Despite the change in the White House administration and corresponding reshuffling in the US State and Defense Departments, it is obvious that Donald Trump will follow the policy of pressure on China in his foreign policy, including proven methods of military-strategic engagement. While the military build-up of US allies in the Asia-Pacific region has also taken place under Biden, it is likely that the resources freed up on the Ukrainian front will be redirected to that part of the world.
The key elements of the US strategy will be both sea power through the Navy and air supremacy through the Air Force, with reliance on the network of allies off the coast of China. Obviously, in addition to formal satellites, such as South Korea and Japan, Washington will make heavy use of India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a good relationship with Donald Trump.
Bangladesh, which saw a coup last year, could also become a new US stronghold.
According to the US Naval Institute’s website, “Bangladesh’s primary naval bases overlook Myanmar’s Rakhine region and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s belt and road initiative aimed at lessening pressure on Chinese sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the South China Sea.” By working with the Bangladesh Navy, the U.S. Navy could utilize these bases to monitor Chinese projects. Moreover, Bangladesh’s strategic position in the upper Bay of Bengal could provide the United States with an advantage in guarding the Strait of Malacca, which is vital to the Chinese economy and industry.
“During any potential conflict, Bangladesh’s naval bases could be a hub for logistics and a safe harbor for the U.S. Navy. The United States currently has no bases in the Bay of Bengal. While Diego Garcia Island will certainly be a logistics hub for operations in the Indian Ocean, Bangladesh—with its manpower, vibrant shipbuilding industry, and a professional navy—could offer U.S. Navy ships a place for rest, recuperation, and rearming. Bangladesh currently is building a deep seaport in Matarbari, Cox’s Bazar with the assistance of Japan, one of the most trusted and important U.S. allies since World War II. Japan could help build a bridge between these two countries to ensure that the USN could use Matarbari deep-sea port as a naval operations base during any future war by blockading potential Chinese shipments that bypasses the Malacca to use CMEC as an alternative. This would provide the United States leverage against China in the Bay of Bengal region.”
As for air supremacy, although the US is having some noticeable difficulties right now, panicky anti-China sentiment could help the MIC, the Pentagon and the White House restructure the future budget to meet new challenges.
In this regard, a special report by the Hudson Institute on the need to strengthen and expand the U.S. Air Force to confront China, not only as a deterrent but also for direct military conflict, is noteworthy. It was released in early January 2025. The authors point out that even US airfields are threatened by a serious Chinese military attack. A Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike force consisting of aircraft, land-based missile systems, surface and submarine vessels, and special operations forces could attack US aircraft and their support systems at airfields around the world, including the continental United States itself. It is noted that military analysis of potential conflicts involving China and the United States shows that the vast majority of US aviation losses are likely to occur directly at the airfields and these losses could be very significant. At the same time, it is emphasized that the US military currently devotes relatively little attention and resources to countering these threats, compared to the development of modern aircraft.
The People’s Republic of China views potential conflict differently, and assumes that if airfields come under massive attack, they need to be protected, expanded, and fortified. Since the early 2010s, the People’s Liberation Army has more than doubled the number of protected air shelters and unprotected individual air shelters at military airfields, creating a total of more than 3,000 air shelters, not counting civilian or commercial airfields. This is enough to hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. The area of runways across the country has increased by nearly 75 percent. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait – airfields that house more than 650 aircraft in hiding and nearly 2,000 without serious protection.
In response, the report’s authors suggest that the U.S. Department of Defense should organize resources to support air operations under attack. To regain the advantage and prevent conflict, the United States and allies and partners, to varying degrees, must pursue efforts in the following three areas:
- Encourage continued PRC defensive investment. The United States must continue to improve its ability to launch deep and massive strikes against PLA forces and key elements of critical infrastructure despite the presence of dense, unsuppressed air defenses. In response, already hardened PLA forces are likely to continue to spend on additional costly passive and active defenses and, in turn, have fewer opportunities for alternative investments, including strike assets and other force projection capabilities.
- Build resilient infrastructure on the ground. The United States must improve the resilience of its military infrastructure, including but not limited to expanding capacity and strengthening airfields in the continental United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond. Although the funds spent on active and passive defense reduce the funds available for offensive operations, absent a baseline level of infrastructure resilience, which is currently lacking, it is reasonable to expect that the Department of Defense’s offensive capabilities will be overwhelmed during a conflict. Resilient infrastructure is necessary for the U.S. Air Force to fight effectively.
A resilient architecture must include passive defense (e.g., redundancy, geographic distribution and tactical dispersal, reinforcement, recovery, and camouflage, concealment, and deception capabilities) and active defense. As concluded by Christopher Lynch and other analysts at the RAND Corporation, which has conducted a major U.S. airfield resilience analysis, “the most cost-effective ways to improve airbase resilience are robust passive defenses.”
To consolidate airfields in an integrated manner, the Department of Defense would need to move from an individualized approach to each construction project to a construction campaign. A major multi-year integrated airfield construction campaign within and outside the United States, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, would provide sustained momentum for military construction work on bases, create consortia of commercial contractors, and reduce construction costs. As part of this campaign, the United States could enter into joint contracts with those allies that are also strengthening their infrastructure.
In addition, the Pentagon should adopt appropriate tightening measures, especially for new military construction work. A recent plan to forgo building fortified shelters at a cost of about $30 million for new B-21 bombers at a cost of more than $600 million has been called a foolish decision that jeopardizes the U.S. ability to strike around the world.
To sustain operations, airfields will also need to be protected with active defense systems that are lethal, adaptable and resilient to ongoing enemy action. This requires the U.S. Army to reallocate funding for maneuver forces to develop the anti-aircraft artillery unit and enhance its ability to protect airfields, ports, and other critical facilities. It also requires more sustained air and missile defense systems capable of supporting a calibrated long-term defense.
- Develop the Armed Forces. The U.S. Department of Defense should develop and accelerate the deployment of forces that are less vulnerable to PLA attacks on airfields. Elements of this change in force structure should include long-range and endurance aircraft, such as B-21 bombers and next-generation air-to-air refueling (NGAS) tankers, that can operate from more distant airfields or spend more time in the air rather than on the runway, where they are an easier target. The Pentagon should also deploy forces such as missiles and some types of autonomous joint operations platforms that can operate from short or damaged runways or independently of airfields if logistically supported. However, the U.S. Armed Forces will not deploy these types of forces in large numbers until the 2030s, so passive and active defenses at airfields will be required regardless of these changes in force structure.
The report’s findings state that the Pentagon’s current approach of ignoring this threat is leading to aggression by the PRC and there is a risk of losing the war. What is needed, therefore, is an urgent and effective campaign to make U.S. airfield operations more resilient, which requires sound decision-making and sustained funding.
Meanwhile, the emergence of such infrastructure means not only a perceived deterrence of China, but also a significant strengthening of the U.S. ability to conduct offensive operations both in the areas where it deploys its military infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region and at home, such as in Latin America, whose sovereignty is already being encroached upon by Donald Trump.
Courtesy: Geopolitika.
