Alexey Soloviev published in the June 2024 issue of the Postil, a very accurate article on Tocqueville’s work, L’Ancien-Régime et la Révolution. As I read and reread it, my memories of my reading of Tocqueville came flooding back. The French Revolution of 1789 may be a long way back, but it still provides an invaluable model for those seeking a general theory of revolutions, one capable of helping us understand the revolution in the making, which is global, or if you prefer, planetary—but which is also French. In the margins of Soloviev’s paper, I jotted down a number of observations, of which this brief article is the extended form. What I offer here is not, strictly speaking, a commentary or a response to this article, but some remarks suggested by reading it. Nothing seems more useful than a frank conversation on the most topical of all subjects: revolution.
Bankruptcy and the Revolution
No one can doubt that a revolution is in the making in France. Expenditure by the State and the Welfare State far exceeds resources, which it is almost impossible to increase significantly through economic growth or taxation. The only way for the State to make ends meet is to run up increasing debts, which can only be supported by very low interest rates, but above all by the ability to issue money infinitely, “out of thin air,” without significant inflation, thanks to the Euro’s status as a reserve currency, itself dependent on German credit. If these facilities were to cease, financiers estimate that France would have to cut the salaries of its civil servants, or cut back their numbers, by around a third, and retirement pensions of everyone by a fifth. This is obviously unfeasible. Let us just remember that President Macron, having wanted to reform the pension payment system, took three years to do so, and only succeeded with extreme difficulty in getting a law passed that was largely emptied of its content, in the face of overwhelming opposition from the Nation, a law already rendered obsolete by the deterioration of the situation, due to the war in Ukraine and the sudden fall in demographics.
What is in reality a budget and trade deficit is disguised as debt, and would have been purged thirty years ago by national currency devaluation (Lira, French Franc, Peseta, etc.), before the implementation of neoliberal policies (see, John Kenneth Galbraith, Money: Whence it Came, Where it Went). This artifice, combined with an ageing population and the long-term stagnation of wages and consumption, limits inflation to the assets of the rich, who thus seem to be getting richer, while the middle classes are less and less able to buy property. The population never ceases to grumble, while living in a rosy dream, held in total ignorance of the state of our finances. Accounting tricks, the nullity of Parliament and the daily propaganda of a superficial and complacent press all serve to create the illusion. That said, the ruling class is well aware of the situation, but prefers not to talk about it, because no one knows what to do. One thinks of the feigned indignation of the Notables assembled by Louis XVI in 1787, and again in December 1788, when at last a courageous Minister of Finance gave them an accurate and complete report on the near-bankruptcy of the State. Calonne proposed a way out of the budgetary impasse by introducing a tax on landed property, which until then had been tax-exempt. The privileged refused, and he resigned. The Notables’ cowardice, hypocrisy and selfishness forced Louis XVI to convene the Estates-General for 1789. Today, even before the bankruptcy has been declared, the loss of confidence in the institutions, the powerlessness of the public authorities, deprived of prestige and authority, and the detestation of the President, make it possible to foresee the energy of the shockwave that would be unleashed by the revelation of the fiasco. A “Greek-style” scenario is unlikely in France. We had better bet on something else.
This is not unique to France, as the general world situation suggests that the West will soon be forced to put an end to the policy of indefinite indebtedness and the issuance of money without significant inflation. There can be no doubt, then, that at this moment of truth, when states declare themselves bankrupt, not only the parties in power, but the political regimes of the West will be shaken to the core, and some will pop like champagne corks. The economy will have to be reorganized. Perhaps also the beginning of a cultural revolution. It was the failure of the State that, let us not forget, provoked the French Revolution. But, you may ask, why can this not go on indefinitely? That is what we are going to find out, but not just yet.
THE PRECEDING PAGES, AND THOSE THAT FOLLOW, WERE WRITTEN BEFORE THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN FRANCE BY PRESIDENT MACRON FOLLOWING HIS MASSIVE DEFEAT IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN JUNE 2024.
I spoke at length with a brilliant CFO at one a major financial company. It is best if I summarize his excellent observations here:
“This decision by Macron, misunderstood and disapproved of by all his supporters in society, stunned and dismayed, cannot be explained in terms of interests, but has either to do with existential psychoanalysis, or with occult causes, which we may know one day. It probably only delays his inevitable resignation by a month or two. He has ‘burnt himself out’ in the eyes of all serious-minded people. In financial terms, he has made the situation immensely worse, much worse than his predecessors. The 2025 budget is unfeasible. His ego refuses to be the one to declare a bankruptcy that could otherwise have waited ten years before reaching a liquidity crisis. Out of pride, he commits political suicide rather than accept the immense humiliation of tomorrow. It is terrifying to realize that such a psychologically complicated man holds the nuclear codes. So, he chooses to pull the pin on a grenade in the public square. The National Rally, if it comes to power, will not solve the problem, because the problem is insoluble. In 1789, all it took was a reasonable increase in taxes and the abolition of feudal rights, and the financial problem was solved. In 2024, the capital has gone abroad. What are the solutions? Either we dispossess the middle class and the little people by making all homeowners pay rent to the State, which will reduce pensioners to poverty; or we default on the public debt, and then for thirty years not a penny will be invested in France; or we jail the upper class until they have repatriated their money, but in that case, we are off on a 1792-like rampage; or finally a respected authority emerges, which brings back the money. But the National Rally is obviously not up to the task. It will play up xenophobia without changing the problem or solving it. We are heading for chaos.”
It appears that the CFO forgot to mention another option: a controlled inflation and a sufficient devaluation of the Euro—because the majority of EU countries are as bankrupt as France is. The Euro system was supposed to force the countries to be financially wise and Virtuous. But the very contrary happened. And the credit of the Germans allowed the other States to self-indulge in infinite debt. So, it is only fair and reasonable to devaluate this currency rather than ruin the whole people. What is already clear in France is that the bourgeoisie lost the power they had managed to keep from 1789, and now the “rentier” will have to pay and the capital will have to come back home. Which is hard, not for the rich only but for emerging countries. A new international deal has to be struck.
The only positive thing is that we can now hope to prevent Macron’s psychological complications from provoking atomic war. What is clear is that Macron will go down in history as the proud incompetent whose neurosis precipitated the outbreak of the new French Revolution. And I return to our original subject.
Bankruptcy and Privatization
In 1789, Prince de Talleyrand, then bishop of Autun, proposed the nationalization of clergy property to the Estates-General, now the Constituent Assembly. Historiography generally avoids explaining what this “nationalization” consisted of. In a few words: “privatization at a low price.” Or in two words, a “liberal policy,” which today would be formulated as follows: abolition of free elementary education and abolition of social insurance. Indeed, the clergy’s assets, essentially land (the income from which was, it is true, partly diverted and appropriated by the privileged, thanks to the “profit” system), nevertheless served to finance, in addition to worship, most of the cost of public health and primary education. [Land ownership was distributed in round figures as follows—Forests: 15 percent of the land was owned entirely by the nobility. Of the remainder under cultivation, 20 percent belonged to the nobility, 40 percent to commoners and 40 percent to the church. A significant proportion of this capital’s income was transferred from the people to the bourgeoisie].
The consequences of nationalization/privatization were predictable. It took a generation of implementation of the Ferry school laws (after 1885) before the literacy rate of 1789 could be painfully restored before the First World War. (See, Roger Chartier, Dominique Julia, Marie-Madeleine Compère, L’éducation en France du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle). These landed assets were used to issue a fiduciary currency, the “assignats,” a paper currency that soon became hyper-devalued. It was with these means of payment that the clergy’s property was acquired by the bourgeoisie at a very low price. Nationalization was in fact a privatization on scandalous terms. Voltaire said of popular education: “If your cobbler can write, will he make you better shoes?” Rousseau, in maudlin style, said much the same thing. That is what we call “Progress.”
But one might have asked, then as now, why could it not have gone on indefinitely? And why could it not have lasted longer? What triggered the bankruptcy was the astronomical cost to France of the American War of Independence. At least that war was won.
War, Bankruptcy and Revolution
The parallel between the American War of Independence that led to the French Revolution of 1789, and the Ukrainian War, that will lead to the European Revolution of the 21st century is likely to emerge. The massive increase in energy prices resulting from the war in Ukraine is destroying the competitiveness of European industries and triggering inflation, not just on the goods for the rich, but on consumer goods for all. It reduces the tax base and increases deficits. As long as the privilege of the US Dollar persists, that of the Euro will remain, especially if German industry maintains its strength. But the war in Ukraine is ruining German industry first and foremost. And the privilege of the Dollar is crumbling along with Western domination of the rest of the world.
To re-establish American order and silence dissent, a NATO victory was necessary. It would have brought the rebels to their senses, but it is clear to everyone that Russia cannot be defeated militarily in this conventional war. Will we trigger a nuclear apocalypse out of rage at not being able to maintain our hegemony? This is not necessarily the most likely hypothesis—unless all Western leaders are as suicidal as Macron.
We are not sufficiently aware of the foreseeable consequences of NATO’s defeat. The regime of oligarchic democracy survives in the West because governments can open their checkbooks whenever discontent exceeds certain limits. But this indefinite credit depends on their monetary privilege, which in turn conditions their ability to finance military superiority, which in turn guarantees the currency’s credibility. The privilege of the dollar finances the US Navy, and the US Navy guarantees the privilege of the dollar, thus preserving the empire, the pax americana.
If NATO is defeated, there will eventually be no Dollar and no Empire. Now, NATO is defeated. [The situation is indeed asymmetrical. For Russia (and China), to win is simply not to lose, and maintaining their regime and independence. For NATO, winning means re-establishing world order by bringing rebel countries back into line, starting with Russia. Even a mediocre Russian success, or even partial failures, are not equivalent to defeat].
Thus, on the very day that negotiations began to formalize the Ukrainian defeat, the West was declared bankrupt. And the Revolution broke out in France. And from France, it spread like wildfire throughout the West.
That is what I wrote ten days ago. Today, it looks like the revolution is already popping.
Why in France? Because that is just the way it is. France is a highly explosive country. And above all, it is the country whose political structure, history, culture and mentality are the most resistant to American assimilation. It has never been willingly accepted. For a long time, American protectorate was tolerable, even advantageous. It has become politically humiliating, militarily dangerous, economically ruinous and culturally monstrous. Above all, America no longer frightens anyone, not even us. Taboos are breaking down. The Revolution is worldwide, against the postmodern West. Europe will either distance itself from it, or become embroiled in the detestation of the “privileged ci-devant.” The end of the dollar is indeed the analogue of the abolition of feudal rights. It is inevitable, but it will also cost Europeans dearly, who have submitted to the insane logic of US indebtedness. Here again, xenophobic nationalism is unfit to handle such a situation, as are the servile political classes currently in power. So, why is President Macron at the forefront of the war in Ukraine?
Various explanations, including psychoanalytical ones, are possible. One is that he senses that the explosion will start in France, and that he will be on the first tumbril. His idea was to gain time by prolonging the war (and thus postponing the admission of bankruptcy) until the last Ukrainian soldier is dead. And he was hoping to the very end for a miracle, a divine surprise, discord among the enemy, a coup d’état, what have you. But it is like a desperate businessman buying a lottery ticket and hoping to get away with winning the jackpot. Why would he not? That is how, thanks to the Tsarina’s death, Frederick II of Prussia won the Second Seven Years’ War, which he had lost.
The preceding reasoning is rationally based. However, we must not minimize the irrationality of postmodern culture. If a man can be a woman, a deficit can be a surplus, a balance of power its arithmetic inverse, a democracy can be totalitarianism, defeat a victory, censorship freedom, and bankruptcy fortune. Let us set aside all the facts; they have no bearing on the question. It is the words that count. Until the day when it is—revolution?
Demythologization
The French Revolution has been mythologized in a way that it would no doubt be futile to try to dispel. But if I were to demythologize it, for the happy few, here is how I would characterize it: Economically, it was an ultra-liberal policy, for the reasons I have already given. Socially, we need to distinguish between the subjective and the objective. Objectively, despite the abolition of the privileges of the nobility, it was a concentration of private property, a growth in inequality and a transfer to the bourgeoisie of the power long shared between it and the nobility; subjectively, it was an intoxication by the feeling of equality due to the lowering of the privileged. Politically, the Bourbon monarchy was replaced by a chaotic succession of bourgeois regimes, some dictatorial, others rather weak, but all equally unstable. What they had in common was the continued power of the centralizing Jacobin state. Jacobinism was, as Tocqueville clearly showed, nothing more than the Rousseauist republican continuation of the Hobbesian absolute monarchy. I would add that the latter was the political projection of a certain Cartesian rationalism, to which the French language can sometimes be welcoming. This Jacobin statism, controlled by the bourgeoisie, gave the latter a free hand. [This bourgeoisie, before being largely Americanized in the last generation, was liberal-Jacobin, but who found it more convenient to use the power of the state to maintain the advantages of a liberal economy, for which see, Beau de Lomenie, Les Responsabilités des dynasties bourgeoises]. Culturally, it was the partial replacement of the Catholic religion by Enlightenment philosophy. In France, what we call laïcité is the existence of an established religion, a philosophical state religion, not particularly tolerant, whose most fervent believers meet discreetly in a well-known philanthropic association. Only Maximilien de Robespierre attempted to transform the esoteric worship of the Goddess Reason into a civil religion. De Gaulle, a realist, ended up solving the problem with a kind of republican restoration of the monarchy, or monarchical stabilization of the Republic. In his mind, the bourgeoisie was to once again become a controlled aristocracy, at the service of the State and the Nation. The bourgeoisie, no doubt, did not appreciate this. But this did not last, especially given the external conditions. The bourgeoisie thus became a privileged aristocracy in its own right, and joined with its congeners throughout the West in an aristocratic reaction dubbed “neo-liberal.” The republican monarchs of the 5th Republic, though for long reluctantly, and from Macron (on?) enthusiastically, have supported this reaction of the “privileged.” Chateaubriand said: “Rather the Republic than the Orléans.” [The Orléans were the younger, liberal branch of the Bourbon dynasty. However, the name “Bourbons” is generally reserved for the elder, more conservative branch]. It is very French—the monarchy, in France, must be democratic (popular, egalitarian, lowering the feudalists). If, on the contrary, it serves an aristocratic reaction, then the French people still prefer the Republic. Its character being what it is, the parliamentary or liberal Republic does not work. But if the monarchy is aristocratic, the King ends up in exile or guillotined. Which just goes to show how violent France’s submission to the Anglo-Saxon model is.
Privilege and Revolution
The most certain and justified effect of the Revolution was the abolition of the privileges of the nobility. And it would be too cynical, though not absolutely inaccurate, simply to say that they were replaced by privileges of the bourgeoisie. The “privileges” of the nobility consisted of (a) exemption from payment of the main tax, the “taille,” (b) privileged or exclusive access to certain functions, notably military, (c) the right to levy local taxes, the “feudal rights.” These privileges were abuses. The weakness of the State’s revenues was mainly due to this exemption, and judging by the disaster that ensued for them, the privileged were particularly short-sighted when they obstinately opposed equality before taxation. The kings had long since become disillusioned with the nobility’s failure to educate their children seriously, and recruited their top civil servants from the bourgeoisie, who believed that taking the trouble to be born was not enough. Unfortunately, the ambition of the bourgeois families who entered the King’s service was to be ennobled. Privileged access to the officer’s profession might have been more defensible, but after the two disastrous Seven Years’ Wars during the reign of Louis XV, the people had lost confidence in the military skills of the nobility, which had long ensured its prestige. Military schools were created, but too late, and the good officers thus trained fought not for the King, but in the wars of the Republic and Empire.
Feudal rights are a more curious story. An example given by Taine, in his book, The Origins of Contemporary France, will make the point clear. The French peasantry was outraged by the nobility’s monopoly of hunting rights in the forests at the end of the 18th century. There were constant disputes and court cases. When the nobility acquired the exclusive right to hunt, the forests were dangerous, full of wild beasts, and it was the role of the nobility to protect villages from their incursions by tracking down animals in the deep forests. The right to hunt was therefore the counterpart of a duty of protection involving real risks. Centuries later, bears and wolves had almost entirely disappeared, but the exclusive right to hunt remained, as a remuneration now without justification or counterpart. And there were many other such things.
More generally, feudalism was established after the collapse of the state, following the barbaric invasions and fall of the Roman Empire, and the weakness or incompetence of the barbarian regimes that replaced it. To ensure security, the people, exercising their right to self-defense in the face of state failure, turned to a local chief, who himself, along with others, sought a higher protector (a “suzerain”), and so on. Thus, from the bottom up, on the basis of personal relationships and private law, an effective public defense organization was formed. It was not unreasonable for those who ensured security to receive taxes at every level, corresponding to the services to be rendered or already rendered. But feudalism died with its success. The State was reconstituted, and the suzerain once again became the sovereign. Feudalism no longer served any purpose. But its old rights remained, no longer corresponding to functions and duties. Devaluation had reduced the purchasing power of the nobility, who were all the more eager to demand what they felt was their due. In such a situation, it was inevitable that relations would become strained between nobles and commoners, especially with the bourgeoisie, who knew they were more competent and felt discriminated against. Such was the situation. Throughout Louis XVI’s reign, he tolerated a noble reaction aimed at strengthening the feudal class. To complete this clarification, we will have to explain the very notion of privilege in the history of France—but that will require a whole article (perhaps later).
Once equality of taxation and free access to all offices had been established, and feudal rights abolished, the revolution should have been considered over. Unfortunately, it had only just begun. Ten years of chaos, terror, dictatorship, and twenty-five years of war, two million dead. Napoleon said: “I have an income of 80,000 men” (annual).
If the monarchy had taken the initiative for these reforms in good time, instead of being subjected to them, it would have strengthened itself while at the same time tempering itself, and would have been able to introduce representation without losing its prerogative. This would have been a constitutional monarchy of the 5th Republic type, a Bourbonnaisque Gaullism. But it chose the easy path of absolutism and the careless maintenance of privileges.
The Abolition of Privileges
The night of August 4, 1789, when an enthusiastic vote was taken to abolish feudal privileges, is remembered in France as a great moment of Justice and Liberty. Let us not forget, however, that the deputies had second thoughts and decided a few days later that, in the end, feudal rights would remain abolished, but would have to be bought back by former taxpayers. If not demythologized, then at least clarified.
A classmate of mine, teaching the history of law and institutions in France, sometimes composed his instruction plan in three parts: constitution of privilege; demolition of privilege; reconstitution of privilege. In fact, the French are egalitarians who love privilege. Saying it is absurd is not enough, because deep down it seems absurd, but it is not. It would undoubtedly be chauvinistic to reduce to nothing the place of envy and jealousy in the national character. But it is fair to note that the French are also elitists, idealists, who like to see an elite whose recruitment is genuinely open to all the best, whatever their social origin, and whose actions are selfless and in the service of the common good. If that is all egalitarianism is, then it differs little from common sense and natural equity. French egalitarianism must therefore be well understood. Here it is at his best, in the middle of the 17th century: “It is good, Monsieur,” writes Pascal, addressing a Grand de France, “that you know what is owed to you, so that you do not pretend to demand from men what is not owed to you; for it is a visible injustice—and yet it is very common to those of your condition, because they are ignorant of its nature” [Blaise Pascal, “Trois discours sur la condition des grands,” the beginning of the second discourse, in Œuvres, Gallimard-Pléiade, p.618]. The French are not anti-elitist. On the contrary, they are as Mandarin as China ever was. Inequality exists only to serve, and must be earned by superiority duly recognized through open competitions, or other non-arbitrary procedures.
Chateaubriand, that aristocrat so much the friend of the people and so French, noted with acuity: “It is only in the bosom of aristocracies that I have fully observed the egalitarian spirit.” France’s greatest poet, Victor Hugo, was rejected 22 times by the Académie française. The first time he applied, he received 2 votes (out of 39) from Lamartine and Chateaubriand, the two greatest men of letters of their time. A witty woman commented: “If we weighed the votes, Monsieur Hugo would be elected; but we’re counting them.” Such is egalitarianism within aristocracies. The French people loathe power, which appears to be that of a snooty privileged few, but they want strong power that demeans the great, who believe themselves to be superior. They know that such power needs a generous and capable elite. They are indignant when the selection of the elite is not open enough. What we call statism, Colbertism, centralization, Jacobinism, etc. are excesses and distortions of a very reasonable structure of justice, which liberals do not support, but wrongly and unjustly.
Every free economy needs a truly independent, incorruptible and competent regulator. What disgraces a so-called free economy is that the regulator is regulated by the regulated, to the great detriment of the public. And these deregulated bourgeoisies turn into aristocracies, self-destructing through rapacity and short-sighted libertarianism. Chateaubriand, again, spoke well of aristocracies, “which begin with merit, continue with privilege and end with vanity.”
The philosopher Malebranche wrote in his Traité de Morale: “Men forgive everything, except contempt.” An elite that fails in its duties is called “privileged.” From then on, their activity seems unjust and abusive, but more importantly, their very existence is an affront. This is the source of hatred, of the transformation of emulation into jealousy, and of jealousy into a thirst for revenge—and consequently of wars.
I have gone into some detail on the question of privilege, to make it easier for readers, depending on their place of residence and height of vision, to apply it in the most relevant way possible to the situations that concern them.
Featured: Gertrud Eysoldt als “Salome” (Gertrud Eysoldt as “Salome”), by Lovis Corinth; painted in 1903.
