This is an excerpt from Proofs for God—Some New Approaches, the recent book by Dennis Bonnette. The book’s great merit resides in its ability to clarify that it is impossible to use rationality to explain away God. Please purchase a copy and support the work of Professor Bonnette.
Read excerpts from Book 1, Book 2, Book 3, Book 5 and Book 6.
This present book, Proofs For God: Some New Approaches, is the fourth of a series of publications containing shorter portions of the much larger volume—each with themes coherent in themselves as subjects of independent investigation, and yet, still subordinate to the overall message of Rational Responses to Skepticism.
Proofs For God: Some New Approaches contains eight chapters. Each was itself originally published online as an independent essay—making it easier for the reader to make complete sense of its content without reading the other seven chapters or the entire large volume from which it came.
Chapter one shows why the human mind can have absolute certitude about certain basic truths which can serve as a secure foundation to establish other truths leading, ultimately, to definitive proofs for the existence of the God of classical theism. Among these are things evident to all rational human beings, such as, that (1) something cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect and (2) that you simply cannot get something from nothing.
Chapter one shows why such absolute certitudes, properly understood, are simply impossible to doubt. From examination of the implications of these foundational truths about the nature of being, other metaphysical first principles can be formally articulated, such as, the principles of identity, non-contradiction, sufficient reason, causality, and finality.
In accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, whatever is not fully explained within itself needs a reason for being from outside itself, that is, an extrinsic sufficient reason. Such extrinsic reasons are called “causes.” Traditional proofs for God’s existence arise by first discerning that finite beings inherently need extrinsic reasons or causes for their existence or coming-to-be. Following this, God is shown to be the necessary ultimate ground or explanation for the existence or coming-to-be of all finite things.
Chapter two examines the notion of “creation.” The very act of existing in finite beings demands an explanation which is essentially either a form of “self-creation” or creation by an omnipotent Creator, who is the God of classical theism. It is shown that the very act of existence of any being whatever requires an expression of infinite power which solely the God of classical theism can provide.
Chapter three explores a somewhat different take on the famous “proof from motion”—showing how even the least possible change or movement in finite beings necessarily entails a form of “new existence” which, ultimately can come solely from the God of classical theism—acting as a kind of “Universal Donor” of all new qualities of existence found in changing beings.
Chapter four shows how the existence of the cosmos—whether having started in time with some sort of “Big Bang” or having no beginning in time at all — requires the infinite power of an Infinite Being to explain it.
Chapter five explores the mysterious nature of Aquinas’ famous Fifth Way to prove God’s existence—the one based on the constant unfolding of final causality in every aspect of the cosmos. Not only does the metaphysical principle of finality require that every agent must act for an end, but it also entails that there must be knowledge of the end to be attained. This chapter rationally explains how a mysterious intellectual apprehension governs the finality of every single thing existing and acting in the universe as well as how the universe as a whole attains its own end as governed by the omniscient mind of God himself.
Chapter six explains how God is, not only the First Mover of all things in creation, but also how he governs all things so as to attain their ends according to his providential intentions.
Chapter seven addresses the argument of some atheists that the universe needs no special explanation, since it has simply always existed and that “existential inertia” keeps it in existence. This chapter focuses on the need for infinite power to explain the continued existence of every single being that exists, thereby showing that “existential inertia” is impossible.
Finally, chapter eight offers the “Santa Claus ‘proof’ for God’s existence.” Skeptics and atheists consistently attempt to show that the very notion of the God of classical theism entails many contradictions and absurdities. This chapter is not intended as a direct proof of God’s existence. Rather it aims simply to show that, while the story of Santa Claus entails many absurdities and contradictions, the nature of God entails many amazing attributes, but no absurdities or self-contradictions. Many examples of seeming contradictions are given and answered in this chapter. Indeed, the very fact that, unlike Santa Claus, the coherence of the awesome divine attributes has a long history of rigorous rational defense is itself something of an argument for the actual existence of the God of classical theism.
Proofs For God: Some New Approaches should give the reader some novel insights and ways to understand the traditional proofs for God’s existence. In so doing, it is designed to augment, rather than replace, the classical Five Ways as offered by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae, book I, question 2, article 3.
****
How “New Existence” Implies God
“Why new existence?” What kind of a question is that? Does it really mean anything? We know that motion or change is real and that everything in motion is moved by another. Moreover, a new paper defends the common sense Aristotelian understanding of motion and time while simultaneously definitively refuting certain misinterpretations of modern physics. But what does all that have to do with “new existence?”
Let’s look at this from a different perspective. Being a finite or limited being means to exist here and now with certain qualities of being—and no others. Substantial beings exist in themselves, while accidental beings exist only in another and are merely qualities of a substance or, perhaps, of another accident. Thus, being limited means being just what a thing is and no more at a given point in time. That is, every limited being is a substance of a certain specific type, having particular accidental qualities that determine and restrict its way of existing down to the last detail—with certain existential qualities or perfections—and without all other possible ones.
Every being in the cosmos, and the cosmos itself, is a finite entity (or cosmic multitude of entities). The cosmos is a collection of finite bodies. All of them exist in a finite mode of existence (even if only as energy fields or quanta). And even though they may exhibit great states of momentum and velocity, at any given instant in time, they occupy only the exact position they have and not a future one. They are limited in existence at that time to where they are and what they are, while they lack whatever existential perfections they will manifest newly at the next moment. It really does not matter how a “moment” is defined, as long as one realizes that they manifest certain qualities of existence that they have, but simultaneously lack others that they do not yet possess. Nor does it matter which body is actually in motion relative to any other, just as long as change of position entails some real existential difference on the part of one or the other body or bodies.
If every being were truly finite, change would be impossible. Every finite being is limited solely to the existential perfections it possesses here and now. The totality of all cosmic existence, even finite spirits if there be such, is limited to being what it is and no more. So, how can change or becoming take place?
For argument’s sake, let us assume that all change is merely accidental (in the Aristotelian sense); nothing changes substantially. Change may be merely a difference in position, size, shape, quality, relation, time, quantity, and so forth. Still, even trivial change, be it submicroscopic or merely imaginary, entails “new existence.” “New existence” is any existential perfection or reality at all which comes into being and was not there before. “Potential existence” is not “new existence,” since potency is only what is able to be, not what actually is. For example, saying one appears to be “potentially” intelligent is rightly not taken as a complement.
Assuming an atomic world in which change means merely change of position, whence comes the newness entailed in the new positions? (This will work even in a non-mechanistic universe, since changes in energy states or quanta are real.) The key insight is this: For change, becoming, or progress to occur, new existence must be posited. Where does it come from? How do you get the new from the old, the after from the before? Is there a real difference between them or not? If not, then all change, becoming, progress, or evolution is mere illusion. (But even an illusion is real as an illusion!)
If change is real, where does it come from? The old, precisely as such, is old because it lacks the existential differences that differentiate it from the new. Neither inertia nor gravity, nor any other physical force or phenomena explains this new reality. These laws merely describe how the world works, not why it is so. What is the metaphysical explanation? This is as simple as Parmenides’ first insights into being. Non-being does not beget being. All finite reality is limited to being what it is in every least detail. If anything truly new comes to be (even by the least change of position, energy level, or any other physical or spiritual quality we might envision), where does the newness come from? Merely rearranging the old does not explain the new existential distinction of the rearrangement itself. And what is rearranged has new properties in virtue of the new arrangement itself. If all finite reality is thus restricted to the “before,” whence comes the “after?”
This is also why it is critical to understand that Newton’s laws of inertia and momentum, while they describe bodies’ behavior, explain absolutely nothing metaphysically—as I have shown in a previous Strange Notions article. Even proclaimed physical “explanations,” such as general relativity’s curvature of space around masses, may give a seemingly deeper understanding in terms of related phenomena, but do not explain the existential origin of the new qualities or perfections manifested by the coming-to-be of new space-time locations and their attendant novel properties, such as greater gravitational attraction or time dilation or length contraction.
But newness does occur. Change, progress, evolution, and becoming are real. Hence, some adequate cause or reason for new existence must be posited—since whatever is in motion is moved by another. Still, the old, finite reality is old and finite precisely because it does not contain what is discovered in the new reality or new existence that is manifested in the “after” state of things.
Considering the universe as a whole, the concept of a limited cosmos in a process of evolutionary becoming and yet existing solely by itself constitutes a contradiction in terms. Because it is constantly becoming or changing, it needs to acquire new states of reality; but because it is limited in every aspect to its present exact limited state of being, it has no source from which to obtain those new states. By definition, the new cannot come from the old, or else, it isn’t really new. Yet, even changes allegedly explained by inertial motion, as seen above, entail new states of being, which then cannot be explained by the old state of the cosmos.
Thus, a purely physical universe in which motion exists is something that cannot be explained in terms of itself alone. Something else must be posited. But all physical reality has already been included in the cosmos (or even multiverse!). So, the “something else” must be non-physical—something entirely outside the finite, physical universe itself.
Moreover, this non-physical entity (or entities) must explain all that comes-to-be in the physical world, since the entire cosmos is lacking in those new qualities that arise through ongoing motion or change. Thus, neither can one finite part of the cosmos adequately account for its own motion nor can one finite part adequately account for motion of yet another finite part. Finally, the role played by this non-physical source of all that comes to be is that of a cause in relation to the effect produced, which effect is all the new aspects of existence that manifest in the world through change.
Nor does this analysis apply merely to the physical world itself. It applies to all finite things, whether they are physical or not—since the same logic applies to any limited being or beings. Such limited or finite reality cannot explain any changes at all, since it cannot give to itself or to another that which it lacks, namely, new modes of existence in any form.
If finite things cannot account for the continued newness that we experience in the cosmos, then something else must. That something else must serve as a “universal donor” of new existence. Since we have already considered every possible finite being in the finite cosmos (and even outside it) as incapable of producing “new existence,” whatever causes new existence must, by definition, not be either physical or even finite.
If it is not finite, then there cannot be two such infinite beings that cause change in the cosmos. Were there two such beings, something would have to differentiate the one from the other, or else, as Leibniz points out, the “two” would be one thing. Were either one to possess any quality of differentiation the other lacked, then the one lacking it would not be infinite, but finite.
Hence, there must exist but a single Infinite Being that serves as the only adequate explanation and source of all the new existential perfections or qualities that are continually manifested in our ever-changing universe, or even any world of finite spiritual things. Nothing is new under the Sun. What is new is new in reference to all previously existing finite beings, but is not new in reference to the Infinite Being, since that Being already contains every possible perfection or quality of existence in virtue of being infinite. Such a Being cannot itself be subject to change, or else, it would gain existential qualities it previously lacked, and thus, could not have been infinite in the first place.
Without attempting the lengthy formal demonstrations proper to natural theology, I would simply suggest that the discovery of a single Infinite Being that is responsible for all that is ever-new in finite reality is a good candidate for the classical conception of what men call God—especially since this Being is the cause of the very existence of all that is new.
This “insight based on new-existence” has the distinct advantage that it leads at once to God’s existence—without need to consider intermediate causes or possible infinite regressions among essentially ordered intermediate causes. Still, the preceding argument is not intended as a formal proof for God’s existence, but rather as a reflection on a question that finds no rational satisfaction short of conceding an Infinite Being’s existence.
