ween BRICS nations and countries from the so called ‘Global South’ under the formula “Strengthening Multilateralism for Equitable Global Development and Security” and for the BRICS+ format, with representatives from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, on the theme “BRICS and the Global South: Building the Future of the World Together”.
The Summit and results were obviously presented as a success, and as the (another time) birth certificate of a solid bloc that will compete with the economic and security architectures of the West (G7, OECD, EPC, NATO and EU [and partially, G20]) for global hegemony and will constitute a fair and just future (free, at least in the sense of individual and collective freedoms, given the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian nature of many participant states, has been little talked about). The reality, as always, is very different. First of all, the bloc, as such, or at least for some of its founding members, such as Moscow and Beijing, does not exist. The BRICS membership (and the SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization) or similar initiatives, such as the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), reflect the functional multi-alignment of the participant states, a phenomenon that is increasingly spreading and that if it scares for its unpredictable effects the Euro-Atlantic bloc, does not reassure the BRICS themselves. Like it or not, it is a reality now and imposes itself and forces all the major players; especially those who lead (or led) more or less large and/or more or less ancient and/or consolidated coalitions to manage new situations that reflect the ever-increasing awareness of national interests and priorities to the detriment of agglomerations of states. In reality, giving that scholars and emeritus prof always try to (re)invent the wheel and assigning new names to old trends. Historically all and each state looked to have the free hand and pursuit as first their own national interests/priorities. Especially after WWII, the establishment of organized architectures (like NATO, EU, Warsaw Pact and Comecon) put these aspirations in strict boxes. The end of the Cold War put an end to it, but in a progressive way and the globalization of the economy and the consequent reduction of LDCs (Less Developed Countries) allowed states which were in a mere obedient stance in a more vocal active one and looking for new framework where to express and implement their view and priorities without suffocating ties of powerful partners and taking ways that looked unthinkable before, like adopting a new currency replacing the US dollar and EU euros for exclusive currency for international payment tools (in reality, due for the incertitude about which currency would be choose by group, many states continue to keep dollar and euro). This tendency, however, creates paradoxical situations; for example, Türkiye. Ankara is a very important country for NATO (and relevant for the EU) has asked to join the BRICS, but this request was preceded by an increasingly conflictual process that Ankara has started with its traditional partners, starting with the controversial affair of the S-400 ‘Triumph’ SAMs (and the subsequent controversy over the F-35s ‘Lightning II’), the blackmail of the entry of Sweden in NATO to obtain from US spare parts for the aging fleet of F-16s ‘Falcon’ fighters, the sparks with France for the support of Armenia against Azerbaijan, the interferences in Libya, the tensions with Israel, Greece Egypt, Italy and France for the hydrocarbon exploration campaign around Cyprus. Türkiye formally expressed its intention to join the bloc earlier this year, has been offered ‘partner’ country status by BRICS, as part of its ongoing efforts to balance its relationships between Eastern and Western powers; Ankara Trade Minister Ömer Bolat presented the ‘partnership’ as a mere transitional phase.
In a declaration issued on October 23, BRICS introduced a new “partner country” category, signalling a significant shift in its membership structure and future architecture. The political element of stability of the new members states appears growing and BRICS want to avoid the repetition of the mistake to accept new members, like Egypt and Ethiopia, since years on the verge of a major crisis for the dam on the Blue Nile. For similar reasons, the tense relations with its neighbours, Venezuela faced the veto of Brazil.
Giving that in the economy terms Türkiye it is much stronger that other states that joined BRICS in 2023 (like, again, Egypt and Ethiopia) appear clear that this is a political position and reflect a lack of consensus among the founder members and doubts about the real values of enlarging the block (and this is applicable to all the other new ‘partner’ states, Indonesia, Algeria, Belarus, Cuba, Bolivia, Malaysia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Vietnam, Nigeria, and Uganda. The offer comes after Türkiye’ President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended a BRICS summit in Kazan, underscoring Ankara’s aspirations for deeper engagement with the group, but without detriment to its Western-like alliance. As quoted above, establishing a new category of membership, reflect a new phase, that look to reduce the risk to open the door to problematic states, with a limited adhesion to the ideological backbone of BRICS (or, at least, for Moscow and Beijing), the frontal hostility to Washington and Bruxelles. Like Ankara, other new ‘partners’, especially the one more economically developed, want to keep free hands in reflecting a broader approach of engaging with both Eastern and Western partners to bolster their geopolitical and economic standing and getting advantage from both sides.
Another example of the ambiguities that run through the BRICS (and SCO) system is the position of the KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), which has been part of the organization since January 1 of this year. Obviously invited to participate, Riyadh, unlike Tehran (Iran is part of BRICS at the same time as the KSA), has made them wait for the response of participation, and how to formalize the actual participation in the new international architecture.
Most probably, KSA still analysing all pros and cons of membership—with its factors in favor and/or against this choice. The economic considerations appear prevailing into the (prudent) leaning of Riyadh towards BRICS, view as an important market and purchaser of the hydrocarbons: the expanded group of countries will represent 45% of the world population and 28% of global GDP; further, the core members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) make approximately 40% of the new BRICS members’ exports and imports. In the case of KSA, this figure is 30% and steadily growing—along with a positive trade balance for Riyadh. Of further note, this trade volume has long since surpassed that with the main political ally of Riyadh, US, which progressively reduced the purchase of hydrocarbons from KSA and more Washington, thanks to the new techniques of exploitations since 2019 sharply reduced to near to zero the dependence from imports of this raw material from MENA. However, the heavy dependence of Riyadh from Washington’s security insurances, started in 1945 after the meeting of 16 February on board of the USS Quincy at the Suez Canal’s Bitter Lake between President F. D. Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud, undoubtedly an element which mitigate a strong enthusiasm for BRICS and the relevance of the Washington (and other allies) showed their relevance during the campaign against the Houtis in Yemen since 2015 and in keeping the efficiency of the endless armoury that Riyadh built along the years with thousands of technicians, advisors and trainers.
Mindful of the complex scenario, there is also a growing inflow of investment in KSA economy from the core BRICS countries, especially India and China. These capital inflows are playing an important role in the Kingdom’s attempt to transform its economy and be less dependent from the exclusivity of hydrocarbon exploitation. As stated by Bloomberg, KSA has already immense infrastructural programmes since years as framework for the transformation of the national economy from a mere ‘oil state’, including opening the country to international tourism, (despite the possible repercussions on the social and cultural of domestic individual and collective model life aspects).
Moreover, while western investors might be doubting the necessity to deal with the KSA economy at a time of change and global economic instability, China and India as well as other non-western countries have clearly shown their readiness to work with Riyadh, including on projects targeted at the development of the green and sustainability-related sectors.
BRICS membership could further support the Kingdom’s positions on the global oil market. On the one hand, the emerging bloc includes two major consumers of KSA (and Gulf region) hydrocarbons, namely China and India. Given that competition for the Asian market among hydrocarbon producers will grow in the coming years, cooperation with Beijing and New Delhi within BRICS could additionally ensure the loyalty of potential consumers. On the other hand, by joining BRICS, Saudi Arabia reinforce the coordination energy ties with Russia, which it coordinates efforts within OPEC+ (OPEC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, was formed in 1960 by Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, KSA, and Venezuela. Then expanded to Algeria, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, UAE. In 2016, largely in response to dramatically falling oil prices driven by significant increases in U.S. shale oil output, OPEC signed an agreement with 10 other oil-producing countries: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia, South Sudan and Sudan establishing the OPEC+. Among these 10 countries was the world’s third-largest oil producer in 2022, Russia, which produced 13% of the world total (10.3 million barrels per day; Indonesia, Angola, Ecuador, Qatar, Somalia, [and Somaliland] would be join and/or re-join the organization(s)) and other key hydrocarbon producers in the world. The increasing, and unregulated multipolarity in global trends and politics—together with the Washington uncertain approach to MENA — would force KSA into enlarge her not only economic but also security ties and the BRICS membership, therefore, provides a multilateral opportunity for Riyadh to diversify its international partnerships and engage more directly with non-western global powers. Formally joining the bloc would aligns with Saudi interests. Riyadh hope that the presence of China and Russia, within BRICS ease the complicate relation with Teheran, also member and bring effectiveness after the two countries announced the resumption of relations on 10 March 2023, following a deal brokered by China. The deal followed several days of secret talks in Beijing by Iranian and Saudi officials. However, the Palestine-Lebanon crisis complicate it (and the hopes of KSA to join the Abraham Accords, as another example of the dysfunctional, multipolar world).
But, as said, KSA remain prudent. BRICS membership also represent security risks, particularly regarding political entanglements. Aligning with a group that includes Russia may embroil the KSA in the ongoing geopolitical tensions between Moscow and the west. Similarly, the rivalry between China and the US could complicate the Saudi diplomatic balancing and have a negative domestic effect. The return of Donald Trump to the White House might increase China-US tensions and impact on Saudi-US relations. Again, as mentioned, Washington remains a key defense partner and arms provider for KSA, with the 75% of US defense systems purchases (the other 25% it is shared between UK, France, Germany, Spain, ROK, Turkey, Italy) and remain the world’s second-largest arms importer in 2019–23. Finally, even for an authoritarian framework as it is KSA, the public opinion should be considered; in fact, according to recent polls, almost half of Saudis prefer closer cooperation with the US and its allies rather than China.
But the BRICS have inside other potential fractures, like the divergences between core member nations, such as the India-China rivalry, complicate the bloc’s ability to form a unified stance on critical international issues.
Another example of the growing approach of the free hand principle (and action) by the states is the newly announced Saudi-backed IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) is likely to be a “game changer” for New Delhi, and serving its ambitions, providing unprecedented access to global markets, and at the same time reflecting the weakness of the BRICS project to propose itself as exclusive alternative aggregation point against the Washington-Bruxelles area of influences.
On 9 September 2023 the MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) was signed during the 2023 G20 New Delhi summit by India, US, UAE, KSA, France, Germany, Italy and EU. The new 4,800-km trade route is intended to stimulate economic development and integration. It comprises two separate routes — an east corridor linking India to the Arabian Gulf and a northern corridor connecting Gulf states to Europe and proposing an alternate project to the BRI and it should be noted that three signatories parties are members of BRICS (India, KSA, UAE) and the weight of the other partners USA and EU will make this group an actor of global relevance.
The rail and sea routes will enable not only the transit of goods and services, but also electric and digital connectivity, as well as pipes for the export of clean hydrogen.
In line with the mainstream, the rail and sea routes will enable not only the transit of goods and services, but also electric and digital connectivity, as well as pipes for the export of clean hydrogen. The ship-to-rail transit system is expected to slash shipping costs and expedite transit times.
Indian-Gulf relations are already strong and have gained momentum during India’s year presidency of G20 and the new trade route is expected to further boost them, along with India’s ties to its other Gulf actor, the UAE.
Given that the IMEC’s eight signatories account for about half of the world’s economy, the transcontinental project is also poised to have geopolitical implications.
But the real crux of the effectiveness of BRICS (and SCO in its wake) present and future is the state of relations between the two most prominent members of this group and their strategic vision, namely China and Russia.
If now the relationship appears improved, the history of how the two was controversial. The Tzarist Russia was a deadly enemy of the Imperial China; annexed Northern Manchuria by Qing China during the Amur Annexation in the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and 1860 Treaty of Peking; followed by the invasion of the region in 1900 (paving the way to the Japanese penetration from Korea peninsula). Russia takes a large role in the international punitive expedition against the ‘boxers’ and in terms of aims of subjugate China, Tzarist Russia was not better than the other countries (British Empire, France, US, Japan, ecc.). During the communist era the ties improved but with persistent tensions behind the official solidarity line against the capitalism, imperialism and colonialism. Also, the ambiguous stance of Stalin during the Chinese civil wars and WWII let behind a line of mutual suspects, worsened when Khruschev raised to the power. Since then, the relations remained high, including serious armed clashes of the border of Ussuri river in 1969 (the border issue was finalised in a series of agreements in the 1990s and 2000s). The end of the communism in USSR increased the Chinese suspicions and the lack of this ideologic element (even if instrumental, giving that Beijing is a highly capitalist model) keep distant the two. Those, without mentioning the mutual racist/ethnic perceptions and contempt between Russian and Chinese, make difficult their relation.
There are other concerns within the Chinese system about Russian policies, especially the orientation of the use of force or the threat to use it, fomenting separatism and alteration of international borders, giving that alle those are considered dangerous precedents that would may affect the Beijing national integrity and security for Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Sinkiang/East Turkestan. And Ukraine crisis has added validity to these concerns. China has abstained on most UN resolutions regarding the war, but at the same time has provided Moscow with an economic lifeline and is reportedly considering the provision of weapons to its beleaguered partner. Beijing has not publicly justified Moscow’s actions, but has amplified Russian narratives. Despite Xi Jinping’s deliberately publicised ‘questions and concerns’, and this underline the complexity of the bilateral relations and how these dynamics are reflected in the building and managing their ‘new multilateralism’.
In recent years, for different reasons, the relationship between Russia and China has intensified, deeply worrying the Western leadership. Both countries have advanced nuclear arsenals and sophisticated military technologies, and have developed a strategic partnership that manifests itself both economically and militarily. China has provided Russia with crucial support, both economic and diplomatic, to sustain its large-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, trade between the two countries reached a record high of $240 billion, a clear sign of this growing interdependence — and it is growing despite Western sanctions.
China has made technological gains from its relations with Russia and buys heavily discounted energy. Each side legitimises the other internationally. Historically, Western pressure against one or both countries (usually in the form of sanctions or blocs in their ‘near abroad’) has deepened their relations. The newly normalised relationship deepened after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre as the international community sanctioned China. The US’s much-heralded ‘Pivot to Asia’ and sanctions implemented against Russia since 2014 were followed by a large number of economic and military agreements between Beijing and Moscow.
However, the relationship also presents growing imbalances that make it problematic. Russia, weakened by the conflict in Ukraine, is increasingly dependent on China to maintain its war economy and the exposure of Russian export to Beijing further fragilize Moscow freedom of decision and action. This dependence offers Beijing room to maneuver, which it can use to further consolidate its position, even at the cost of some economic sacrifices. And it makes the alignment increasingly stronger, almost a necessary dependence for Moscow, a strategic will for Beijing, Apparently Russia and China now seem to be consolidated partners, both economically and strategically, to the point of making any attempt at separation extremely difficult. Even the most daring policies may not be enough to break this alliance, which, in an international scenario dominated by competition between great powers, represents an increasingly central challenge for the United States, for the EU, for the like-minded Indo-Pacific allied countries (such as Japan and South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, UK, France and Taiwan).
It is increasingly clear that this is an alliance of convenience (or inconvenience, for Russia) between two powers that have as their objective the reduction of the capabilities of the Euro-Atlantic bloc. But this reduction has different terms. Moscow perceives the objective of reducing this capacity as necessary for its survival as a state entity while China sees it as the start of an unchallenged access to world power.
This divergence of objectives lies in the recent history of both. The current Moscow leadership feels like it is in a besieged fortress, attacked from all sides and with all means, from direct confrontation to hybrid attacks and the penetration of Western values into civil society that are foreign and dangerous.
Therefore, Putin had no other choice than to turn to the only viable option, even aware of the risks that this entails. It is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin is not aware that Beijing’s global ambitions will do not heavily affect Russian interests and priorities. Chinese penetration in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia seems unstoppable and the Russian offer is weak (even if in difficulty, the Chinese economic capacity is incomparable and the Russian GDP is equal to the Spanish one and is now based almost exclusively on the sale of raw materials); the difficult progress of operations in Ukraine (a failed politico-military blitz, a war of attrition with very slow and costly gains, the disappearance of the Russian fleet from the Black Sea, the use of Iranian drones and North Korean troops to fill the gaps in technology and manpower) further weakens Putin’s negotiating position even within the alliance with China, making it increasingly instrumental to Beijing’s objectives, which use it in the attempt to distract the West’s resources and energy from the Indo-Pacific with the war in Ukraine, and continues to weaken Russia to make it increasingly docile to its plans and increasingly less capable of resisting them.
The divergent ‘great strategies’ of Moscow and Beijing vis-à-vis BRICS (and SCO) objectives is clear, even within the main common target: the establishment of a galaxy of ‘client states’. This is difficult exercise; as above mentioned, the growing success and attractiveness of the new architectures, face, like in the other camp for their old ones, the impetuous emerging of mid-size powers, uneasy to dictate and riotous to obey simply. The obedience could be obtained but at increasing financial costs (which only Beijing could afford) and/or military assistance (which the stretched military structures of Moscow find more complicate to provide).
The different strategies of Moscow and Beijing are reflected in their operational targets; Russia need to reinforce a ‘buffer states’ system, not necessarily in geographical terms: this need emerged with great urgency after the votes in UN General Assembly and Security Council after the beginning of the operations in Ukraine, which punished severely the Moscow stance.
For Beijing, the construction of a global network of friendly states is instrumental to the assault to the global power and use it as ‘sky jump’ for economic and political penetration in areas where the Western powers considered to have a kind of exclusive influence, like Latin America for the US and Sahel for Europe.
Giving these pro and cons of the Moscow-Beijing alliance and the complex architecture that is under, but slow and in some aspects, uncertain, construction could the second Trump administration seek those vulnerabilities to break the bond?
