Before we begin to reflect on the essence of the problem, let us try to define the concepts that form the basis of this article. First, it is “social evolution.” This notion denotes a period that, in terms of its duration, far exceeds the time period of a revolution. In our opinion, social evolution is a qualitative change in the fundamental aspects of the life of society over a period of time, exceeding one or several generations (depending on the pace of the process), and consists in a change in the established features (social forms or social structures) inherited by society.
Without falling into the extremes of reductionism, it can be argued that the changes gradually occurring in society and conditioned by its comprehensive development (technical, economic, political, cultural, spiritual, etc.) have appropriate regulators commensurate with the level and complexity of the problems requiring resolution. But these solutions are far from always being able to remove entirely the contradictions that gradually “sludge up” the social organism. It is the problems arising in the depths of the old society that lead to its radical “purification” from the accumulated obstacles through revolution to ensure the dynamic development of society.
The second important concept that requires definition within the framework of this article is “social revolution.” What can it be compared to? Of course, any comparison suffers from inaccuracy, but here, perhaps, it is quite appropriate to recall one of Hercules’ feats related to the cleaning of the stables of Augeas, when he used the power of the water flow of two rivers, which he directed to the stables of the king of Eleia, which had not been cleaned for 30 years, in order to remove the obstacles that had accumulated in the stables of the king of Eleia. It took Hercules only one day to accomplish this feat and clean the stables of the king of Eleia to remove all the filth.
Social evolution and social revolution as forms of social development represent a unified whole, corresponding to the needs of a particular society at a certain stage of its development. Both of these concepts are related to other close concepts, such as “change,” “development,” “progress,” “leap,” and others. The term “revolution” appeared in the 14th century. Its use in a scientific context is associated with the name of Nicolaus Copernicus, who used this concept in his work, On the Revolution of the Celestial Spheres (De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, 1543). This term had a natural-scientific meaning and denoted rotational, circular motion when describing the trajectories of celestial bodies. The new era consolidated the concept of independence from Providence and gained autonomy and constancy in motion. Later, in the 17th century, it was filled with political meaning and began to mean a cyclical change of rulers. In this sense, it was used in 1660 in relation to the restoration of the English monarchy—it meant a political process leading to a sharp and profound change in the political and social structure of the state.
Many researchers have paid attention to the problem of the emergence of revolution. One of them was the famous French politician, philosopher and sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville, who devoted to this event his historical-philosophical and historical-political study, The Old Regime and Revolution, published in 1856. To understand the meaning of what happened, he focused on the internal politics of pre-revolutionary France. In his study, Tocqueville reflects on the reasons why “The Revolution effected suddenly, by a convulsive and sudden effort, without transition, precautions, or pity, what would have been gradually effected by time had it never occurred.” One of the chapters of his book is called, “How the Revolution sprang spontaneously out of the preceding facts.” In this chapter he notes one of the interesting features of the French Revolution: “To comprehend the contrast between the benign theories and the violent acts of Revolution, one must remember that it was prepared by the most civilized classes of the nation, and executed by the roughest and most unpolished.”
But if everything preceding itself led to the Revolution, the question arises: does a revolution need leaders? One can find various answers to this question. It seems to us that in any social process that is filled with political content, at a certain stage there is a need for coordination and leadership. As historical experience shows, chaos gradually gives way to order and coherence. Tocqueville described the situation of the development of revolution in the following way: “But when the vigorous generation which began the Revolution perished or became enervated, as all generations must which undertake such enterprises; when in the natural course of events of this character, the love of liberty had been discouraged and grown languid in the midst of anarchy and popular despotism, and the bewildered nation began to grope around for a master, immense facilities were offered for the restoration of absolute government; and it was easy for the genius of him who was destined both to continue and to destroy the Revolution to discover them.”
Of course, a revolution needs a leader who can lead the revolutionary masses, just as in artillery it takes not only a charge of powder and a shell to get a shell to its target, but also the muzzle of the gun to point the shooter in the right direction. Revolution is a complex process involving many forces that have different orientations depending on the interests that drive them. Therefore, revolutions can often be characterized by the presence of multiple leaders, seeking to direct events according to their own scenario. Accordingly, the opponents try to change the course of the revolution not only by political struggle, but also by the direct elimination of the leaders (Charlotte Corday, Fanny Kaplan, etc.), because the elimination of the leader of the revolution may well lead to a decline in the revolutionary intensity, if there are no fellow revolutionaries able to compensate for the disappearance of the main figure. It is difficult to imagine a social revolution without a leader(s). Revolution is not the work of loners; it requires the presence of a group of people (a party), which has a certain structure and hierarchy, relying on the masses. Suffice it to recall as an example the model of political party organization proposed by Maurice Duverger. If we turn to astronomy (from which the concept of “revolution” came), related to celestial bodies, we will notice that in accordance with the objective laws of organization of nature, various stellar systems are organized hierarchically. In society there are also regularities reflecting the laws of nature in a transformed form, with the difference that the processes taking place are influenced by rational human activity. The question of whether the revolution is an accidental event or a regular event is resolved in favor of the regularity of this phenomenon. Many authors are inclined to this interpretation of the problem. Already at the beginning of the October Revolution of 1917, the French author Pierre Pascal, who was in St. Petersburg at the time, wrote in his diaries, published later: “The Russian Revolution, whatever the reaction to it, will have the same huge response as the revolution of 1789, and even much greater: it is not an accident, it is an epoch.“ The French historian Albert Soboul also insists on the inevitability of the (French) Revolution, citing his illustrious predecessor: “Tocqueville, for his part, showed with his characteristic insight the inevitability of the Revolution. Certainly, the Revolution was not an accidental event. It is true that the world was taken by surprise by it, but it was nevertheless only the consummation of a longer work, the swift and tumultuous end of an endeavor on which ten human generations had labored.”
Without claiming to be an exhaustive definition, based on the above, social revolution can be defined as an accelerated form of overcoming the accumulated structural contradictions in society through the violent elimination of relations and institutions constraining development, leading to fundamental changes in all spheres of society.
It is generally believed that revolution as a social phenomenon in its modern form appeared in history in the late 18th century, when in the West the development of philosophical and political concepts significantly influenced change in the political system and the course of historical development of a number of countries. Hannah Arendt argued that the modern understanding of revolution can be dated back to the time of the two great revolutions of the late 18th century, linking it to the birth of freedom. She referred to Condorcet, who formulated a postulate stating that the word “revolutionary” cannot be applied to revolutions whose goal is not freedom. From this, Arendt concluded that the main thing in modern revolutions is to combine the idea of freedom with the experience of starting something new. The American Revolution of 1776, which led to the creation of the United States, and the French Revolution of 1789, which resulted in the birth of the republic in France, are vivid examples in this respect. They started a series of revolutions that have changed the face of the world to a great extent: the revolutions of 1848 in Europe, the Paris Commune (1871), the revolution in Russia in 1917, the revolution in China (1949), and the revolutions of the twentieth century in Africa, Latin America, and Cuba.
One of the common features between the above-mentioned revolutions is their connection with another no less important socio-political phenomenon—war. It would be presumptuous to claim that the relationship between war and revolution has the character of rigid determination. Of course, here we can rather speak of a stochastic regularity inherent in many social phenomena. Nevertheless, the basis for hypotheses of this kind exists. The cause-and-effect relationship between war and revolution can be both direct and reverse. That is, war can give rise to revolution under certain conditions, but not always. At the same time, revolution can serve as a starting point for the beginning of a war or a series of wars. This depends on historical and other conditions that determine the development of events.
In a number of cases, war fulfills the function of revolution, namely, fundamental social, political, economic and other changes. Thus, World War I led to the liquidation of four empires, two of which—the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian—collapsed without revolutions. Revolutions manifest themselves most tangibly in the social and political spheres of society. A very important component of fundamental transformations of society is political revolution, which is singled out by the sociology of social change as one of the main concepts of revolution (behavioral, psychological, structural and political). It is a well-known fact that the first act of social revolution is political revolution, namely, the conquest of state power, since the question of power is the main question of any revolution. However, treating revolution solely as a political phenomenon impoverishes the understanding of this multifaceted phenomenon and reduces it to an extreme form of competition for political control. Revolution in society can be a profound socio-political transformation of the entire social organism and a qualitative transformation of individual spheres of life, such as political life. Revolution is the result of the impact of various factors of objective and subjective nature.
To answer the question of what is the main determining factor and engine of social revolutions—objective conditions and contradictions or party-ideological strategies and projects, activities of political actors, subjective socio-political construction, including with the participation of external forces—let us turn to the existing points of view. In principle, they can be divided into two positions: opponents and supporters of the benefits of objective factors. However, both points of view in their extreme interpretations suffer from one-sidedness and cannot convincingly answer the question posed. Those who argue that socio-political processes (e.g., revolution, war, etc.) are completely uncontrollable are perhaps not so numerous. Nevertheless, Joseph Marie de Maistre, viewing the French Revolution as a social phenomenon, identified it with a mystical being: “It is not the people who carry out the revolution at all, it is the revolution that leads the people” (Triomphe R. Joseph de Maistre, Etudes sur la vie et sur la doctrine d’un matérialiste mystique. Genève, 1968, p. 12). In this respect, the subject-object relationship between war and people (read, between revolution and people) is described quite eloquently by the famous French polemologist Gaston Bouthoul. Discussing the theories that regard war as a type of rational human activity, he writes: “Deceptive doctrines, because they make us believe that war is an instrument that serves us, that we can use at will—a continuation of politics by other means; in short, to assume that we have dominion over it instead of us being a toy in its hands. Surely war, and especially its preparation, may seem rational to some staff officer like Clausewitz, since his profession is to prepare and plan wars in advance, as a kind of engineer” (Gaston Bouthoul, Traité de polémologie. Paris, 1970, p. 533). In this context, in our opinion, much closer to the real state of affairs is the interpretation of the problem by Albert Soboul. In a number of works devoted to the revolution, he shows the real correlation between subjective and objective factors in the revolution. Thus, he writes about the influence of political consciousness on the development of the French Revolution of 1789: “The role of the ideological movement in the preparation of the Revolution should not be overly minimized. In particular, officials who had achieved, if not wealth, then affluence and independent position through the purchase of their offices, constituted a cultural milieu where people freely criticized the existing order. In this sense, both—officials and intellectuals—contributed to the formation of an ideology that awakened all categories of the bourgeoisie, and then to the emergence of their class consciousness, a phenomenon without which the Revolution would have been unthinkable” (La Révolution française. Paris, 1965, pp. 30-40; Soboul, “Classical historiography of the French Revolution on the current controversy,” French Yearbook, 1976; 1978, pp. 155-170; p. 163).
Minimizing the destructive and violent consequences of revolutionary change seems to be a poorly managed process. It depends on the depth and scale of the accumulated contradictions, on the one hand, and the real balance of forces inside the country where the revolutionary events are taking place, on the other. As a rule, the losing side will seek to aggravate and escalate the confrontation, as long as it possesses human and personnel superiority and sources of funding.
The hypothesis that under certain conditions the world can get rid of revolutions and wars is often proposed and considered. Such a desire did not arise yesterday. Hypothetically, it is not excluded. It is quite likely that such a thing will happen someday. Then the “end of history” will come. But even supporters of this concept have recently abandoned this view of the modern historical process. Of course, it is possible to throw out the concept of “revolution” from the vocabulary and replace it with others—“carnation revolution,” “velvet revolution,” “rose revolution,” “orange revolution,” “tulip revolution,” etc.—but what about the phenomenon itself? It is even more convenient to get rid of an inconvenient term, as, for example, in the case of the Arab Spring. It would seem that Occam’s Razor has become very blunt—and not without the involvement of the parties concerned.
Can humanity hope for a future without revolutions and wars? Of course it can, but it hardly makes sense to count on it with certainty, at least in the foreseeable future (this applies equally to war). This is evidenced by the processes taking place in the world, the results of which clearly show that there are objective and subjective conditions for disturbing the equilibrium both within and between countries. Pavel I. Novgorodtsev’s position on the social ideal is consonant with this approach. This thinker perceived the social ideal as an unattainable aspiration of people to justice, directed into the future, as a principle of universal unification on the principles of equality and freedom. Criticizing historically emerging forms of positive law and the state, including the rule of law, as moral values and ideals, he recognized that these real forms, institutions and establishments are “a necessary and indispensable means to move forward on the path of moral progress.” Thus, he departs from Aristotle’s position, who did not oppose the ideal to reality, and inclines to Plato’s view, for whom the ideal is something unattainable and speculative. It was Plato who emphasized that the essence of all earthly aspirations is the approximation to the ideal. In his work, On the Social Ideal, among other problems, Novgorodtsev raises the problem of war, but he considers war as an attribute of modern society. Rather, he treats its existence realistically, perceiving it as a historical given.
Obviously, an important point in understanding the causes and consequences of the revolution is to analyze the relationship between revolution and war. Historical experience confirms that there is a certain relationship between them, which can be regarded as probabilistic. It is indicative that both phenomena are varieties of violence. In terms of causality, revolution can be a cause of war (internal, external or both) or a consequence of war (as one of the factors leading to a revolutionary situation).
War is a socio-political phenomenon, the main content of which is an armed struggle between subjects of politics in the international arena or inside the state, the meaning of which is the continuation of politics by violent means; sometimes broadly interpreted as a state of enmity, struggle with someone. War is a phenomenon present in the life of peoples for many millennia; it is an organic element of the socio-cultural context of their development. It is characteristic that during the war all the processes that are latent in peacetime are aggravated in society.
At the end of the 19th century, the prevailing opinion was that wars should leave the life of mankind and give way to peaceful development, free from military clashes. But history has proved the rightness of those who, contrary to the apparent prosperity, did not succumb to soothing illusions.
Pointing to the natural connection between revolution and war, the French historian Claude Mazorik argues that war is “a natural component of revolution.” Regarding this statement, François Furet specifies that “the outbreak of war between the French Revolution and Europe is perhaps one of the most important and most revealing problems in the history of the Revolution. This war… was imposed rather than desired by the Europe of kings, against the pressure of the émigrés and the royal family… But it was the Revolution that wanted this war.”
Proponents of the Marxist-Leninist approach interpreted the relationship between war and revolution in terms of class struggle: “Gathering all the imperialist contradictions into one knot, war weakened world capitalism and accelerated and facilitated the revolutionary struggles of the working class. The revolution became the immediate practical task of the proletariat, the natural development of its class struggle.”
So that the proletariat wins the class struggle with the help of the proletarian revolution, Lenin put forward the slogan of the defeat of the Russian government in the imperialist war, supported by its supporters. They advocated the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, on the basis that the revolution in time of war is a civil war. Thus, the Bolsheviks not only spoke of the causal relationship between war and revolution, but even identified them (of course, with certain reservations).
To consider the relationship between the phenomena of war and revolution, the collective work of French researchers from the French Institute of Polemology under the leadership of Gaston Bouthoul is of some interest. This study analyzes almost 200-year period (1740-1974) from the point of view of its saturation with wars and revolutions, the reasons for their emergence and mutual connection.
Revolution and war are autonomous social phenomena. There are similarities and differences between them. The similarities include the following points: 1) they belong to socio-political phenomena; 2) both are a means of resolving political contradictions; 3) both lead to the aggravation of all processes that are latent in peaceful/crisis-free times; 4) they are a sharp transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones; 5) they are varieties of violence; 6) in the course of their implementation, as a rule, weapons are used.
As for the difference, it can be attributed to the following: 1) wars occur more often than revolutions; 2) they differ in duration (revolutions happen in a short period of time); 3) revolution takes place inside the country, while war is more often external and less often internal (civil); 4) revolutions take place in centers of political power, while wars cover large territories; 5) in war, the opposing sides wear uniforms that differ from those of the enemy; 6) war involves the use of regular units and different types of weapons; 7) the purpose of the (external) war is to protect the state and the population from enemy troops, and the revolution aims to seize political power.
At the same time, revolution and war can enter into causal relations among themselves. They are not unidirectional, but may have the property of reversibility. That is, in some cases war becomes the cause of revolution. In other circumstances, revolution may become the cause of war or intervention. In each case, war appears in a specific capacity. Usually, the cause of revolution is unsuccessful, exhausting external wars. And the consequence of revolution is civil wars, but sometimes external wars (revolutionary wars after the French Revolution of 1789).
In conclusion, it can be argued that social evolution, which is the gradual development of society, is periodically affected by such phenomena as revolution and war, which dramatically change the situation in the state, provoking social, economic, political and other metamorphoses that lead to irreversible changes, provoking the transformation of the image of states subjected to these accelerated forms of loss of stability.
Featured: La liberté (Liberty, an allegory of the French Revolution), by Jeanne-Louise (Nanine) Vallain; painted ca. 1793-1794.
