On April 4, South Korea’s Constitutional Court unanimously ruled to remove President Yoon Suk-yeol from office, striking down his controversial martial law declaration from last December.
Since taking office, the now-ousted Yoon had firmly aligned South Korea with the liberal-democratic camp, deepening ties with Washington and Tokyo. That effort culminated in two landmark agreements in 2023: the Washington Declaration and the Camp David Pact.
But all of that now hangs in the balance. With a snap presidential election scheduled for early June—and a leftist, arguably anti-American, candidate leading in the polls—South Korea and its allies may soon find themselves in deep kimchi.
In this exclusive interview, we speak with South Korean attorney, former parliamentarian, and prominent conservative commentator Kang Yong-suk to unpack what’s at stake.
Jason Morgan and Kenji Yoshida (JM&KY): On April 4, South Korea’s eight Constitutional Court judges unanimously ruled to oust President Yoon Seok-yeol from office. How do you assess the decision?
Kang Yong-suk (KY-s): In a single sentence, the constitutional order of the Republic of Korea has collapsed. In any nation governed by the rule of law, judicial rulings must, of course, be respected. However, the proceedings in President Yoon’s impeachment case raise a host of grave legal and procedural concerns.
First of all, the assessment of a national emergency and the subsequent declaration of emergency martial law fall squarely within the President’s prerogative (political question) as head of state. In such matters, the Constitutional Court ought to have exercised the utmost restraint, limiting its judgment to one of clear legal significance. Instead, it overstepped this foundational principle, rendering what is effectively a political decision under the guise of judicial review.
JM&KY: Parliament impeached Yoon on charges of inciting an insurrection, but why was the court unable to reach a verdict on that count?
KY-s: In South Korea, insurrection is a criminal offense defined under Articles 87 and 91 of the Criminal Code. To be found guilty of leading an insurrection, one must have either usurped national territory or subverted the constitutional order. The first condition—territorial usurpation—clearly does not apply in this case.
The second condition—subversion of the constitutional order—requires that the accused sought to neutralize an existing law, the Constitution, or a state institution through the use of force, and that a riot was incited in the process. Proponents of the insurrection theory argue that President Yoon deployed troops to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission with precisely that intent.
However, the December 3 martial law did not result in any casualties, and property damage was minimal, limited to a few broken windows at the National Assembly. The authority to declare emergency martial law is explicitly granted to the president under the Constitution, and there is little evidence to suggest serious unconstitutionality or illegality in its implementation.
Historically, the scale of military mobilization for similar actions has been far greater. More than 30,000 troops were deployed during the May 16 [1961] Incident led by Park Chung-hee, and over 20,000 soldiers were mobilized for the May 17 [1980] Incident under Chun Doo-hwan. By comparison, the December 3 martial law proclamation involved a significantly smaller deployment. Approximately 500 troops were sent to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission.
At the time, over 1,000 lawmakers and related personnel were present at the National Assembly. From a purely practical standpoint, deploying a few hundred soldiers would have been insufficient to overpower them or neutralize the legislature. Instead, the move should be understood as a symbolic gesture aimed at maintaining order and sending a message, rather than a genuine attempt to subvert constitutional authority.
JM&KY: One of the key reasons cited for Yoon’s declaration of martial law was the investigation into alleged election fraud. Could you elaborate?
KY-s: Serious allegations of election fraud first emerged during the general elections held on April 15, 2020, and again on April 10, 2024. In both instances, controversy centered on the early voting system held 5 days before the same-day voting.
In the 2020 election, statistically improbable patterns surfaced in the early vote count. Across every district nationwide, candidates from the left-wing Democratic Party consistently outperformed those from the conservative Future Korea Party in early voting. On average, the Democratic Party’s early vote share was 12.5 percentage points higher than its same-day vote share, while the Future Korea Party’s early vote share was 12.5 percentage points lower. This disparity suggests that roughly 25% of additional early votes.
A similar pattern reappeared in the 2024 general election. The Democratic Party’s early vote share exceeded its same-day vote share by 13 percentage points, while the conservative People Power Party’s early vote share was 13 points lower.
Discrepancies of this scale are highly unlikely to occur naturally and are referred to in mathematics as statistical anomalies. When anomalies of this magnitude are observed, they warrant a comprehensive and transparent investigation.
JM&KY: Were any legal actions taken to contest the results?
KY-s: Candidates who challenged the outcomes of their races filed lawsuits seeking to invalidate the election results. I personally led over 100 of these legal actions. Yet, only six districts were granted permission to conduct a recount. During those recounts, we discovered numerous irregular ballots and compelling evidence suggesting serious fraud.
Despite these findings, the Supreme Court dismissed our claims on what I believe were unreasonable grounds. The Court argued that the plaintiffs failed to identify the perpetrators and reasoned that, had fraud occurred, the culprits would not have left behind such blatant evidence at the scene.
JM&KY: Anti-China sentiment in South Korea has surged since the December 3 martial law declaration. What factors have contributed to this shift?
KY-s: Part of the surge in anti-China sentiment relates to the issue of electoral fraud. Many on the conservative side believe the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was heavily involved in manipulating South Korea’s elections. For example, Chinese companies such as Huawei have exported defective vote-counting devices to South Korean electronics firms like LG, which were then used in the elections.
More broadly, the current crisis in South Korea should not be seen merely as a domestic left-right political struggle, but as part of a larger international context. It is increasingly difficult to deny that the CCP played a significant role in the impeachment proceedings—a view shared by several prominent American thinkers.
Matthew Schlapp and Steve Bannon, close allies of former President Trump, have also stated that South Korea is now at the frontline of a global conflict between the forces defending liberal democracy and those seeking to undermine it.
This perspective gained further traction at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States this February, where many American intellectuals expressed concern over China’s role in Korean politics. Some, like attorney Gordon Chang, openly said China had a direct hand in manipulating the country’s elections.
In this light, the martial law declaration and impeachment drama should not be understood solely as domestic political theater. Rather, they represent a critical phase in a broader “hegemonic war” between Washington and Beijing.
JM&KY: With a snap election scheduled for June 3 to choose South Korea’s next leader, leftist and staunchly pro-Beijing candidate Lee Jae-myung is leading in the polls. Should South Korea and the US be concerned?
KY-s: This is a matter of utmost concern for South Korea and the United States. U.S. military bases on the Korean Peninsula serve as a vital geopolitical linchpin in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. From South Korea, major Chinese cities like Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai fall within the range of short-range ballistic missiles, positioning the peninsula as the frontline of strategic deterrence. Notably, Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek—the largest U.S. military installation overseas—functions as a critical forward base capable of responding swiftly to regional contingencies.
Should a Lee Jae-myung administration come to power, the risk of these strategic assets falling under indirect Chinese influence would be difficult to avoid. There is growing concern that Chinese state-affiliated investors and entities with ties to the Chinese Communist Party may be allowed, either tacitly or deliberately, to acquire land and real estate near key military sites, opening the door to stealth military penetration under the guise of economic investment.
Moreover, such a political shift would pose a serious challenge to the strategic vision of the Trump administration, which views South Korea as a core partner in defense and energy cooperation. President Trump has praised South Korea’s world-class shipbuilding expertise and its capabilities in small modular reactor (SMR) technology. Under former President Yoon Suk-yeol, bilateral cooperation in these areas has deepened significantly and is seen as a model for a forward-looking alliance.
However, Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party’s entrenched anti-nuclear stance and apparent tilt toward Beijing raise serious doubts about the continuity of this partnership. A change in administration could thus undermine not only South Korea’s national security posture but also broader U.S. strategic interests in the region.
