Introduction
Recent political events in the CIS region (crisis situations in Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia) show an increase in the degree of social discontent and reveal difficulties in the systems of power. Among the main sources of problems researchers most often name unsatisfactory implementation of the law, low efficiency of political and state institutions and mechanisms together with the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies and curtailment of democracy. For example, in relation to Russian realities, such conclusions were reached by the participants of the scientific round table “Elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation 2021: interests, strategies, technologies,” organized at the highest level and held on April 26, 2021 by the staff of the Department of International Relations and Geopolitics of Transport of the Russian University of Transport and the Institute of CIS countries.
It is difficult to argue with this conclusion. At the same time, it seems that it neglects one important phenomenon, whose importance can be likened to the cornerstone, which the builders in the famous Gospel story carelessly neglected, namely, the peculiarities of political culture, which determines the grounds, reasons and direction of (un)action of ordinary citizens. After all, whether the majority of the population uses the mentioned norms, institutions, mechanisms “to make democracy work,” or ignores them, preferring other (informal) practices, or is alienated from them, directly depends on their efficiency and effectiveness, movement towards authoritarianism or democracy and, ultimately, the stability of the whole system of power in its functioning either for the common good or in its own interests. Therefore, in order to correctly interpret and predict political processes in the CIS countries, it is necessary to consider more carefully and thoroughly the specifics of their political culture.
Modern Theory of Political Culture: Aspects for CIS Countries
The basic thesis of political culture research, substantiated in the works of G. Almond and S. Verba, R. Inglehart and K. Welzel, etc. Verba, R. Inglehart and K Welzel and others is that there is a stable connection between the values and orientations of citizens and the form of government. It follows from this that all systems of government operating for long periods of time are relatively consistent with the basic attitudes of the societies they govern. Otherwise, these systems are battered by incessant waves of mass discontent and are eventually swept away by the ninth shaft of popular revolt. The recent upheavals in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, for example, once again confirm this thesis (in a longer retrospective we can also include Moldova). The seeming stability of the consolidated political systems of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan is equally convincing evidence. It is true that now the row of these countries is not so slender due to the isolation of Belarus and Russia with their protests. Thus, in Belarus in August-October 2020, according to “Chatham House,” about one million people (every fifth resident of the country) took part in political protests. In Russia from January to April 2021, according to various estimates, from 110,000 to 300,000 citizens protested against the current government. In response, law enforcement agencies took unprecedented measures of suppression, and administrative structures began demonstrative actions of persecution (dismissal of employees, expulsion of students, deportation of foreigners, etc.). The protests themselves, as follows from the Levada Center (foreign agent) poll, ranked second in the list of the most memorable incidents for Russians in April 2021. At the same time, 41% of respondents believe that things in the country are going on the wrong track; there is also an increase in the potential of protests with economic (43%) and political demands (45%), which for the first time in more than two decades became comparable to the level of 1997.
The list of illustrations could be continued, but, I think, the sophisticated reader already has an idea, and the picture looks quite definite for him, namely: a noticeable part of the population expresses dissatisfaction, but as long as the political system maintains the status quo, it does not work according to the classical scheme of D. Easton – it does not respond to the growing demands and support, while repression increases. The bulk of citizens are mysteriously silent, like the people in the last scene of Alexander Pushkin’s tragedy, Boris Godunov.
In these circumstances, the specifics of political culture common to many CIS countries can be traced: division, mistrust, alienation of ordinary citizens from political life, restraint in expressing civil rights and freedoms (very scarce in quality and quantity), and extremely rare use of the privileges of civil honor, as Aristotle would put it. Explanations here are usually offered from the openly odious (the idea of “slave spirit” promoted by American sovietologists) to moderately critical (lack of the proper mood of the soul, degree of maturity, high level of legal consciousness, sense of duty, about the importance of which wrote, in particular, I.A. Ilyin, unfavorable socio-economic conditions according to S. Lipset, unfavorable socio-economic conditions according to I.A. Ilyin. Lipset, lack of civic qualities [social capital] according to D. Coleman, lack of democratic experience according to D. Rastow, E. Muller, etc.) In contrast to the above-mentioned approaches, the approaches that draw attention to some hidden defect that undermines social forces, hindering social growth and political development remain somewhat aloof. Aspects of this phenomenon were once extensively studied by authoritative researchers: the concepts of anomie (E. Durkheim), civilizational incompetence and distrust syndrome (P. Sztompka), social friction (A. Etzioni), collective sense of shame and guilt, identity crisis, crisis of legitimacy (J. Habermas), cultural lag (W. Ogburn), etc., and others.
Trauma as a Feature of Political Culture
P. Sztompka united the above described constructs on a single theoretical platform built around the concept of “cultural trauma.”
The CIS countries experienced cultural trauma during the period of the dismemberment of the USSR, the destruction of the Soviet nation, an almost instantaneous and radical change of lifestyle, a radical change of values and reference points. Subsequently, some projects to construct new identities were quite successful (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), but in a number of other countries they have not been completed to this day.
The main sign of cultural trauma is widespread polemical discussion in the media, at public meetings, and in the political sphere with sharp opposition and/or challenge of basic values or critical judgments, which is reflected in cinema, theater, and literature and mobilizes new groups of dissatisfied people. Although in CIS countries these symptoms are not visible to the armed eye, however, experts point to the possibility of trauma even in the absence of obvious signs. Thus, R. Merton writes about such a way of transferring trauma as retreatism, which is a passive adaptation, ignoring, attempting to act as if there is no damage. In turn, E. Giddens points to one of the types of social behavior in adapting to trauma, which is expressed in cynical pessimism, short-termism and hedonism. It is difficult to disagree with the fact that the characteristics of R. Merton and E. Giddens are very suitable for describing modern CIS societies.
To determine the main features of the modern political culture of Russians, the author conducted two questionnaires among 260 2nd-4th year students and December 2020.
The largest number of respondents are men – 57.2% of respondents. Natives of the Central (Moscow, Kaluga, Tula, Ryazan Regions), North-Western (Novgorod, Pskov Regions) and Volga (Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Chuvashia, Samara Region) Federal Districts prevail among the respondents.
When asked whether the respondents are sure that they are part of the united Russian nation, 68% answered positively, while when asked about self-identification only 23% (Russians, mainly) called themselves Russians, the rest of the answers (especially those given by representatives of other nations) coincided with the ethnicity of the respondents (Russian, Bashkir, Tatar, etc.). These data show that there is a big problem with national unity and consolidation in Russia.
A significant part of respondents (43%) could not accurately and definitely name the values that drive them in social life, 32% stated the need to follow their interests to achieve personal wealth and success, only 8% mentioned the need to benefit society. Most (48%) intend to gain social recognition through high personal incomes and expensive consumer goods; 24% believe they can achieve it through achievements for the common good. Here it is clear that irresponsible egoistic consumption trends are widespread among Russian youth.
It is curious that half of the respondents (58%) recognized the interests of the collective as having a higher priority than the individual interests of those who are members of it. Almost two thirds of respondents (65%) demonstrated their readiness to obey the decision of the majority. The explanation for this may be, on the one hand, the continuing reproduction of the mass attitude to collectivism, and on the other hand, the unwillingness to make an independent decision and bear responsibility for it.
The majority of respondents (82%) could not name the purpose and objectives of the existence of Russia and the Russian nation in the modern world, and found it difficult to define Russia’s mission in the international community. From this we can conclude that Russian youth has no idea of its place and role in the world, which causes the degradation of citizenship, a drop in faith in the future, and a lack of national dignity.
The overwhelming majority of respondents (69%) consider personal security, preservation of stability, absence of war, protection from extremism to be the main thing in their lives. Happiness was mentioned by 20%. Freedom was mentioned by 9%. The data show a high level of fear among Russian youth.
The majority of respondents are not interested in politics (71%) and do not support any party (68%), while 35% have experience of political participation in street actions. Those who do not participate in politics wrote mainly that “nothing depends on them.” Disbelief, apathy, alienation can be explained by the growth of administrative and police arbitrariness and pressure.
At the same time, 61% would be willing and able to participate in politics if they knew that they could influence the decision-making process. These results demonstrate a high proportion of those willing to participate in the political process, which is very important and promising for further socio-political development.
When asked who should take part in politics and the decision-making process affecting the common interests of citizens, 36% of respondents said that “politicians and experts”; one third are sure that this should be done by citizens themselves; 29% gave this prerogative to the government and the president. This data shows the lack of understanding among the respondents of the importance of the role of civic participation in politics, demonstrates a high degree of alienation from the political process.
At the same time, when asked what role citizens should actually play in making the most important political decisions, the majority agreed that “the main role” (47%). This indicates a significant gap between young Russians’ perceptions of proper politics and real political life, in which, according to 71%, “officials decide everything.
Respondents believe that their well-being depends on the government (37%), on themselves (25%), on the joint work of all residents of the country (23%). It can be concluded that the level of consumerist and dependent attitudes among young people is rather high.
When asked about participation in collective actions of a voluntary nature (volunteer movement, etc.) to jointly solve any problem and/or help those in need, 25% of respondents answered positively. On the one hand, this indicator is not so small, but, on the other hand, it is noticeably lower (almost two times lower) than in Western countries.
It is quite revealing that 60% of respondents do not believe that it is possible to trust strangers around them, viewing them as a source of risks and threats; more than a third (35%) are not ready to seriously trust their acquaintances either, which indicates a great deal of distrust among Russian youth.
Approximately 40% of respondents were in favor of supporting traditions. In more than half of the families (65%) parents have high authority and decisive voice for their adult children. The level of support (70%) for religious systems (Christianity, Islam, Buddhism) is high. The majority of respondents (75%) described themselves as patriots.
The respondents showed relative unanimity in answering the question about the prospects for their future life in Russian society: 55% do not see them and wish to go abroad to build a life and career; 21% believe that they should and must live in their native country and do what they love. The rest found it difficult to answer.
So, if we believe the survey data, which generally correlate with earlier surveys of youth sentiment conducted by VTsIOM (in 2018) and Levada Center (in 2019), the political culture of Russian youth looks unbalanced, weak, immature, split, and heterogeneous. It is characterized by dependency, distrust, fear, alienation, weak readiness to unite with others for joint activities for the common benefit, uncertainty about the future, unwillingness to take responsibility for themselves. At the same time, there is an attitude to collectivism and readiness for civic participation in the presence of favorable conditions and confidence in its effectiveness.
The respondents do not belong to any party, do not regularly participate in politics, but at the same time they realize the importance and necessity of such activities. The vast majority of them do not support the current government, however, they do not openly express their protest and dissatisfaction for fear of reprisals.
It is highly probable that the diagnosis of the political culture of Russian youth roughly corresponds to the state of the entire Russian nation, with the caveat that the symptoms are more pronounced and acute among the young. This conclusion is not surprising if we bear in mind the anamnesis, which includes memories of the crushing and catastrophic events that destroyed the Soviet state and the lives of its peoples, and which have left a huge and deep imprint on the modernity of the CIS countries, where there are not so many prerequisites for recovery. Rather, on the contrary, negative trends leading to complications are on the rise.
P. Sztompka sees two possible scenarios for the development of events in cultural trauma: “One is a vicious circle of cultural destruction, the other is a virtuous circle of cultural reconstruction.” In this case, the first option assumes that the transformation aggravates socio-cultural contusion, society uses a counterproductive strategy and unsuccessfully tries to cope with the situation, supporting the outdated culture in every possible way “by persistent cultivation of memories.” It seems that a number of CIS societies and states are still walking in a “vicious circle” or, to put it in the spirit of Dhammapada’s Sutra 342, “running around like a frightened hare. Bound by fetters and bonds, they return to suffering again and again for a long time.”
As general recommendations for mitigating and eliminating cultural trauma and consolidating a new culture, P. Sztompka calls parametric transformation, coping with the traumatic situation and gradual departure from the former cultural heritage (the latter is associated with generational change). In due time, these tips were useful for Poland and other countries from the former Soviet camp. The most important conditions for societies, particularly Polish societies, to successfully overcome cultural trauma were national consolidation, in which the leading role was played by the “Solidarity” movement, consensus among the political class on democratization, large-scale and consistent cultivation of civic qualities in society (cultivation of civic virtue according to Aristotle) with the full support of a democratically oriented power structure.
In the case of the CIS countries, however, almost thirty years after the fall of the USSR, parametric transformation has not yet been completed, and cultural reconstruction has not been carried out, largely due to the establishment of unfavorable conditions. The point is that the authoritarian systems that have gained strength since about the second half of the 1990s (or since the early 2000s) are interested not only in the constant reproduction of cultural trauma, but, more broadly, in socio-economic stagnation and even decline. At first glance, this thesis seems paradoxical, at least because of mercantile and utilitarian considerations and simple rational calculation: the worse things are for the population, the less revenue is received by the budget, the less stable the power is, and the more problems arise for it. But this obvious and clear logic does not apply to the cases of neopatrimonial autocracies, which trample the CIS space with an iron heel. The fact is that the main source of well-being of their ruling classes is not taxes and/or income from industrial, commercial and other activities of economic agents, but appropriated and monopolized natural resources used for personal purposes. Therefore, one of the main concerns of the authorities is to maintain the current situation and to prevent the restoration of public control over what is rightfully owned by citizens. Therefore, autocracies support social division, poverty, fear, mistrust, thereby preventing the growth of social capital, and ultimately, counteracting the dangerous healing of cultural trauma, fraught with national consolidation and recovery, and public awareness of the true meaning of rights and freedoms, their role and their capabilities in governing themselves and the state.
Conclusion
The concept of cultural trauma can serve as a relevant explanation of the peculiarities of political culture in a number of CIS countries, especially in Belarus and Russia. After major social upheavals (the collapse of the union state, loss of life benchmarks, a sharp decline in the welfare of the majority of citizens, a rapid increase in mortality, etc.), the peoples of the CIS faced the need to survive in new conditions. However, the course of overcoming the trauma through democratic renewal by realizing the problem, national consolidation and formation of a new culture was lost rather quickly. The groups that expropriated power established their own order, in which cultural trauma was preserved and became an instrument of oppression and suppression, as well as an obstacle to further development. Therefore, at present, the political culture of many CIS countries is fragmented, unbalanced, seriously damaged, its carriers are imbued with discontent, loneliness, distrust, fear, and lack of confidence in their own strength, which alienates them from active joint political life in order to achieve the common good.
In conclusion, we would like to recall that the people’s silence in the above-mentioned scene of Boris Godunov is interpreted in different ways: an expression of submission; a manifestation of horror at the atrocity committed and remorse for unconsciously contributing to the crime; tragic silence as a response to what has been seen (like the rhetorical figure of aposiopeza), a harbinger of a new trial and a sign of judgment to those who ruined the Godunov family (the people’s Nemesis according to V.G. Belinsky). Which of these explanations reveals the true meaning of the silence of the majority of citizens in the CIS countries is a question for the next study.
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