These present, difficult times, are characterized by geographical and thematic poly-crises, by the decomposition and re-composition of sub-regional, regional/continental contexts and the impact of these dynamics up to the global dimension. An example of this situation, whose evolution in clear terms is not yet visible, is the Sahel (yet), where a new political reality, the AES (Alliance of Sahel States, in French), is coming together. The AES seems to be the natural evolution of a crisis, which emerged recently, but has its roots in post-decolonization and in the interests of old and new international actors.
Coups and Coups
Since 2020, six coups have occurred in the broader West Africa. Two in Mali (2020, 2021), two in Burkina Faso (both in 2022), one in Niger (2023) and one in Guinea (2021) without considering a dubious transition in Chad, more similar to a ‘white coup’ (2021). This landscape of notable instability is accompanied by a relevant militarization in the region. Together with poor governance, semi failed states, corruption, economic mismanagement, ethno-tribalism (generally Black-Arab antagonism), the unbridled rise of jihadism and the inability of these governments to face these challenges are some of the factors that have encouraged political and social tensions that have been reflected in the aforementioned coups d’état.
The countries of the Liptako-Gourma region (a three-country concept joining Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) have followed a more demanding approach than Guinea, which historically has a confrontational approach with the West. These three states have taken their own initiative and have decided to join a coalition with the aim to resolve the precarious situation in West Africa, abandoning established relationships and alliances to create new ones. Similarities between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. These three countries share much more than a border and the belonging to to the Liptako-Gourma. Firstly, they share a colonial past marked by the French presence, as part of the French West Africa (Afrique Occidental Française), experienced the Paris influence of culture and administration, and became independent the same year, in 1960 together with many other French African colonies.
As of now, the relationship of these countries with France remained strong, both politically, socially and economically. The clearest example of this is the use of the CFA franc (Franc of the Financial Community of Africa, is the name of two currencies, the West African CFA franc, used in eight West African countries, and the Central African CFA franc, used in six Central African countries) as the national currency in all three countries. CFA franc, despite being a currency linked to the euro, is essentially controlled by France and which has been described as a form of monetary colonialism by some economists, politicians and scholars. This is because the African states that use this currency must deposit half of their foreign currency reserves in the French Treasury and, if they wish to withdraw an amount greater than a certain limit in a single year, they need approval from France. Secondly, the three countries enjoy great cultural diversity within their borders, where communities of different ethnicities, religions and languages coexist.
However, within this diversity a great Muslim influence heavily predominates, whose origin is found in the arrival of the Tuaregs in the XII Century and which is still present today with a certain radicalization by terrorist groups. Third, these countries share similar economic difficulties. High poverty rates, poorly diversified economies and a great dependence on agriculture or raw materials. Their economies, as a consequence of the colonial period, are more focused on the exploitation and export of raw materials than on their manufacturing. For example, Niger is highly dependent on the exploitation and export of uranium, gold or oil mines. Fourth, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso suffer from great political instability. Continuous changes in power, coups d’état, highly established corruption and lack of unity with neighboring countries in the fight for shared problems are the result of the failure of established political systems. In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta has led two coups in the last four years. The first in August 2020 and the second in May 2021. In Burkina Faso, there have also been two coups d’état, the first in January 2022 and eight months later, the second in October 2022, which brought the Captain Traoré. In Niger, the last coup d’état took place on July 26, 2023, with which the Nigerien army overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum (who is believed to be currently detained at the presidential palace along with his wife Hadiza and son Mohammed Salem; his daughters were vacationing in Paris at the time of the coup).
These coups have had multiple consequences in economic matters and in relations with neighboring countries and powers present in the area. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which the three countries are part, has applied various sanctions, interrupting diplomatic and commercial relations with them, and the African Union (AU) has suspended the three States from the organization, but giving the bad relations between the organizations it was impossible to coordinate a more serious political initiative focused to the re-establishment of the constitutional order. Finally, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger share a major regional security problem, caused by the diffused presence of terrorist groups, especially Islamist ones. This influences, directly and indirectly, negatively the rest of the mentioned factors.
The beginning of this increase in terrorism, which was taken advantage of by jihadist groups to extend their presence in neighboring countries and take over the region, can be traced back to the Tuareg rebellion in Mali in 2012. Since then, West African countries have witnessed a devastating war between government forces and armed Islamist groups, including those affiliated with AIQM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) via its local wing Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). or IS-GS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara), in the Liptako-Gourma region from 2014 to 2023 (it should be remembered that often these groups clash between them in fight based on ‘theological’ dispute, territorial control and/or sharing benefit of criminal activities).
The objective of these terrorist groups has been to control supply routes in order to get money for the free passes and increase their areas of influence through sieges of military and civilian premises, kidnappings, land mines or IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) as war tactics. But the more extreme these become and the worse security in these countries worsens, the more the military campaigns of the government junta become tougher. An example of this is Burkina Faso, which has developed a total war strategy against jihadists, recruiting and organizing tens of thousands of civilians into self-defense militias. Further than the purely ideological terrorist threats, the security in two out three states (Niger and Mali) are affected by separatists’ movements, the Tuareg movement especially in Mali and Niger, these groups looking for the establishment of a new state in the Sahara/Sahel region, named Azawad.
The project finds the hostility, not only of Niamey and Bamako, but of Libya (sic) and Algeria, giving the presence in those territories of Tuareg populations (all together, the Tuareg population count around 4 million of persons). But there are also ‘simply’ criminal groups involved in smuggling (migrants, narcotics, cigarettes, fake medical products, gasoline/diesel, technical spare parts) and other involved in illegal mining works, contributing to the worsening of the security and stability of the subregion.This increase in violence and armed conflict worsens the living conditions of the population, increases tension, alters the political order and makes economic activity difficult. If we add to this the ineffective response of the elected governments, the consequence is that insecurity and regional violence are the main cause of the sequence of coups d’état and destabilization in the three countries analyzed.
Foreign Presences, Old and New
This instability and growing insecurity in West Africa has also affected external actors present in the territory. France and the United States had been, until now, the powers with the greatest presence and influence in the area. Either for political reasons, or for economic incentives, such as the uranium and oil reserves in Niger. Since the second half of the 20th century, France has been considered the “gendarme of Africa” and the highest representative of Europe on the continent, even if EU and other states of the union complained often for the instrumentalizazion of Europe name, resources and credit into serving the interest of Paris and the major economic firms of the Exagone. Since the above-mentioned independences season of ‘60s, Paris has maintained close relations with its former African colonies and has carried out dozens of military interventions to maintain its influence in the region, ensure access to markets and strategic natural resources, protect allied regimes and prevent the rise of governments that went against its own interests. A type of relationship that has given the name FrancAfrique to the region of African countries with a French presence. The “FrancAfrique” was a complex of agreements, situations which kept very tight ties France with the former colonies. A system which starting with the above-mentioned CFA, dense programmes of training of military personnel, the obsessive presence of French ‘presidential advisors’ aside to the local head of states, a constant flow of money and other corruption paths (including the lavishes French-Africa conferences). But the most visible sign of the French presence was the military arm.
The most recent and relevant operations are related to the growing insecurity in the region. Of particular note is Operation Serval, which began in January 2013 with the aim of stopping the advance of Islamist groups after the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali. In July 2014 it was replaced by Operation Barkhane. Other European powers also showed interest in intervening through the European (not EU but multilateral and established by a French initiative) Takuba Task Force, integrated into Operation Barkhane. However, in the absence of improvements in the situation, protests by the Malian population increased. This factor, added to the two coups d’état in 2020 and 2021, the bad relations of the French Government with the new junta and the entry on the scene of the Wagner group, caused the withdrawal of French troops from Mali in 2022. This situation was repeated later in Burkina Faso and Niger hand in hand with their own coups d’état.
These coups have symbolized a revolution for the population of these countries, an opportunity to regain sovereignty and put an end to France’s influence and privileged access to the political elite and natural resources. That is the opinion of growing part of the local population, who expressed their disappointment for the governance of the traditional élites, considered too lined with the French/European/US interests and back their support for the military junta in transitory times, arguing that their role is temporary and they will eventually hand over power to a civilian government, more prepared and closer to the local demands. On the other hand, the US, which unlike France did not have colonies in Africa, increased its presence on this continent after the Cold War in order to filling the gap which led to the expansion of the influence of the USSR.
Since then, Washington’s main objective in Africa has been to contain jihadism, especially in North Africa and the Sahel due to the growing threat from terrorist groups such as Boko Haram or Al-Qaeda. In 2007, the US centralized its military actions on the continent through a unified combatant command under the name AFRICOM. But after the failure and unfavorable public opinion created by the Iraq war (2003) and the death of US ambassador Chris Stevens in the Benghazi attack in 2012, the US changed its security policy in the region and reduced its commitments. This international activity was even further reduced under the Trump Administration, reflecting the historical incertitude of Washington in managing the African affairs. Currently, the North American security strategy is focused on the Indo-Pacific, where its main rival, China, is located.
Furthermore, public opinion’s rejection of acting militarily outside its borders has meant that the US only intervenes in conflicts where it has very clear interests. Compared to the rest of the world, the US military presence in Africa is tiny, but very specialized. Limited conventional capabilities (including air and naval assets), but relevant special operations and training assistance elements. This means that the US presence serves mainly as support to allied states and as a prevention or deterrent measure against possible threats or conflicts on the planet.
In the face of the coups d’état in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the US has maintained a firm position defending the restoration of the constitutional order and its support for ECOWAS, as a fundamental body for the transition processes, and for the countries of the region who maintain and defend democratic principles. Proof of the latter are the visits of diplomatic trips of Linda Thomas-Greenfield, US Ambassador to the UN (and member of the Cabinet) to Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, where she reaffirmed the Washington commitment to the fight against corruption, disinformation, defense of press freedom and minorities rights. But this has not been the only visit of the North American government to the African continent. The Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, has carried out a tour of West Africa in which he has highlighted the alarming role that the Russian presence plays in regional conflicts and has promised 45 million dollars to boost coastal security and almost 150 million in humanitarian aid for West Africa and the Sahel. In an interview with Jeune Afrique and The African Report, Blinken recalled that in the states that have appealed to the Wagner group, violence, extremism and terrorism are worsening. Furthermore, he assured that they will only lift sanctions and reestablish anti-terrorism programs in the region if these countries return to constitutional order. In the midst of the Niger crisis, the then Assistant Secretary of State Victoria ‘Vicky’ Nuland rushed to Niamey to negotiate the permanence the US presence in the country after the announcement of the expulsion of the French troops stationed there, but without success and the US forces will complete their withdrawal for mid-September. Also, the small German contingent there (initially embedded with the French troops) will leave soon and, as of now, other then the Russian troops and advisers which arrive, the only foreign contingent is the Italian one (even if massively reduced) and there is no indication about their future.
First Steps for an Alternative Architecture
Faced with growing mistrust about the ability of external actors, such as France, EU or the US, to address security and economic problems in the region, African states have come together on several occasions to find their own solution and fight together a common problem. In 2014, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger created an alliance to combat regional insecurity through cooperation and coordination, under the name of G5 Sahel.
However, the alliance was born with several root problems. Firstly, the creation of a force from pre-existing national armies carried in the initiative their own structural and operational challenges and weakness. Secondly, its initial limited funding, since its members are among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. This is the reason why the alliance lacked the necessary means to achieve its objectives (every member state had to select the best 5.000 elements of its military and assign them, on rigid national base, to the force, without permission to cross their borders in case of operations, which however where focused on static defence and protection of sites, road and similar activities, giving that the kinetic role should been carried out by the Western/international forces). Finally, the immensity of the territory covered by the region exceeds the capacity of the military force at their disposal. Furthermore, the alliance has failed to maintain firm independence from Western foreign aid as initially claimed. The G5 Sahel has received support from the EU, its member states and many other donors, but the force remained a weak option due her nature of suppletive element of the French, French-led, UN (MINUSMA), EU (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali) missions and operations. For this reason, the G5 Sahel has not worked as expected and given the growing situation of insecurity, instability and distrust in Western powers, Mali was the first country to leave the alliance in 2022 and a year later, in 2023, followed by Burkina Faso and Niger.
Subsequently, on September 16, 2023, the military junta of these three countries decided to create their own initiative by signing the Liptako-Gourma Charter, the doctrinal document of the AES. A pact by which they undertake to intervene, even through the use of force, on behalf of the members if one of them is attacked by an external power, in order to restore and guarantee the regional and national security of each of them. they. But the aspirations of this alliance have gone further. In addition to defense, the signatory boards intend to take it to the political and economic sphere, as they demonstrated in November 2023 after holding a summit with the ministers of Economy, Industry and Commerce18. These moves by the AES caused some alarm in ECOWAS, as they further marked the distancing of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the economic community. Consequently, a first meeting between an ECOWAS delegation and the Niamey junta was called for January 10, 2024, which was postponed until the 25th of the same month, with the aim of negotiating the lifting of sanctions and the periods of transition from military junta to democratic governments. However, of the five members of the ECOWAS commission expected in Niamey, only one showed up, something that was not well accepted by the Niger military junta and consequently by its allies.
On January 28, 2024, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso announced in a television appearance and without prior national consultation their departure from ECOWAS, giving as the main reasons: the illegitimacy of the sanctions imposed, the betrayal of the founding principles of the alliance, the control of external powers and the failure in the fight against its regional insecurity. This decision could have multidimensional consequences. Although this is not the first time that a member of the alliance decides to leave it (Mauritania already did so in 2000), the situation and conditions of ECOWAS then and now are very different. At this moment its cohesion and solidity is not the same as in the year 2000 and the departure of one member is not the same as three. The consequences in this case would put the regional group in a complicated position. The end of the free movement of people and goods, the breakdown of the free trade agreement or the return of trade barriers are some of the consequences that would have a negative impact on economic growth, migratory flows and food security. Furthermore, ECOWAS would lose its role as a mediator in negotiations on democratic transitions with the military junta, it would lose around 8% of its GDP and the response against terrorism would be divided.
However, the process of leaving ECOWAS is long and the formal steps for this have not been taken. The television announcement of the AES military junta has no legitimacy. These should make a formal notification and, in the case of article 91.1 of the treaty that governs ECOWAS: “Any Member State that wishes to withdraw from the Community must notify it in writing one year in advance to the executive secretary, who will inform it. to the Member States. Upon expiry of this period, if it does not withdraw said notification, said State will cease to be a member of the Community”. And in accordance with article 91.2.: “During the period of one year mentioned in art. 91.1, that Member State shall continue to comply with the provisions of this Treaty and shall remain bound to fulfil its obligations under this Treaty”. To do so, they should continue to comply with the obligations that come with being a member of said community until their departure is legally formalized. This entire process diverts attention from democratic transitions and redirects public debate, thus benefiting the military juntas, which takes the opportunity to continue developing their new alliance. However, like all the international treaties, despite the legal binding, the political will remain a prevalent element and if the three want to leave immediately, ECOWAS as organization, and its member states, visibly lack of willing and capacity to stop it.
A Series of Acts
On February 15, 2024, ministers from the three military juntas met in Ouagadougou to design the institutional and legal architecture of a possible confederation that would be formed from the AES to achieve broader integration. The AES is a newly created alliance that must be gradually developed in form and content, as established in articles 3 and 15 of its founding charter. It is a future project that must be complemented with additional texts and establish the necessary bodies and mechanisms for its operation in order to expand and expand its borders in West Africa. However, in the current context, this uncertainty and lack of development keep open much incertitude.
The only clear element is that, the members of the AES is in a process of transition and restructuring of alliances with which they try to distance themselves from Western influence. Further, according to some analysts, AES look to enlarge the membership to neighbour countries like Guinea and Chad. If this would happen, ECOWAS will remain with few coastal states around Nigeria and more weaken than now. Chad, since the beginning of the year is at the center of a diplomatic offensive of Moscow, based on old ties and it is watched with concern the expulsion of the small US training mission from the country, tasked to assist the AU-led Multinational Joint Task Force, which fight Islamist terrorists of Boko Haram in the Cameroon lake region. The establishment of the AES and the announcement of its desire to leave ECOWAS have been the first steps, but the next steps do not seem to be very clear. Meanwhile, the AU, confirming the intrinsic weakness of the regional organization, has, till now, ignored what was happening in this area of the continent. MISAHEL, the mission of this organization in the Sahel has been without a leader since August, and the objectives, purposes and principles established in its Constitutive Act seem to have been forgotten, also due to her lack of magnitude and action.
Just for the record it useful recall another AU failure. The intensification of the crisis in northern Mali and the total occupation of the northern regions by armed insurgent and terrorist groups have further weakened peace and security in the Sahel pushed AU to action and tasked ECOWAS to deploy the ad hoc created AFISMA (AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali), which operated with NATO support. In accordance with UNSCR resolution 2100 of April 25, 2013, AFISMA was transformed on July 1, 2013, in MINUSMA. Following this transition, the then Chairperson of the AU Commission decided to establish, from August 1, 2013, the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), with HQ in Bamako and extensions within other structures of the AU in the region.
In this way, in the face of uncertainty, the need for external help and disenchantment with Western powers and African organizations, Russia presents itself as an alternative for the Liptako-Gourma countries. A country that offers a new framework of relations where political, moral structures or values appear as not imposed. Russia as an alternative for foreign aid to emerging governments and include a growing confrontation with the West as the scenario that the Kremlin included by the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation in its 2021 update. There are several regions in which that Russia is trying to reduce the sphere of influence of Western powers, including West Africa. Since 2010, Russia has included the African continent in its foreign policy. During these years it has been positioning itself as a possible alternative for African states disillusioned with Western alliances, both politically and militarily, through a complex approach.
On the one hand, Russia has actively participated through the Wagner Group, carried out alternate media campaigns and led a vehement anti-colonial discourse. Among these objectives, purposes and principles, there are: promotion of the unity and solidarity of African States, coordination and intensification of cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the African people, promotion of international cooperation, establishment a common defence policy for the African continent, or respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. Wagner is present in Mali and Burkina Faso, among other countries, with active military operations, participating in combat, supporting military junta in recent coups d’état and controlling mining resources. After the absorption of Wagner under a more centralized command structure in the Ministry of Defence as “African Corps,” Moscow offered support to military junta in exchange for access to natural resources. In this way, Russia seeks to expand, obtain mining concessions and establish parallel businesses with which to cover the costs of its operations or even obtain profits.
Furthermore, with its presence it manages to dislodge Western companies from an area of strategic importance (symbol of it is the expulsion of French mining company Orano, specialized in the exploitation of uranium, from Niger, causing a strategic setback for Paris and its nuclear-powered energy programme). The first major deployment of this new military body took place in Burkina Faso in January 2024 with 100 Russian soldiers and, since then, it has been gradually taking control of Mali operations. Regarding disinformation campaigns, Russia has invested in conventional and social networks to encourage anti-colonial discourse, revolts against Western allied governments, and discontent in society against the old leaderships, pushing up an already existent fatigue. These have started to spread pro-Russian and anti-Western propaganda, which emphasizes the decline of the West and presents Russia as a benevolent ally that maintains an equal relationship with its partners and not re-proposing neocolonialistic approaches.
On the other hand, Russia has used diplomatic channels to increase and improve relations with African countries. The summits in Sochi in 2019 and St. Petersburg in 2023 have played a fundamental role in this process, strengthening Russian-African relations through political, economic and cultural cooperation. At the last summit, Russia announced the cancellation of $90 million in debt, the donation of between 25,000 and 50,000 tons of Russian grain, and arms contracts with more than 40 countries. Some measures that were caused by the need for Russian international support in the face of the war in Ukraine, which has deteriorated its public image and diplomatic relations. With the AES countries, Russia has increased its relations after the sequence of coups d’état. In November 2023, Burkinabe Defense Minister Kassoum Coulibaly traveled to Moscow to meet with his counterpart, and in January 2024 the Nigerien Prime Minister appointed by the military junta, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, did so to discuss a possible extension of relations with Russia in defense, agriculture and energy. Furthermore, the creation of the AES itself took place a day after the defense ministers of Mali and Niger met with the Russian Deputy Defense Minister, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, demonstrating the close contact between the governments of both continents.
This approach of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to Russia generated tensions with the countries of the Western bloc. Uranium exploitation in Niger and illegal immigration are two examples that could become threats to the West. As mentioned above with the case of Orano, if Niger grants uranium exploration and exploitation rights to Russia (or other countries), this would be perceived by France as a direct attack on French companies that already have such a license. This would mean increased competition and loss of control of raw materials. Likewise, if the AES countries allow massive illegal migration through their territory to continue on the way to Europe, this would be a big problem for Bruxelles (in prima facie EU and secondarily NATO).
Currently, the EU receives large waves of illegal immigration in its countries that exceed its coordination and response capacity due to the lack of a common migration policy, generating great political and social tensions in several European countries. But the situation is more complicated, showing that the AES states, despite Western media assets describe as new Russian puppets, have the will to carry out their own autonomous initiatives, like reinforcing the ties with Morocco (this in order to balance a potential penetration of Algeria, deadly competitor of Rabat) or with Türkiye. In fact, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on mid-July said that during a recent visit to Niger, he discussed the fight against terrorism, “which is the main source of instability in the Sahel region …We discussed what could be done to advance the defence industry and intelligence capacity within the framework of counterterrorism in Niger, as we have done in Somalia.” And the Ankara official was accompanied National Defence, Energy and Natural Resources Ministers and the National Intelligence Organization chief.
Conclusion
The creation of the AES, the possible exit from ECOWAS and the increase in relations between Russia and the emerging governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger anticipate a geopolitical reconfiguration in West Africa and worsening the scenario of an African poli-crisis with impact on the whole global confrontation. The increased terrorist activity, the growing Russian military presence, the inattention by the AU, the loss of power in the region of the US and European countries, the emergence of Moscow, Beijing, Teheran as a new alternative(s) and the uncertainty of the future of ECOWAS have led West African countries into a process of change.
The attempt to leave ECOWAS, by the Liptako-Gourma military junta, is the clearest expression of the boredom of their countries with the passivity of regional organizations and their long-standing inability to respond to the growing situation of insecurity in the area. An exit that, if it were to take place, would cause drastic consequences on the economy and security of the region. Otherwise, if the Liptako-Gourma pact countries would remained in ECOWAS, their mere attempt or willingness to leave would have meant a clear and firm demonstration of the need for greater involvement in an effective response by the regional group and the AU to the security, economic and institutional problems of the area.
At the same time, the creation of the AES demonstrates the presence will for independence, change and new solutions in the region. If the alliance is maintained, neighboring countries such as Guinea and Senegal, which also suffer periods of political instability, could join in the not-too-distant future, and there are signs in this way. However, currently the AES is a weak alliance, with a structure to be built and a future that is still quite uncertain. The current situation in West Africa demands change. Insecurity has become the main factor of regional instability and external help continues to be necessary. The AES as has already been demonstrated that, lack the necessary economic and military capabilities. The question is, who is going to provide that external help? Will the US and France maintain their influence in the area or will be replaced by Russia?
Other countries, like Türkiye look to enter in the arena with their own agendas. A complex question, since the future of ECOWAS and the AES (and even AU in the foreground), on the one hand, and the future of foreign aid, on the other, are closely related and directly dependent on each other. The answer poses two scenarios. In a first scenario, if Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso leave ECOWAS and strengthen the ESA bloc, foreign aid will possibly come from Russia. Likewise, if Russia exerts greater influence in the region, the departure of these ECOWAS countries will be more likely and the future of the AES more stable. In a second scenario, if Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso remain in ECOWAS and dissolve the AES, the US and EU will likely remain allies. Likewise, if Western powers exert greater influence in the area, ECOWAS will be strengthened, preventing the departure of these three countries, and the AES will be weakened, causing its dissolution.
What does seem to be clear is that Russia and the AES form one bloc and ECOWAS and the Western powers another. There are two incompatible blocks. Russia defends the military juntas against the return to constitutional order desired by the Western powers. Russia does this through economic and military aid, with the African Corps, and the US, the leading Western power, through support and investment in the countries neighboring the AES that maintain the constitutional order. Ultimately, the geopolitical reconfiguration of West Africa is subject to two factors, regional organizations or alliances and external aid. Two factors that in turn determine the two blocks that will determine the future of the LiptakoGourma countries (present and futures).
But the establishment of AES (and the potential enlargements) does not mean that the file is closed in the region. Facing an important setback with the exit from Niger and Chad, Washington look other options. The Joint Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of AFRICOM (the regional command of US forces for Africa), the USAF General Brown and the USMC General Langley attended the African defense chiefs’ conference held in June in Botswana (was present also the Chairman of NATO Military Committee, the Dutch Admiral Bauer), a faithful ally of US, signaled Washington’s intensifying interest in securing its foothold in the region as both Russia and China seek to expand their access to key resources and military sites, giving that Pentagon officials continue to try to find an alternative drone base in West Africa after the ongoing withdrawal from Air Bases 101 and 201 and media sources reported that the Biden administration has so far held initial discussions with officials in Benin, Ivory Coast and Ghana. But also, France maneuvring, always according to the media. Burkina Faso accuses France of destabilization in complicity with Benin, Ivory Coast and Ouagadougou junta leader Capt. Ibrahim Traore stated: “We have proof. Tracks have been laid; soldiers are equipped.”
The president of the West African country in transition since the September 2022 coup said he had a problem with the policies of the leaders of Benin and Ivory Coast, especially about the rights of transit and related royalties of oil pipelines to Guinea Gulf (forcing Beijing, who import oil from Sahel, to mediate among the litigants). Traore said evidences revealed that Benin is home to two clandestine French military bases, directed against Burkina Faso. Like Mali and Niger, after taking power, the junta broke military and bilateral agreements with France, accusing it of not only having failed in its efforts to combat terrorism, but also of wanting to destabilize the country. French authorities denied the existence of similar premises and stated that occasionally, temporary and short-term operational training detachments are deployed to support the Beninese armed forces, at their request, stressing there are bases only Chad, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon (where btw there was another coup in August 2023) and Djibouti. France also denied similar allegations in May; but recalling the fragility of the region were recorded one clandestine attempt to exfiltrate President Bazoum from Niamey (failed) and several wave of arrests among military and police personnel in the three AES for alleged fomenting coups.
