Why did Syria fall so quickly into the hands of the terrorist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)? There are several explanations, which focus on the enervating effects of sanctions, a demoralized military, poor coordination between the Syrians, Russians and Iranians, and internal corruption. None are satisfactory, because they completely ignore the efforts of the CIA, Israel, Turkey, and various Arab states. Then, President Putin stated that “all that is happening in Syria is not a defeat for Russia,” and that Russia had achieved its goal there, which was to prevent the establishment of a terrorist state. So, what is Syria now, since it is in the hands of the HTS, which is an offshoot of Al-Qaeda/ISIS, the very terrorists that Russia says it was trying to defeat. So, what “goal” did Russia really achieve?
Russia began its active support of President Assad in 2011, when the Syrian civil war began, which was part of the CIA’s covert operation known as “Timber Sycamore.” In 2015, at the request of President Assad, Russia intervened militarily to fight against ISIS (a CIA proxy), which was gaining an upper hand. With the help of Iran, ISIS was ultimately defeated in those parts of Syria controlled by President Assad, and stability returned in those parts. The northwast remained in the hands of other terrorists, all supported by the United States; these are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the Kujrdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
Perhaps the “goal” that President Putin is talking about is the defeat of ISIS in the parts of Syria that belonged to Assad. Let us not forget that ISIS and Al-Qaeda were and are proxies of Washington. So, the defeat of these terrorists in Syria was supposedly also a defeat of the US and its various allies. But did that really happen?
In the now (in)famous email sent to Hilary Clinton (then Secretary of State) by her aide, Jake Sullivan (later Joe Biden’s National Security Advisor), stated in 2012: “AQ [al-Qaeda] is on our side in Syria.” The context of this admission of America supporting Islamic extremists is, as noted, Operation Timber Sycamore, the covert program run by the CIA, whose aim was ousting Assad and taking contol of Syria.
Timber Sycamore, which officially operated from 2012 t0 2017, armed, trained, funded and supported various militias and terrorist groups to fight and overthrow Assad. The other countries involved with this CIA program included the UK, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar and Turkey. The funding amounted to $1 billion each year. It was via Timber Sycamore that ISIS emerged, since Islamic extremism is a highly effective CIA tool, as menrioned already. And Israel also had its own jihadists.
Although ISIS was eventually dismantled by Iran and Russia in certain parts of Syria, the work of Timber Sycamore continued and bore fruit—the important Syrian city of Idlib came under the control of Al-Qaeda/ISIS, which by this time was rebranded as Jabhat al-Nusra, which in turn was renamed Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and finally renamed once again as HTS (in 2017). But fundamentally it is Al-Qaeda/ISIS.
The official American narrative states that Timber Sycamore was phased out by President Trump in July of 2017 (about the time HTS took possession of Idlib), so that the money could be put to better use overthrowing Assad. Rather, Timber Sycamore had achieved its objective—the establishment of Idlib as a terrorist basecamp, from which the next stage could be implemented—the overthrow of Assad and the takeover of Syria.
The loss of Idlib was Russia’s first major defeat, in Syria, and it would not be its last.
Initially, Russia sought to strengthen its position with the recapture of Aleppo in late 2016. However, Idlib proved impossible to take, because the various groups and militias that had been trained and funded by the CIA consolidated their positions and proved impossible to dislodge. These groups were now led by HTS, which also became the government of Idlib. Russia carried out many airstrikes, along with ground assaults by the Syrian army, but to no avail. HTS and its various supporting groups could not be defeated. This was the second major defeat for Russia—the inability to destroy HTS.
One of the key partners in Project Timber Sycamore was Turkey, which officially handled Idlib, along with HTS and various other anti-Assad groups. Thus, moving against Idlib, for Russia, would mean moving against Turkey, which for various economic and strategic reasons Russia was not willing, or able, to do (see, the Astana Talks). Thus, on the one hand Russia was committed to supporting Assad and his need to defeat HTS, while on the other hand, Russia was also eager to maintain its ties with Turkey. By trying to “serve” two masters, Russia hobbled itself. HTS also made sure to never engage in a direct conflict with Russia, thus ensuring that there could be no military solution to anti-Assad insurgency, because Russia was not going to, or able to, capture Idlib.
HTS also knew that were Russia to attack Idlib, there would be serious civilian casualties, which would put Russia in a bad light internationally and further feed the growing anti-Russian sentiment of the West.
Instead, Russia decided to leave Idlib alone and focus on other ISIS pockets, and in this way show support for Assad. This was a strange decision, since all of ISIS and other extremist groups in Syria drew their strength and funding from Idlib. Thus, by leaving Idlib alone, Russia could no longer control what would come next—an all-out assault on Syria, and the country’s eventual and rapid fall.
Control over Idlib, the city and province, was crucial for both Assad and the forces opposing him because of its geographical position and economic significance. The area has strategic importance, since it is a transport hub that connects all of Syria, via the major highways, the M5 and M4. Control of Idlib means control over logistical capabilities, both military and economic. The inability to serve two masters was the third major defeat for Russia.
Over the years of the Syrian civil war, the population of the city surged to 3 million, who would become civilian casualties were Russia to undertake a massive attack. Plus, such an attack would open the floodgates for more refugees to flee into Turkey and then Europe; and so, Istanbul was not going to allow Russia to carry out any major military operations against the city. Turkey undertook Operation Spring Shield in 2020 to ensure this would never happen. In these contradictory allegiances of Russia, to both Turkey and Assad, the weakest link would eventually snap (Assad).
Thus, the various forces that had joined together for Timber Sycamore now began the next stage of their operation from Idlib—the defeat of Assad and the capture of the entire country. Despite the official narrative, the quick fall of Syria was not a surprise but fully anticipated. The Timber Sycamore associates were just waiting for the right time to strike. Russia did not prepare for this eventuality in any way, and the inability to prepare for HTS’s blitzkrieg operation was Russia’s fourth defeat.
There was also the heavy involvement of the Mossad in Idlib, along with the various other conjoined intelligence organizations under Timber Sycamore.
For Israel, Assad was long a threat because he was allied with Iran, which Israel sees as its greatest enemy and has long sought to destroy it. Syria was also the conduit for Iran’s support of the Palestinians and of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Through Syria, Iran also supported Armenia against the aggression of Azerbaijan (an ally of Israel and Turkey). Thus, for Israel, the defeat of Assad would prepare the way for the defeat of Iran—Israel’s greatest goal which would ensure its firm control of the region. Russia could not counter this checkmate of Iran, and this constitues its fifth defeat. The fact that as soon as Assad fell, Israel carried out massive and devastating air raids all across Syria demonstates the thorough defeat of Russia, for the equipment, facilities and armor destroyed by Israel largely came from Russia. Millions of dollars worth gone in an instant.
For the United States, Assad was the last Arab leader that yet resisted American hegemony, and with him gone, the entire Arab world, if not the Middle East itself, would belong to America. Russia tried to counter this American influence in Syria but failed—and this constitutes Russia’s sixth major defeat. The Middle East now firmly belongs to America and thus Israel.
As for Russia’s ally, Turkey, it was always working closely with the CIA to deliver massive amount of arms and munitions to HTS and other anti-Assad groups. Turkey also transported the various militias, who were being trained in Jordan, into Syria to take up the fight (the Syrian Train and Equip Program). These fighting men came from the larger Mongol-Turkic sphere of Central Asia which Turkey deeply influences, namely, Azeri, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Chechens and Uyghurs. As well, there were Islamist contingents from Europe, Pakistan, Indonesia, and most importantly from Ukraine, which has long been engaged in Syria through its Khimik Group, in order to fight Russia in Africa and the Middle East.
Turkey also provided technical and logistical support, in conjunction with the CIA, along with extensive training in maneuvers and ground assault support. Turkey did all this because of its own ambitions, first, to defeat the various groups, led by the Kurdish PPK, that seek to weaken Turkey by winning Kurdish sovereignty. By overthrowing Assad, Turkey would gain an upper hand in this fight. Second, there is also the grander project of Pan-Turkism which would see the various Turkic speaking peoples, in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe, form a grand bloc, all led by Turkey. Again, Assad stood in the way of this greater ambition. This Turkic diaspora constitutes the key faction in the entire HTS army.
Meanwhile, in Idlib, under the rule of HTS, with Abu Mohammed al-Jolani as the governor, there was terror and misery for the ordinary people—indiscriminate shelling of heavily populated civilian areas, routine torture and summary executions, including of many journalists. A pall of fear hung over the city. This “method” of government now holds sway in that country once known as Syria.
When the time came, HTS struck Assad. Here is a timeline of how quickly he was defeated.
November 27, 2024: A coalition of opposition forces, led by HTS and supported by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, launched a major offensive against Assad.
November 30, 2024: Opposition forces quickly captured Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, a city held by Russia. The loss of strategic Aleppo was Russia’s seventh major defeat.
December 7, 2024: Opposition forces advanced into Damascus, the capital, checkmating Assad who had no options left. Letting Assad be painted into a corner was Russia’s eighth major defeat.
December 8, 2024: Assad’s regime officially collapsed as opposition forces declared victory in Damascus. Assad fled the capital and eventually found asylum in Moscow.
How is it that Assad’s entire army, over 600,000 battle-hardened men (including an air force 100,000 strong), hardly fought at all and simply laid down their arms and either surrendered or fled into neighboring countries?
Yes, the argument can be made that the army simply did not want to fight for Assad—but then they also did not want to fight for themselves, since many of them have now been rounded up and are either sitting in prison or have been executed.
So, why this mass surrender when the Syrian army knew full well what awaited them? ISIS is not known for mercy—and this would be especially known by the Syrian rank-and-file, which had spent many long years fighting these very terrorists. Why would these soldiers believe that they would be treated with mercy by their bitterest enemy, if they surrendered? Or were they betrayed by their officers? Rumors say that the military command was bribed not to fight and thus ordered the laying down of arms and the surrender. If this is true, who was paying them? Whatever the reason for this odd behavior of the entire army, the fact remains that a collective decision was made by the military to not fight. It is also worth poitning out that those who say Assad’s army was corrupt and thus rotten to the core which made it collapse instantly are also saying that Russia’s help was therefore totally ineffective—because what we witnessed was an army 600,000 man strong, simply disappear.
But here, mention must also be made of the fact that the fall of Assad is a major defeat also for Iran.
As Assad’s forces collapsed, Iran began evacuating its military from Syria, because it could no longer hold against the assaults coming from the South and the Northwest. It was a strategic retreat, lest it all turn into an embarrassing debacle. Iran, like Russia, was Assad’s major supporter.
Unlike Iran, Russia did not withdraw—but like Assad’s troops, it simply did not fight. Iran saw this and wisely withdrew because it understood that it would be fighting alone, a fight for which it was not preapred.
What does all this say?
First, it appears that Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has indeed taken a heavy toll, because it could muster only a very weak response to the attacks of the opposition forces in Syria.
Second, it appears that Russia had a major intelligence failure, because it did not know its enemy well enough to fight it effectively. It was outplayed by HTS.
Third, because Russia never understood the gravity of the assault, let alone the strength of the HTS, it overestimated its own ability to handle the situation by way of diplomacy. Which means that Russia knew it was weak in Syria and used its only strength (diplomacy) to get some sort of win. When the need was for decisive military action, Russia tried to talk its way out. Assad and Iran relied on Russian intelligence, which was both faulty and inadequate. Thus, the collapse of Syria was ensured.
It was also said that HTS comprised a small group of men, some say as little as 6,000 to as large as 31,000. There is no data available as to the actual strength of the HTS and the various opposition forces coimbined. If it was assumed that there were at most 31,000 men driving around in Toyota pickups, who came up with this number? And if this number was believed by Assad and his army, and the Russians and the Iranians, they would be consistently ill-prepared for what actually hit them. HTS out-maneuvered the Russians, Iranians and Syrians combined—and thus were hardly a bunch of young guys behaving badly in Toyota pickup trucks. At best, Russia could only save Assad and his immediate family. His extended family has been slaughtered whenever found. And now his people, the Alawites, are being targeted.
With the departure of Assad. Israel next began a devastating air campaign, as noted, undertaking over 600 sortees which destroyed the Syrian army, navy, air defense systems, research facilities and nearly all of the country’s military infrastructure. A lot of this armament, equipment and facilities were Russian. Many thought that this was Israel taking advantage of chaos, but perhaps it is better to view this massive destruction as the final blow to Russia in Syria—there would be nothing left for Russia to call its own. We have to bear in mind that Israel was very much a participant in Timber Sycamore. And, therefore, Israel also got the best parts of the Golan Heights—it now has 1200 square kilometers. As Prime Minister Netanyahu said, all this territory is Israel’s forever.
Then it became known that Russia had asked for help from Turkey to get its troops out from Syria, many of whom were trapped in isolated pockets. This disarray is telling of how devasting was the defeat for Russia.
One of the key Russian bases was the naval one at Tartus. Before Syria fell, Russia pulled out all its ships and took them out on a “maneuver” in the Mediterranean. There are now reports that Russia is trying negotiate with Libya to start a naval base there, from where it can oversee its interests in Africa. And Israel, true to form, also struck Tartus with so much TNT that the resulting explosion caused an earthquake. It is not yet known what survives of the Russian base there.
Is it still even worth asking the obvious question—was Russia strategically defeated in Syria? Sure, Russia continues its symbolic presence there, but why would HTS want Russia, its enemy just a few months ago, to remain in Syria? It is already welcoming Ukraine, its friend in the fight.
Consider the following:
There is now much uncertainty as to the eventual fate of Russia’s two most important bases, the naval one at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim. Both are most certainly lost. Both long served as major strategic hubs for Russia’s engagement not only in the Middle East but also in the Mediterranean and Africa. HTS now has full control of both bases, while Russia is trying to negotiate some sort of future arrangement. Why would America, via its proxy, HTS, want to allow its enemy to carry on in Syria, as if nothing ever happened?
It will be very difficult for Russia to project power in the region and this will hinder, if not undermine, its various logistical networks that oversee its interests in Africa. The Middle East no longer exists for Russia. The number of airplanes at Khmeimim has already decreased to just a few, which severely limits Russia’s operational capabilities. Khmeimim was a major strategic center for Russian cargo planes which maintained supply chains and ensured operational readiness not only in Syria but in the Sudan, the Central African Republic, and West Africa. In fact, it was because of Syria that Russia could play such a vital role in Africa. Thus, Russia’s defeat in Syria is a major strategic blow to its larger ambitions. Africa is now very far away for Russia.
As noted, Russia is now negotiating with HTS to continue its military presence in the area. But this raises the obvious point—HTS is the final outcome of Timber Sycamore, so why would America allow any sort of a future for Russia in Syria? America understands perfectly the importance of Syria to Russia’s future plans for the Middle East and for Africa, regions for which America has very definite plans of its own. But notice, the leader of new Syria is making sure to meet with Ukraine, its ally. There are no such meetings with Russia.
This strategic defeat of Russia is further highlighted by President Putin’s statement that Russia was not defeated in Syria but achieved its military goal, which is difficult to identify; Putin also said that Assad was ousted because of a weak Syrian army and because Iran came up short. Never mind that both were replying on Russian intelligence and support, which came up short.
Plus, it is said that Russia sought to restructure the Syrian army in order to fashion a more effective fighting force that would be able to operate independently, with Russian oversight. However, for various reasons (given as, corruption, weak morale of the Syrian army, and the competing influence of Iran), these reforms could not be implemented. But one can only wonder then, why Russia could not correct these failings, given the importance to it of Syria? Or, is it really all a way to shift the blame—that the Syrian army was neither weak nor ill-prepared, that it was stabbed in the back by those higher up in the chain of command, that Syria was now just too inconvenient for Russia?
It is also said that Assad, supported by Iranian militias, actually did not want to give Russia control over the military. This supposedly limited Russia’s capabilities. If there was such deep antagonism shown by Assad in favor of Iran, then why did he choose to go into exile in Moscow rather than Tehran? More importantly, what does that say about Russo-Iranian cooperation in the months ahead?
We are also told Russia relied too heavily on airstrikes, with no ground operations which could consolidate and control territory, meaning that territory remained unstable and volatile. At the same time, we are told that Russia relied too much on private military contractors like the Wagner Group, which is a ground force. So, which is it?
All this suggests that there were three groups, working independently and often against each other in Syria—Assad’s army, the Russians and the Iranians. If that is actually true, then, again, what does that say about the Russian ability to build consensus and support in regions that truly matter for the interests of Russia? What does that say about BRICS and multipolarity?
If Assad was an important strategic ally, then what does his fall say about Russian reliability and Russian power? And if Iran is a rival that cannot cooperate but hinders, then what does that say about the greater Russian project of becoming an alternative pole to the West?
All this raises the specter of another possibility—perhaps one more aligned with the pragmatics of international relations.
What if Russia is simply tired of fighting in Ukraine—and needs peace just as much as Ukraine needs it? Recall the many diplomatic efforts of Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orban to bring about such a peace. Was a deal indeed made? Was Syria sacrificed in order to win this peace, and with the promise that Russia will be integrated back into the West and the thousands of sanctions on it would be lifted? If it was agreed to let Assad fall and hand the Middle East over to the United States and Israel, then this also suggests an agreement with Israel. Recall also that 15 percent of the population in Israel is Russian, or of Russian origin; that is about 1.3 to 1.5 million people, when the total population of Israel is about 9.8 million. Could Russia really afford to let down such a huge number of its own people in the Middle East, and for Assad?
The loss of Syria is a refashioning of Russia into a Western nation—otherwise, Syria shows Russia to be a paper tiger when push comes to shove.
Syria’s loss has made it obvious that the idealism of the Kazan BRICS Summit is now so much hot air, where all the various have-not nations looked to Russia for leadership—as a viable alternative to the United States. But Russia also needs to look after Number One. For Russia, continuing to support Assad meant the Ukraine war would drag dreaily on, sanctions would continue, and Russia’s isolation would not slacken. But it was decent of Russia to not let Assad suffer the same fate as Saddam Hussein and Moamar Gaddafi.
Consider these two points. First, Russia has high inflation (currently around 8 to 9 percent), and, second, it is facing a persistent labor shortage, which is posing a significant challenge to the economy. Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, has stated that the economy is overheating, because of high capacity utilization levels and increased military spending to feed the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The Russian economy is operating at 84 percent capacity, a threshold that poses risks for sustainable growth.
Industrial facilities are operating at around 81 percent capacity, which suggests that the economy is struggling to meet domestic demand, which is driven by state spending and household consumption. This has led to increased reliance on imports, further straining the ruble and contributing to inflation.
Added to this is the problem of inflation, which has surged to 9 percent by late 2024. Analysts say that it could go higher, given increased state spending and endemic labor shortages. Thus, interest rates stand at 21 percent for businesses and 25 percent for individuals.
Sanctions have drastically limited Russia’s access to international markets and financing, which has brought on dwindling economic reserves. Which means that expenditures rise, while revenues fall. Never a good combo.
The Russian government’s efforts to stablize the economy have only made things worse.
In other words, Russia badly needs peace, and Russia badly needs the West. Despite all the bravura, it has a bleak future, if it tries to wing it alone for much longer.
And notice in this entire debacle, China is quiet as the proverbial mouse. It knows that the CIA can easily unleash a version of the HTS, in the form of the Uyghurs (who are active players in Syria, let’s not forget), and who have now proven to be very effective regime-change operators. China is scared stiff, because no matter the rhetoric, it is not a warrior nation by any stretch of the imagination.
With Syria now supine, it will be no surprise if Israel gets its much-awaited war with Iran. It is something that Trump will also want, who now in his second iteration has discovered the joys of swinging American might like a sledgehammer.
So, Russia’s defeat in Syria was actually a calculated long-term win, where the weakest pawn (Syria) was sacrificed in order to win the greater game—reintegration of into the West. Russia, despite its anti-West rhetoric, cannot really live without the West. Whether that is a defeat or not is another question—but it is a disappointment to those enthusing over BRICS and multipolarity a few months back. Both of which are now dead. And Trump will make sure of that.
