For some time now, we have been witnessing a phenomenon that several experts call a reconfiguration of the international scene, where alliances that were thought to be stable and consolidated are creaking fearfully and new ones are being born, some in good condition and others with more uncertain prospects. One of these alliances that seems to suffer the most from this new scenario is the UN, which after the end of the Cold War seemed to have freed itself from the network of crossed vetoes that had semi-paralyzed it for almost half a century; now the United Nations risks returning to irrelevance, albeit in different terms from the previous ones. The new and increasingly harsh confrontations on the international scene are obviously reflected in the all-encompassing architecture that gave legitimacy to actions, sometimes even questionable from the point of view of consolidated international law. But it is no longer just the UN (meaning the secretariat and its current and controversial head, Antonio Guterres), but the entire so-called ‘system’ of the United Nations, the vast and complex network of agencies, funds and programs (AFPs) that aims to regulate all aspects of collective life, that is under attack. A prime example is the difficult future that looming for some agencies, such as it is for the WHO, a target already declared during his first mandate and then also during the last election campaign, by President Trump, due to the management of the Covid-19 pandemic. And, coherently, the new President withdrew US from WHO among it is first acts. Like WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNESCO and the WFP (AFPs of which Washington is the main funder), it is likely to be expected that there will be major changes in those. Also, giving the approach of the new US representative to the UN, Elise Stefanik, a well-known critic of the system, an havoc is announced there; this perception was confirmed by the hearings at the US Senate of the Sefanik, where she said that her main aim is to reduce the weight and influence of China and Russia within the UN and, giving that, the organization it is, first of all, a political entity, appears clear that there will be a battlefield as well, with further decrease of efficiency and reliability of the organization, reproposing its persistent problems, like the double (or more) standards, selective justice and hypocrisy in applying international law and international criminal law.
Alongside these realities (and the concepts), consolidated until now, such as stabilization operations, or otherwise called peacekeeping (including also its various subcategories such as peace enforcement, transition assistance, peacebuilding), seem to be moving towards a new, unavoidable, historical phase. First of all, it must be remembered that peacekeeping, or in broader terms, the intervention of the international community, articulated in various architectures, from the Congress of Vienna to the United Nations, passing through the League of Nations, from the Allied and Associate Powers after WWI to the regional organizations like EU, the African Union, NATO and OSCE and ending with the ‘coalition of willing’, has existed since the 19th Century and has always had the objective of reducing conflicts and rejecting violations of what, albeit with different parameters according to the historical times, were the principles of law and of the legitimate international community.
The benchmark, even in this case, remains the United Nations, which for years has represented the pillar, even if with many shortcomings, of this kind of operations. For years the UN has deployed up to 100,000 military and police personnel in dozens of missions (even if mainly in Africa); it has also given a mandate to important multilateral missions, from Korea to Kosovo, from Afghanistan to Iraq, from Bosnia to the very recent operation in Haiti.
But as mentioned above, the growing divisions of the international community seem to bring the organization back to the harsh years of the Cold War and the consequent marginalization of peace operations (reduced to some areas, like the Middle East, Cyprus, the forgotten Kashmir and considering the massive peace enforcement operation in the former Belgian Congo an exception) whose main premise is the existence of an agreement within the Security Council to be authorized and deployed (be they ‘blue helmets’ and/or multinational forces).
The UN Security Council present condition reflect the geopolitical tensions and global fragmentation, and as said, peacekeeping suffer openly of a deep identity crisis. Paradoxically, this critical moment would offer a window of opportunity to open a debate on fundamental questions, starting from the intrinsic utility and needs of this kind of military operations profile, aligning with its priority to adapt to the present and future conflicts and their prevention, in the light of the contemporary challenges.
Peacekeeping, historically one of the UN’s most significant and visible conflict management tools, stands at a crossroads. After a thirty-years journey, it seems that it is close to a turning point or to a close road end, after some dramatic changes. As of now few remains, while many others are near to complete their mandate and the options it is tied to a multifaced scenario, rich for sure of uncertainties and risks. No new missions, whether large or small, are currently being deployed. The large, multidimensional flagship mission in Mali was terminated in 2023, and the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has wound down, leaving lingering questions about their contributions to peace. In political terms, the Mali operation, initially launched by France in 2013 with the support of NATO and EU, to avoid that this country falls under the cruel hegemony of Islamist terrorists, failed its long-term aims of the Western actors. Bamako now led a group of states, the newly established AES (Alliance of Sahel States, in French, together with Niger, Burkina Faso and the potential adhesion of Guinea, Senegal, Chad and, now, Togo) which would dissolve the ECOWAS and would be a political challenge for AU, but also for France (with the looming end of FrancAfrique), EU, US and NATO and potential gain for Russia, despite the serious blow of credibility following Moscow’s uncertain and bankruptcy management of Syrian file. The mission in DRC ongoing since 1999 (up to 2010 with the acronym of MONUC), despite an enormous financial and military effort, did not protect the integrity of the country (with irregular, bandits, mercenaries, Islamists, Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian forces, operating with impunity in the east of the country), did not avoid a silenced genocide caused by the civil war started in 1996 that may have originated up to six millions of lives. After many years, with the growing disappointment of the local government and populations MONUSCO was invited to leave. The UN initially accepted, then find a way to postpone it, but the end it is coming, soon or later, also because Kinshasa had enough of what are called ‘intromissions’ in the local policy-making by the organization. Now, MONUSCO fate it is uncertain only in its timeframe.
The poorly committed Secretary-General António Guterres appears disengaged from serious discussions on the future of peacekeeping, the most visible and added value for the organization that he led. Thus, reflecting broader uncertainty about its relevance in today’s conflict landscape, and the consensus among Security Council members, as said, pivotal element for a proper management of peacekeeping, is becoming increasingly elusive. With the present political and strategical scenario, especially vis-à-vis with the situation in Middle East and Ukraine, emerge strongly the feeling that the values of peacekeeping missions (especially the ones deployed directly by the UN, but this is true also for the ones mandated by the Security Council) are heavily eroded and those operation seems no more functional in their attempt to face the challenges of present (and more for the future) conflicts.
Other than these epistemological questions, are the peacekeeping operations still useful for the global and/or regional and/or subregional peace and stability, other points raise. The multiplication and the growing complexities of the conflicts and the presence of (too) many actors, contributed to make the peacekeeping, a complex activity per sé, more complex and less reliable in addressing the issues for it was established
Clearly defined principles, uniformly understood across UN agencies, and agreed by member states, are essential for the success of future peacekeeping missions and should be re-instated, in closing relations with the evolution of the international arena.
There are windows of opportunity for revamping the peacekeeping but keeping in mind that the UN and its action and activities are the mirror of the dynamics and of the health of the international community.
Those are the Pact for the Future and the upcoming Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting for 2025 (planned for 13 to 14 May 2025 in Berlin).
At the Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024, world leaders adopted the Pact for the Future (and its annexes: the Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations).
The Pact, the usual list of high, and unrealistic, expectations and hopes of the UN narrative (however accepted by the member states with the implicit acceptance that those will be at least elusive in their implementation), included chapters, targets and processes on sustainable development and financing for development; international peace and security; science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation; youth and future generations; transformation of global governance towards a more open inclusive.
The UN Peacekeeping Ministerial will serve as a high-level political forum to discuss the future of peacekeeping and for Member States to express and demonstrate their political support. Those are opportunities and other than the rituals may emphasize that, despite significant challenges, peacekeeping remains an unparalleled global mechanism for conflict management.
These challenges have prompted a reflection within the UN on how best to adapt peacekeeping to the reality of a fracturing world. Last November the organization, on the request of host country (Germany) and other co-chairs, prepared and published a study: “The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities.” (by El-Ghassim Wane, the final head of MINUSMA [Mali]; Paul Williams, GWU [George Washington University]; Ai Kihara-Hunt, University of Tokyo) as reflection tool for the above-mentioned Ministerial Conference. The study offers 30 plausible operational models related to future UN missions.
Leading up to the 80th anniversary of the UN and marking the 10-year anniversary of the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, the 2025 Berlin UN Peacekeeping Ministerial is the latest in a series of meetings which looks to discuss the future of peacekeeping and for Member States to express and demonstrate their political support. The UN hope to receive substantial pledges in support of closing the existing capability gaps and adapting peace operations to better respond to present challenges and new realities.
A so large meeting will include a large number of Co-chairs (Bangladesh, Canada, Ethiopia, Ghana, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Uruguay, UK, US and the United Nations Secretariat).
Further, will contribute to increased safety and security for the personnel deployed, and foster overall mission effectiveness. The member states are encouraged to arrange partnerships where appropriate, for instance in training and capacity-building at local level.
Three key events prepared the meeting: 1) Preparatory meeting on Capacity-building, Partnerships and the Future of Peacekeeping, co-hosted by Japan, the UK and Uruguay in Montevideo (10-11 December 2024); 2) Preparatory meeting on the Future of Peacekeeping, New Models and Related Capabilities, will be co-hosted by Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Netherlands and USA in Jakarta (4-5 February 2025); Preparatory meeting on Safety and Security of Peacekeepers, including technology, will be co-hosted by Pakistan and the Republic of Korea in Islamabad (15-16 April 2025)
Fresh visions and leaderships will be essential to revitalize peacekeeping and reaffirm its role as a critical conflict management tool within the UN’s efforts to address complex global conflicts. A key point will be a new leadership; within the UN there are a lot of hopes that the era of Guterres will end with a new, more committed, head of the organization, planned for the end of 2026.
The growing disaffection on the peacekeeping is based that too often it failed the reduction of violence and achieved only the postponing of the conflict’s resolution. Also, for these reasons, more and more countries are increasingly reticent to consider the ‘blue-helmets’ operations as a tool for conflict management and crisis solutions. However, it should not be ignored that the endlessly prolongation of conflicts and truce monitored by the UN troops refer firstly to the lack of commitment and will of Security Council which issued low level mandates as results of the necessary compromise in order to avoid the veto, which means the end of the initiative. The peak of this endless search of compromise at all costs are the mandates, that in a way or another, marked the entire life of the mission in Lebanon, UNIFIL, which since 1978 is cornered between the irrelevance and the uselessness.
In general terms, the peacekeeping today could be summarized in fewer missions and less funding. In 2010-2011, the budget for UN peacekeeping was US $7.2 billion, supporting 15 missions with 100,000 personnel. By 2023-2024, the budget had decreased by 15% to $6.1 billion, funding 11 missions with 76,000 personnel and trend it is expected to continue. These shifts reflect evolving global priorities, changing conflict dynamics, contributor’s fatigue and disappointment about the outcomes.
There a lot of concerns about the decisions of Trump administration toward the UN and especially the peacekeeping. But Trump is in mainstream of member states, not only the main funders and the TCCs/PCCs (Troops Contributing Countries/Police Contributing Countries) but also the host countries. Especially those, are more and more intolerant at the presence and behavior of ‘blue helmets’ contingents.
United Nations peacekeeping faces an uncertain future. Widely seen as a cornerstone of the UN’s contribution in world affairs, in recent years it has been marred by scandal, hostility in countries where missions are deployed and declining appetite for it among member states amid deepening global divides.
Despite reductions and criticism, peacekeeping remains a core component of the UN’s global role, with missions across Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Asia, many of which exists since decades.
The international community should raise, to herself firstly, difficult but necessary questions that will help to pave a new way for peacekeeping, such as how to better align peacekeeping with political processes, close the capability-expectations gap to match clear, realistic mandates with adequate and properly managed resources, and integrate it with the new emerging demands, like climate security to address links between environmental challenges, conflicts, natural resources exploitation and population movements.
In this process, it is necessary to consider a reform of the peacekeeping seminal principles, consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense. Those are now a façade where behind it the international community hide her disfunctions and hypocrisies and for that have been under pressure since the 1990s, when many peacekeeping missions were expanded into multidimensional operations to transform failed states into improbable liberal-democratic states. As the example the UN presence in East Timor began in 1999 and ended up on 2012 with different mandates and architectures; as well the UN presence in Sierra Leone (also with different names and acronyms) run from 2001 to 2014. Both were mandated to rebuild state institutions and prepare these territories for post-conflict governance.
In East Timor the UN take the burden of the full administrative control over the territory, reaching a peak of more than 10.000 military, police and civilian staff tasked to establish functioning state structures (from scratch) and secure independence. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, with almost 20.000 personnel at its peak, supported the disarmament of more than 75,000 irregular combatants, the reintegration of former militiamen, and the reconstruction of Sierra Leone’s governance system following a devastating civil war (including the setting up of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone [SCSL]). If East Timor or Sierra Leone emerged from their respective nightmares, the struggle from the Indonesian colonization and a brutal civil war, the reward is not fully in the hand of the UN-led action and, sad to say, Dili and Freetown remain fragile states still looking for a substantial socio-economic development.
The enlargement of mandate and scope of missions in quasi-military operations and governance assistance (nation building in the UN dictionary) is another relevant trend.
This transformation in the scale and scope of the operations coincided with the enlargement of the military component and a process of inter-organizations cooperation. For example, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (2013–2023), with up to 15,000 personnel, was tasked with stabilizing the country amid ongoing insurgencies of Islamist and Tuareg; before its re-hatting as UN mission, the AFISMA (African Union International Support Mission to Mali) troops were rapidly deployed only with the support of NATO/EU airbridge; even good in principle, the interaction between UN, international (EU Training Mission, EUTM; European special forces contingent “Takuba”); national (French operation “Serval”/”Barkhane”), regional (G5Sahel force) and local (FAMA, Forces Armée du Mali) did not provided good results and the evolution of the institutional framework of Mali (coups in 2021 and 2022) led the new leadership to a progressive expulsion of those forces and their replacement with Russian troops and ‘advisors’. MINUSMA end and became one of the deadliest UN missions to date, with over 300 peacekeepers killed; Mali, already a semi failed state, continued to be affected by the above-mentioned insurgencies and it is banned by the international community, led by the military coup’s leadership.
The other case is the UN presence in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with since 1999 firstly MONUC (UN Mission to Congo, in French), and since 2010 with MONUSCO (UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in French) was unable to protect civilians due to the prolonged crossed stalemate within the UN Security Council. In order to overcome it, an ad hoc component was established in 2013, the Force Intervention Brigade (with the UN Security Resolution 2098), splitting the protection of civilian population from the offensive operations against armed groups, marking a decisive turn toward direct military engagement in peacekeeping.
In reality both elements of MONUSCO, the Force Intervention Brigade and the other military component of the mission, did not achieve their mandates: the suppression of armed groups in the East and the protection of the refugees’ camps and civilian population from violence, exploitation and crime.
Also, in DRC, as well for the previous format of the country (Belgian Congo, former Belgian Congo, Congo-Kinshasa, Zaire) there was a massive deployment of international forces. This started with the first peace enforcement mission of the United Nations, ONUC (UN Operation in Congo, in French). This one despite the not properly reported use of excessive force and many collateral deaths among the civil population due to the extensive use of air bombing, barely saved it from the secession of the mineral-rich region of Katanga. The mission, due to the financial management of the operation risked to bring the organization on the brink of financial collapse (it was learnt to set up a dedicate budget for these activities). ONUC was then followed by any kind of foreign troops operation (US, French, Belgian, Moroccan, EU and, as said, UN). All without bringing stability, peace and development. The last attempt to stabilize the East of DRC was given to an Eastern Africa Community (EAC) force; followed, after a sound failure, by a similar one organized by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), with the same poor result; thus, forcing the UN to postpone the planned withdrawal of MONUSCO but the situation in the East remains fragile with the offensive of Rwanda-backed M23 (the most powerful irregular force in the region).
Under historical point view it should be remembered that the first shift from the traditional image of UN peacekeeping, with high visible white vehicles and aircrafts, the famous blue helmets, appeared during the Suez operation in 1956, to an attire close to the classic military livery with camouflage, low visibility and lethal weapons, occurred during the UNITAF and UNOSOM II operations in Somalia. Somalia, with the heavy burden of the civil populations, the controversial and massive use of indiscriminate use of force represented a major change in the peacekeeping and structural evolution, with the progressive reduction among the peacekeepers of the presence of NATO/EU countries and the increased presence of TCCs/PCCs elements from the ‘Global South’, with the eventual collapse of operational and ethical performance of the UN operations.
These developments and the poor results recorded have rendered the principles of limited engagement and impartiality of peacekeeping less matchable with the realities of modern situation; this is crossed with the little or no interests by the member states to continue to implement principles and concepts with limited options for a success (first, stability, then peace). Only clearly defined principles, uniformly understood across UN agencies, and agreed by member states, are essential for the success of future peacekeeping missions.
The comprehensive change of peacekeeping principles occurred between the end of Cold War and the terrorist attacks in 2011 in the US. These twenty years, a short period in appearance, saw also tragic failures of peacekeeping in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia with heavy impact over the public opinions and policy makers.
The approaches of this earlier period cannot directly address today’s challenges. However, understanding how innovation, change, and responsiveness have been achieved within a bureaucracy like the UN—characterized by siloed approaches and resistance to change, as is common in many intergovernmental organizations—offers valuable lessons for the 2020s and beyond.
Innovation in peacekeeping relies on strong institutional support, both economically and politically, with the member states helping UN playing a crucial role in mobilizing, deploying, and financing peace operations.
The debate between militarization and demilitarization of peacekeeping involves thoroughly evaluating the implications of each approach, such as their potential impact on the UN’s capacity to protect civilians, included the use of force when and if necessary. An evaluation should clearly define what “demilitarization” entails, exploring options (and their real feasibility) such as increasing the reliance on non-military personnel or reducing the armed presence in missions, considering the growing reluctance of the host countries/authorities (in case of de facto entities) in seeing foreign military personnel going around their own controlled territories. It also requires clearly defining what such a shift would mean for the contexts in which missions can be deployed and the scope of their objectives and relying on the discussion and decisions of the Security Council, which remain the ultimate authorizing body.
These steps might be in the current global political climate. They can include improving civilian-military coordination, rigid military command control of operations (and related use of force), joint humanitarian relief efforts, proper nation building projects and community programs to support local conflict resolution.
Recent initiatives to revamp and reorient the UN peacekeeping, call the need for a real change and focus into the new, and yet unaddressed, challenges like asymmetric warfare, deliberate involvement of civilians as target, terrorism. Several scholars include the external geopolitical influences among the problems; however giving the fact that the United Nations gather all the recognized states, this appears as unrealistic; at the contrary, a proper involvement of the international community and clear commitments would help the solution of the crisis.
A way to address it is the involvement of the regional organization. Again, the doctrine points out the cooperation with AU and ECOWAS as example and models. In reality, a stronger, competence-based collaboration between the UN and regional bodies to address evolving global security challenges cannot be realized with two semi failed entities. Those other than their institutional problems (ECOWAS is on the edge to disappear, undermined as it is by the growing dynamism of the Sahel Alliance States [EAS, in French]), are so heavily financial dependent from external support (primarily EU) in a way to causing serious questions on their reliability. Further previous experiences like the joint UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were so negative, that it became a case study to not to repeat any longer, according the words of a high official of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), now retired. The policy making for peacekeeping of AU it is now limited to the operation in Somalia, which worked only because was logistically sustained by an ad hoc operation of the UN and paid (including the salaries for the troops) by the EU. The performances in DRC by EAC and SADC (for the last one as well also in Mozambique) suggest to not count too much on those. Arab League is non existing entity and the last peacekeeping activity was the dispatch of a small number of unarmed military observers dispatched in the earliest moments of the Syrian civil war and rapidly withdrew (like a similar initiative of the UN). The only real partner of the UN for peacekeeping are NATO and EU due to their military capabilities, the first, and financial availability the second one. OSCE, after the suspension of Russia and Belarus, cannot be considered an impartial stakeholder.
The current trend of the UN peacekeeping, as said, see a descending phase, especially for the missions directly referring to the organization.
With large multidimensional peacekeeping missions currently shutting or winding down, the UN has no more choices than prioritize the smooth transitions to smaller political missions or other post-peacekeeping mechanisms, even in politically hostile environments. Such efforts are crucial for preserving the hard-won (few) gains of these missions and for safeguarding the residual credibility of the organization in peacekeeping as missions are adapted and deployed in future conflict contexts.
As said, one the growing problem of peacekeeping is the quality of the involved personnel. Aside the ethos and behavior, there is another one, long-term challenge in peacekeeping; it is that troops and observers deployed by current TCCs/PCCs are poorly trained and equipped. Although there is a push for TCCs/PCCs to deploy technologically advanced tools like drones and advanced systems, many ‘blue helmets’/’blue berets’ are not trained to use them. This gap increase risk for the missions and the local populations and undermines the UN’s legitimacy. It is an example of the capability-expectations gap, where ambitious and complex mandates, painfully get after tortuous negotiations at the UNSC, are not matched by appropriated resources, training and equipment provided to TCCs/PCCs, which often have very low-level standards. This persistent issue, worsened by complex and militarized missions, requires leadership and management in conditions to face these gaps, which limit the effectiveness of the operation.
The preventive element in conflict management, despite a lot of rhetoric, remains underutilized, partly because its outcomes are less visible and harder to measure than post-conflict interventions. However, it has powerful potential of establishing condition to set up or re-establishing basic conditions for stability. The UN should push prevention, good offices and mediation efforts, even in the face of disagreement within the Security Council, expanding and reinforcing two its semi unknown bodies: Common Country Analyses (CCA) and Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (SDCF).
As said, a proper transition after the peacekeeping appears crucial to save the achievements. While the politics of peacekeeping is considered crucial, bureaucratic disconnects and operational misalignments with futuristic expansion of UN special political missions often complicate the already challenging process of making peace. These challenges arise not from transitions between the two but from identifying which approach best addresses specific conflict dynamics – a question central to the future of peacekeeping. Developing a functional working relationship between these components of the UN system is essential to prevent fragmentation in its conflict management strategies, making real the fusion in DPO/DPPA (Department of Peace Operations/Political and Peace Building Affairs) between DPKO and DPA (Department of Political Affairs), to which belonged in origin the special political missions. Effective communication and aligned priorities among key actors can help mitigate inefficiencies, operational overlaps, and contradictory approaches. Building a shared understanding of what defines a political solution is key to advancing this effort and addressing the underlying political dynamics within the UN system. This is essential for developing a more cohesive and adaptable framework to navigate the interplay between peacekeeping and special political missions in diverse, volatile settings.
Finally, the organizations should address properly the communications, making real the pompous, but ineffective, change of the name of the Department of Public Information (in Department of Strategic Communication). For the peacekeeping this is a critical aspect. Very often there has been little communication with host populations about the reasons for a mission’s deployment and the challenges it faces in achieving its goals. This lack of transparency has led to misunderstandings and unrealistic expectations, undermining trust and local support for the mission. Strategic communication that aligns mission expectations with on-the-ground realities is crucial for managing perceptions and building support (and winning the stiff hostility of the local authorities, allowing the missions, in the future, offices, to deal and communicate directly with the populations and social actors). Transparency with local host populations and international stakeholders about the scope and priorities of missions, and particularly its limitations, can help mitigate raising expectations from the grassroots.
As said, the peacekeeping landscape looms to the end of an era.
MONUSCO is committed to pack and leave asap; the end of the mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is postponed only due to the two-years delay of general elections, as seal for the normalization. The mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), after the end of UNAMID on 2020 in Darfur, was closed down due to the blowing of the civil war in Khartoum. The one in Abyei (UNISFA) await the solution of the negotiation between Sudan and South Sudan for the partition of the natural resources of the territory; giving the precarious state of South Sudan and the brutal civil war which devasting Sudan, appear pending to unclear external factors. The one in Central Africa Republic (MINUSCA) resist to the pressure of the local government which look to repeat the successes achieved in Mali by the military government, expelling progressively all foreign forces (as of now Bangui achieved to close down only the EU training mission and the French troops). Among the major missions, only UNIFIL have the chance to find (or re-find) her raison d’etre, especially after the dismantling of Hezbollah forces, but a new and more solid mandate appears necessary, but the divisions among the Council make it as difficult challenge (a similar situation looming for the mission in Golan Height, UNDOF). Among the oldest missions, their need appears more and more weak: in Cyprus, the future of UNFICYP, on the light of the latest firm declaration of Ankara (the real godfather of Northern Cyprus) for the formalization of the division of the island does not look very stable. This despite the useless wishful thinking position of the UNSC, which insist on the unrealistic federal solution to the Cyprus problem. Similarly, MINURSO continue to see eroded her operational space due to the progressive consolidation of the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco; the missions Libya, Afghanistan require a serious analysis of their need and configuration, giving the situation in the countries, and consequently their real utility. The mission in Colombia had an apparent achievement but the political violence resurfaces; Haiti, despite a prolonged commitment is on the brink on the total chaos and suffer the missed opportunity to absorb the multinational police mission under deployment there. The mission in Iraq, more a political than a peacekeeping is on the way to close down, ending a story initiated in 1991 (Baghdad work intensively also to expel the multinational operation ‘Inherent Resolve’, the NATO and EU missions and the Turkish troops from its territory).
Thus, while the multinational, UN-mandated ones appear in a better shape, but not so much; giving the prolonged stalemate in Kosovo and Bosnia, the permanence of the NATO and EU forces there seems prolonged for mid-term at least; the multinational force for Haiti would face a long-term deployment and little perspective of success.
The EU-led missions giving their limited impact appears less involved in the crisis of modern peacekeeping, but it is necessary that Brussels will monitor the evolution in order to adapt its deployments and concepts. Similarly for NATO, but with a significant difference. For the Atlantic Alliance, even if committed in significant operations, in consideration of the war in Ukraine, the peacekeeping is now a third line concern; this due to the need of reconstruction of the national defense’s paraphernalia, irresponsibly dismantled by the European political leaderships after the Cold War.
Successfully navigating these challenges will require dedicated learning, planning and long-term support, firstly from the member states. There are some signs that the peacekeeping, probably in a new and unedited version, would surge. The Gaza crisis launched the discussion in how a military/police/humanitarian force would garrison the devasted strip and how would take part; several options are now under discussion and the EU work since last year to reactivate soon the small border control mission (EUBAM Rafah, 2005-2015) as first step a commitment of a post-conflict situation. Another post conflict mission looms; the one that would patrol a ceasefire line between Ukraine and Russia, when and if established. Even if the unrealistic dimension (up to 200.000 troops) and the related financial cost could be, in theory addressed, the main problem is the political dimension and the architecture that will take care (UN, EU, something else?). As usual the answer is the and of the international community and its components, the singular states.
