also saved many, many of our military men’s lives during the Great Patriotic War.
Mathematics, on the other hand, according to St. John Damascene, is divided into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. “Practical philosophy is divided into ethics, economics, and politics. Theoretical philosophy has as its task to consider the incorporeal, immaterial, i.e., God, Who, first of all, and in the proper sense is incorporeal and immaterial” [2, p. 74]. In Patristics the “perichoresis” is established—the miracle of independent and free striving for God is given. In any case, to speak about philosophy from the point of view of ecclesiophobia and “freedom” from religious dogmas, as it is sometimes done nowadays in the heat of discussions, is absolutely and fundamentally wrong.
The old classical, seemingly uppermost historical-philosophical truth says: philosophy without history is sterile, and history without philosophy is empty. It is no less and even more true in connection with theology, but in a slightly different way: philosophy without theology is barren. But theology without philosophy is also sterile. Orthodoxy as inseparable and indivisible wants to know what you believe, having an idea of the doctrinal foundations on which this or that knowledge can be immutable. As St. John Damascene said in accordance with what the New Nietzscheans (St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa) also affirmed: “If you are curious about God, then first of all tell me about yourself and what concerns yourself. How does your soul exist? How does your mind move? How do you give birth to a word? How do you exist, mortal and at the same time immortal. If you do not know what is inside you, how will you not shudder to explore the higher heavens?” [2, p. 106].
We can see how many connotations philosophy has that make it indispensable and attractive both for specialists and ordinary citizens: natural-scientific, historical-cultural and artistic-poetic, socio-economic, political-legal, even medical and managerial; but also many, many other components. And each instance of meaning requires clear assessments and emphases. Philosophy is an interdisciplinary science. Otherwise, as V.S. Solovyov said, without mechanisms of its realization, any beautifully soulful philosophical ideal-saying turns into hollow talk.
Justinian defined philosophy more succinctly and, of course, for methodological purposes of greater clarity, combining it with jurisprudence (literally, “comprehensive reflection on essences”). And in this is the agreement of both ancient and Christian philosophical traditions. The task: to dwell on “what constitutes the essence of things” [3, pp. 12-13]. And further this great philosopher specifies: “Justice consists in the constant and firm will to reward everyone with his own. The science of law is the knowledge of the divine and human, the ability to distinguish the just from the unjust… It is not enough to know the rights if the persons for whose sake they are established are ignored” [3, pp. 15, 21].
Even more precise and concise understanding for methodological purposes of systematicity, integrity and universalism of statements in the definition of philosophy was given by V. V. Mironov: “Philosophy studies nature, i.e., the essence of an ideal object.” And it is really very capacious, because in the final analysis, according to the famous specification of L. I. Petrazhitsky, any empirical statement is a set of abstract, i.e., philosophical judgments. As well, in history, especially in the history of politics and religion, it is necessary to constantly correlate meanings, subjects, wills, feelings and deeds based on the example, we repeat, of certain facts and events of history. And only in this case, we should add, is it possible to distinguish essential, i.e., generally meaningful, objective, apodictic, heuristic, epistemological knowledge as problematic knowledge—as opposed to knowledge that is partial, momentary, quickly transient, subjective, superficial, doctrinaire.
A truly philosophical statement should have at least three connotations concerning knowledge: a) reflection-thoughts; b) actions; c) subjects who think and act. At the same time, it is history that makes philosophy particularly “philosophical” due to its special, i.e., interdisciplinary status. Since, we repeat, it is the historical-cultural, civilizational optics that makes philosophy understandable, i.e., subject and actual in any, however difficult (as in Dilthey, Collingwood, or Tikhomirov) style of presentation. And if we are talking about the facts of the past that represent philosophical discourse, then we are talking about the philosophy of history, and if we are talking about modernity, then we should talk about specialization in the philosophy of politics and the law. If at the same time we are talking about long-term forecasts, then philosophical eschatology, philosophy of religion, and theology are available.
Therefore, when they say: “do not invade” our specific philosophical field, it actually turns out that philosophers themselves impose an absolutely unbearable burden of censorship. And the most obnoxious censorship in the form of biased ideological obstacles is, as we know, self-censorship. But philosophy, by virtue of its not just interdisciplinary character, but first of all, by virtue of its inter-hermeneutic purpose, is already a “vocation as a profession,” in the language of sociologist, economist, philosopher, and religious scholar Max Weber.
Philosophy is called upon to carry out the mission of mediation and constantly “invade” economics, sociology, law, politics, theology, natural sciences, helping them to find a common language among themselves and in dialog with civil society. Philosophy should be subject-specific, representative, and thus make itself understandable. And not only to explore these or those ideas of “pure reason” and “absolute consciousness” in itself in the person of certain thinkers. After all, Immanuel Kant considered his Critique of Pure Reason to be only a propaedeutic to morality and the law and, as it turned out, to religion. He made this clear in his Metaphysics of Morals [6, pp. 107-438]. Especially in its first part, “Metaphysics of Right” and in the doctrine of the “amphiboly” of any reflective notions, which already initially carry in themselves a self-binding oughtness and unconditional command, no matter what. Having refuted all modes of theological justification, it was in morality and the law that he found the main arguments for theodicy. Now morality and law are not only a subject of academic debate, but a condition for human survival. And “local narratives” in the spirit of the liberal, post-modern project with its atheistic humanism, belligerent to the theistic humanism, will not solve the problem here. The latter emphasizes the ontology of objectivity, while the former rejects the universality of monotheism and, putting forward a plurality of truths, affirms exactly the epistemological, and therefore historical, political anarchism with its apologetics of subjectivism. Most often in the form of emotional-psychological, psychopathic states. However, both the past and the present show that relevance and conventionalism do not solve the problems here.
Any philosophical judgment is precisely trinitarian, because in any sphere of activity, especially in a crisis situation (as they say—there are no atheists in war or on an airplane), it should be clear and precisely to everyone despite any “pluralism of truths.” (1) What is the cause as the source of anything. Including the crisis of non-construction. (2) How this something is realized and manifested. (3) And what is the meaning of both. In religious philosophy, especially Patristics, this is embodied hypostatically in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But if God is life, freedom and creativity, which is actually what the Church is talking about, and if someone does not like it, it should be remembered—there will be an alternative. More precisely—there will be no life, creativity and freedom. And if there will be something, it will be a misinterpretation of them, passed off as values in the form of anti-values of death, vice and evil. And this, as St. John Damascene stated in the spirit of the New Nietzscheans: “…immutable, incommunicable, unchangeable, indivisible and indistinguishable” [2, p. 192]. Mankind, St. John Chrysostom believed, has placed itself in a raging sea of events and circumstances complicating its life. But, one way or another, it is impossible to cross the sea without a ship. And St. John Chrysostom believed that the Holy Church of Christ in the world is the same as a ship in the sea. The master of this spiritual ship is Almighty God the Father Himself. The helmsman is His only begotten Son; the favorable wind is the Holy Spirit; the subordinate rulers of this ship are the Apostles and their successors, pastors and teachers of the Church. Those sailing on this ship are all orthodox Christians. The bottom and foundation of this ship is the right faith in the Holy Trinity: The mast is the holy cross of Christ, by which everything in the Church is fastened and confirmed; the sails are love; the anchor is hope. This spiritual ship—the Church, which St. John Chrysostom considered responsible as an institution for eschatological service, including in the form of reflection, to mankind, from different countries it transports through the raging sea of life, all faithful Christians to the Heavenly Kingdom. That is why, St. John Chrysostom believed, the ministry of a bishop is more complicated than hermitage [5, pp. 403-492].
But closed speculation, and even undefined in its status-role and institutional functions in relation to the “people in the raging sea” leads either to utopianism as an aspiration to unattainable goals, or to complacent pragmatism. More precisely, anarchism, and even more precisely, anarcho-syndicalism in the form of corporate supremacism and exceptionalism—when there are only rights and no obligations or duties. But both utopianism and anarchism, despite any good wishes and intentions, in fact, in the end, as a certain philosophy or, let us say, “philosophical regulators,” turn out to be a tragedy and destroy people’s lives. And if it is said that philosophy is freedom, freedom of creation, we should remember that freedom is not only “freedom from” but also “freedom for” (according to Kant). Freedom is not only positive freedom, freedom of the good, but also freedom of evil, negative freedom, manifested in the form of the same deviations, cataclysms, civilizational collapses and crises. “Indeed,” says St. John Chrysostom, “it is much more difficult—even for human reasons—to convince the freedom of man than to create nature” [4, c. 34]. And to excite faith in souls “is much more marvelous than to raise the dead” [Ibid]. Why do not believe, he asks? First of all, because they are free and do not want to believ! [4, с. 299]. “Therefore, believe for the very reason that you do not believe.” [4, p. 698]. And nowhere is evil so costly, as historians of all times and people (starting from Suetonius, Polybius, Titus Livius, Plutarch to V.O. Klyuchevsky, F.I. Ouspensky, also R.Y. Whipper, E. Gibbon, I.G. Droizen and many, many others) insist, as in philosophy. More precisely – in philosophy’s absence in history.
This position is precisely defined by St. Basil the Great, who noted that “whoever looks at evil without disgust will soon look at it with pleasure. It is especially dangerous when a person boasts in what is actually vile, and he is not able to see it, because he finds glory in shame itself” [1, p. 82]. And what is the way out—exactly philosophical including: “And if we avoid the low notion, then the absurdity of contradiction will be destroyed as well.” [1, p. 51]. Meanwhile, the danger is that many, advising this or that to people, “dilute,” writes St. Basil the Great, “the word with water,” adding their own thought, to the detriment of those who listen. “For by serving their pleasures and pleasing them with flattering speeches, they feed their passions to their own destruction. Weakening what the Scriptures strictly, strongly and usefully curb, and to the perdition of listeners, allowing some ignorant humanity, a reckless apology for sins and other similar things, liked by many; more and more they relax the souls of voluptuous lovers“ [1, p. 70].
Prediction and Philosophy
And one last thing—the prognostic function of philosophy. More precisely, about the philosophy of prognosis. We should note at once that its (philosophy’s) main function is different—it is propaedeutic as educational. More precisely, historical-cultural and civilizational pedagogy, as insurance against feralization, as education of creative thinking abilities of an interdisciplinary character, including in the natural-scientific, technological field. As noted by Dostoevsky, you cannot invent a nail without beauty. The beauty of thought, more precisely, its education by the example of researching the ultimate essences of everything and everything, is the prerogative of philosophy. As for the function of prediction as a manifestation of creativity, we can talk, in our opinion, about two types of prediction.
- This is a historical-futurological, essentially pagan, approach. A biased, preconceived conceit, most often emotional-passionate and artistic-poetic as, above all, psychopathic, is taken for truth. It is a subjective assumption. Such political solipsism can come true, and then such guesses with unclear methodology of selecting a representative database and their authors are remembered. But there is no objectivity, stability, generalizability, or apodicticism here. But, as Aristotle rightly believed, all great meanings can be conveyed in a calm voice, not in the excitement of madness. By the way, it should be noted that the champions in terms of realized predictions in the history of mankind regarding the future of this very mankind were literary men—H. G. Wells and Jules Verne. But they did not know anything about themselves.
- Historical and sociological analysis of history and modernity, Christian forecast as a gift of foresight and an example of strategic planning that has nothing to do with fiction. St. Basil the Great believed: do not be curious about the future, but usefully dispose of the present. His brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa, continued: that for some reason, with the help of fortune-telling, divination, inspiration and many other tricks men are deceived that the interpretation of signs will allow them to look into the future to avoid trouble or achieve what is desired. Which again is at best vain, and at worst, has the most unfortunate consequences.
Let us remember that all productive, stable forecasts, which have not just the character of realization, but above all are effective in their cautionary recommendation against possible mistakes, have already been realized. Either in the form of wrong decisions, or in the form of success and historical-strategic productivity. And not only in the sense of political or moral. But they are vital and destiny-bearing in their eschatological and soteriological nature. They have, first of all, the present, modernity in the form of a representative database. The prophets, apostles, and saints with the gift of clairvoyance said and say literally the following: certain trends, certain historical and cultural changes in the life of mankind, in social, moral, religious, political, economic, etc. spheres, have been and are happening before your eyes. Some of them are desirable, others are not. Some of them you like, others are disturbing. But some of them are causes. And others are effects! And if you do things the way you are already acting, you will have these and such consequences that you also have in front of you. And if you do it differently, then these are these consequences. And you have them too. Choose! In short, if you sit on a hot frying pan, you will get burned, and if you follow safety rules and use the frying pan for its intended purpose, you will get a wonderful fry-up and will not enjoy what you should only use and will enjoy what you now only use. But at the same time do not complain about some external circumstances or some force or fate and do not say, in justification of your mistakes, that maybe these Commandments used to work, but now they are obsolete. Do not say: why do I need this? But ask: why do I need it? And at least sometimes, remember the philosophy of perennis, not only the philosophy of transitus.
Yes, of course, we live on earth and we naturally want to live in an earthly way. But we should not forget, as St. Theophanes the Hermit said, that we are on earth for a short time. And, therefore, even though we are earthly, we did not receive existence for the earth. After all, we should remember that anyway, as history shows, individuals and even whole civilizations test history, its experience and traditions for strength. How does it end? Crises. Traditions begin to test the strength of people. The experience of being warned against crises is also the valuable philosophical knowledge that history gives people.
Conclusion
When correlating the relationship between philosophy and history, philosophy and culture, it should be borne in mind that it (philosophy) has, first of all, an educational function. And at the same time, it has a function of strategic planning. And not a predictive function. Otherwise, we get what can be called “tunnel thinking” or, as they say nowadays, “block thinking,” which is unable to distinguish between true and false types of progress in the long, medium, and even short term, with all their consequences in the history of cultures and civilizations. Or political solipsism, incapable of any interaction of cultures and negotiation processes in domestic affairs and international relations.
Full references may be consulted via the original:
Featured: Christ Saving Peter from Drowning, by Lorenzo Veneziano; painted in 1370.
