The problem of war and peace has occupied the minds of mankind for thousands of years. Many treatises on “eternal peace” have been written. When we turn to this topic, we, first of all, remember the famous work of Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace. But it would be unfair to ignore the names of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Elert Kruse, William Penn, Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham, Johann Gotlieb Fichte, Johann Gottfried Herder, Joseph Goerres, Friedrich von Gentz, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, Vasily Fedorovich Malinovsky. In their works, these authors called for peace, but wars, nevertheless, did not cease to arise with surprising constancy. However, the desire for peace remains a cherished wish for most people of our planet.
After the Second World War, various organizations emerged to study the possibility of establishing peace between nations, such as Peace Research, SIPRI, the French Institute of Polemology, and others. Most of these organizations chose peace as the subject of their research, avoiding any direct reference to war in their names. At the same time, as practice shows, the studies focused on war as the most convenient phenomenon for research. Moreover, it is war that mankind seeks to remove from the lives of peoples, in order to find peace and realize the opportunities for their development, which are hindered by war.
History shows that war is a companion of civilizations, regardless of their type and the stage of development they are at. The question of what kind of socio-political system would provide a real possibility of eliminating war from the life of society is of theoretical as well as practical interest. There are two approaches to solving the problem, which theoretically have answered and answer this question: the Marxist-Leninist theory, which argued that only the countries of socialism are able to cope with war, at least within the socialist camp, and the current proponents of the concept of “democratic peace” argue something similar with respect to countries with a democratic system.
This issue is being discussed nowadays at various theoretical and scientific-practical conferences, symposia and seminars. Thus, for example, on April 16-18, 2015, a Russian-French round table, In Search of Lost Peace: Reality and Prospects was held in Paris as part of the theoretical seminar Modern Paradoxes of Democracy, where the issues of modern wars and their causes were discussed.
The purpose of comparing such important phenomena, as “democracy” and “war” for political science and practice is to clarify their genetic, economic, social, political connection, their determinism (unilateral or mutual), their historicity, their moral component and a number of other aspects that are of great practical importance. At the same time, theoretical coverage of this problem is of interest, since, forming our ideas about the future of human civilization, we see it as the spread and development of democracy. The question of whether humanity can count on a peaceful existence without wars and military conflicts occupies a special place in this context.
It is likely that war (or something similar to it in the pre-political forms of humanity’s existence) fertilized history. At the dawn of history, states with a democratic polity engaged in numerous wars, which were seen as the natural state of human society. Plato in his Laws stated: “…what most people call peace is only a name, but in reality there is an eternal, irreconcilable war between all states from nature.” According to Plato’s classification, democracy as a form of government is worse than good, but better than bad forms. One of the reasons for this characterization is its unpredictability and being fraught with internal and external wars (internal wars he called “strife”). Antique democracies did not question the possibility and necessity of wars, as wars were a way of establishing domination, replenishing the resources necessary for the life of the state: slaves, wealth, territories. However, philosophical treatises expressed the idea of inadmissibility of war between Hellenic states and its admissibility against barbarians. At present, the low probability of wars between democratic states is discussed, but there are no serious theoretical studies of this problem. At the same time, implicitly under the category of “barbarians” one can easily include states with non-democratic forms of government, which is very similar to the well-known scheme.
During the late antique, medieval periods of history and much of the New Age, democratic regimes ceased to exist, but the theoretical foundations of democracy continued to develop and improve. This period of history was also marked by numerous wars. This suggests that war can arise, and even more often, as a consequence of other political forms of government than democratic rule.
The bourgeois revolutions in Europe set in motion huge masses of people who took part in the processes of political reorganization of the modern world. One of the tools and methods of transformation of modern society was wars, which contributed to the emergence of modern nation-states and the rise of the individual. Whereas before, participation in war was the domain of the nobility, now it has become a common right and duty of the citizen.
The discussion of war and democracy would not be complete without a brief excursion into the history of views on war, dating back to the period of the first bourgeois revolutions. In this sense, the creative heritage of Hugo Grotius (1588-1645), whose worldview was formed under the influence of the Dutch bourgeois revolution of the 16th century, is of great interest. The human mind, in his opinion, served as the basis for the fulfillment of the principles of natural law and the formation of the law of the “human.” He pinned his hopes on the “communal nature of man,” attributing to man, unlike animals, the desire for peaceful companionship. He was also convinced that war was a manifestation of man’s hostility towards each other, inherent in the period of humanity’s fragmented existence.
The Dutch bourgeois thinker wrote his famous treatise On the Law of War and Peace (1625) in the midst of the Thirty Years’ War. In it, he raises very important questions, for his time, about the essence and the justice of wars, the causes of their occurrence, the actions allowed in war, etc. Although the problem of the justice of war had previously been raised by Grotius’ predecessors, it becomes central in his work. Even Aristotle in Politics wrote: “…hunting should be both on wild animals and on those people who, being by nature intended to obey, do not want to obey. This kind of war is by nature just” [1, с. 21-22]. According to the ancient author, war itself contributes to the development of justice, understood as justice for free citizens. It is to him that European political thought owes the introduction of moral characterization of wars—their division into just and unjust. Marcus Tullius Cicero also divided wars into just and unjust, introducing a moral and legal criterion for such classification (a war, according to his views, was considered just if it was preceded by a decree of the Senate and a formal declaration of war).
The doctrine of just and unjust wars was further developed in the Christian tradition. Aurelius Augustine (354–430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) made a significant contribution to this. Aquinas formulated the signs of a just war: 1) the declaration of war must be carried out by state power, and not by private individuals; 2) the war must be caused by legitimate reasons; 3) it must pursue legitimate goals and be waged by legitimate means. Later, Niccolo Machiavelli also used the concepts of “just” and “unjust” wars in his classification.
The fact that these concepts were not first used by Grotius does not diminish his contribution to the development of such an important approach to the typology of wars. These concepts would subsequently be used in various interpretations. It is no coincidence that the Dutch thinker devoted the first book of his treatise to the questions: “What is war?” “Are there just wars?” The division of war into public and private, etc. He explores the moral and legal foundations of war and peace, and seeks the beginnings of justice in international relations. For its time, his treatise was an example of a realistic approach to the problem of war and peace.
In his treatise, he writes: “A public war is either solemn or unsolemn according to the law of nations. The war which I call solemn here is usually called a just [legitimate] war in the same sense in which we speak of a legal will as distinct from a codicil, of a legal marriage as distinct from slavish cohabitation… Many, indeed, poorly understanding the meaning of the word “just,” believe that thereby all wars which do not deserve the name of a just war are condemned as unjust and unlawful. In order for a war to have a solemn character according to the law of nations, two kinds of conditions are necessary: firstly, it is necessary that on both sides the war be waged by the will of those who are vested with supreme power in the state, and then—that certain rites be observed, which will be discussed in their place. Both are required together, because one is not enough without the other. A public war, however, may be free from those rites and ceremonies, and may be waged against private individuals and by the authority of any officials in the state. And so, if we abstract from the internal laws of the state, it would seem that every official, both for the protection of the people entrusted to him and for the implementation of acts of power, has the right to wage war if he meets resistance.”
Grotius examines the causes of wars, focusing on the causes of just wars, pointing out the obvious distinction between cause and pretext, which, as he admits, is not always made by other authors.
Grotius cites the statement of Dio Cassius: “We must be most concerned about observing justice: if the cause is just, then the war can have a successful outcome; otherwise, no one can be sure of anything, even if at first glance the cause promises success.” It suggests the importance that the famous Dutchman attached to this aspect. And today, many political scientists share this opinion, although the concept of “just” can acquire different content and scope in their interpretation. At the same time, the absence of such a concept not only impoverishes the categorical apparatus of political science, but also largely determines military-political practice.
If a war is undertaken by state power and leads to military success, but is undertaken without reason, it can be subject to censure. Grotius gives an instructive example: “Thus, Alexander, who without any reason went to war against the Persians and other peoples in particular… the Scythians, earned the nickname of a robber from Seneca, a robber from Lucian, a daring one from the Indian fakirs, and a pirate once declared him his accomplice in crime.”
Undoubtedly, other thinkers, politicians, and military men have put forward many interesting ideas about war that have not lost their significance even today. This problem has organized a kind of historical “round table” whose participants were representatives of different historical eras who interpreted this state of society differently. One of them is Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote the treatise On War. Among his various thoughts on this topic, it is appropriate to dwell on two of his judgments that are relevant to the subject of our discussion. He asserts that: 1) “…the actual growth of culture in no way paralyzes or denies the desire to exterminate the enemy, which is contained in the very concept of war;” 2) “…war is an act of violence, and there is no limit to its application; each of the combatants prescribes a law for the other; there is a competition that theoretically drove both opponents to extremes.” That is, according to his opinion, the growth of political culture in the future cannot guarantee against the recurrence of wars, as well as against the growth of cruelty during and after military operations. Another researcher, Gaston Bouthoul, placing the emphasis somewhat differently, wrote: “I think that in this regard it is possible to formulate a real law: the cruelty of political events tends to be proportional to the demographic growth of the countries in which they occur.”
Modern democracies are characterized by contradictions, which are expressed in internal and external political conflicts that reach the level of violent actions and the use of armed violence. According to experts, they are at risk of becoming an expression of either private corporate interests or degenerating into ochlocratic forms of government. The democratic nature of the state structure of one state does not provide guarantees for other states (democratic or non-democratic) from possible military actions against them. The decision to initiate such actions can be made in compliance with democratic procedures. This can be a consequence of erroneous conclusions about the presence of weapons of mass destruction, violation of the principles of democracy, a threat to security from another country, etc. In this context, the statement of one of the former presidents of France, Charles de Gaulle, is interesting: “Everywhere we run into the egoism of individual states. Everyone thinks only of himself. Everywhere you hear only: ‘I was harmed,’ ‘I was treated unfairly,’ ‘such and such a place belongs to me by right.’ At the same time that we declare the necessity of outlawing war and are about to bury the sword, others are welcoming force, shouting about danger, demanding arms, forming militias, storm trooping. Where is the dam that will hold back this current?”
Perhaps such a “dam” is man? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 1) states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Wonderful words, if history did not know depressing examples testifying to the contrary (the biblical story of Abel and Cain perfectly illustrates how human passions can push to fratricide).
At the present stage, one of the most important is the demographic problem, leading to the emergence of migration flows capable of disrupting the demographic and political balance in various regions. This process has a serious conflict potential, as Plato pointed out, warning about the possibility of wars between cities arising for this reason. At present, states with democratic political systems are exposed to the danger of internal unrest, the cause of which are migration processes and their direct and indirect consequences. Counteraction of democratic regimes to these negative impacts, destabilizing the political and social balance, in some cases causes the use of violent means.
In relation to the mutual connection between democracy and war, the concept of waves of the democratic process by Philippe Schmitter is interesting. Unlike Samuel Huntington, he counts four waves of global democratization. All of them are causally related to revolution, wars or military coups. By analogy with this scheme, it is permissible to formulate the following working hypothesis: if the impact of the external (international) environment on democratization processes can manifest itself in the form of persuasion, various incentives, and sometimes direct coercion, then global democratization can become a potential cause of revolutions, wars and military coups.
The processes of globalization, which have been developing dynamically in the late 20th – early 21st centuries, have shown that global dependencies are changing democracy. A number of researchers believe it is possible to speak of “global democratization.” This trend, along with obvious successes, encounters significant difficulties in the field of international relations, reaching the military stage of conflict resolution, which seriously undermines confidence in the ability of democracy to organize and regulate political processes in the international arena. In the modern world, attempts to create cosmopolitan models of democracy encounter resistance from many national states that do not want to put up with the dominance of interstate and transnational centers of power that do not take into account the position of the world community represented by the UN, and that violate international law, etc. The concepts of “humanitarian intervention,” “limited sovereignty,” “transnational democracy” implemented in practice cause a wide range of reactions—from disagreement, objection to condemnation and counteraction, including military, on the part of the object of these influences. This leads, according to the French philosopher and political scientist Alain Brossat, to the conclusion that “…the schemes of Carl Schmitt, which previously remained nothing more than the shameful dregs of democratic globalization, are once again being used: a state of emergency, civil war, total war.”
Modern theories of democracy, developing the concepts of value and rational-procedural approach, testify to the diversity of interpretations of the concept of “democracy.” The criteria underlying the selection of this or that interpretation determine their originality and the possibilities of implementing the idea of democracy in a particular form. The theories of participatory democracy, egalitarian elitism, pluralism, consociational democracy, market democracy, cyberdemocracy, reflexive democracy, etc. in the field of political practice have found their expression in universal procedures that materialize theoretical approaches. Despite the obvious advantages of the democratic structure of society over other known forms, democracy is not free from a number of drawbacks (imperfections) that jeopardize the internal equilibrium of the political system. The very nature of public power is burdened with contradictions due to real inequality of people, and the mismatch of their political opportunities. Democracy is no less complicated in the international arena. Are the principles of democracy able to withstand the challenges posed by the globalization of various processes? The struggle for energy resources, demographic problems, famine, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental problems—this is not a complete list of potential causes of conflicts that can undermine the democratic foundations of international relations. Sharp contradictions between actors of international political relations can lead to a situation when states with a democratic political system assume the responsibility to use force against other sovereign states with the consent of the world community or (sadly) without it, or in spite of its disagreement. Forceful solution of the problem in violation of the established system of international law is justified by rhetoric of a humanistic nature (“humanitarian intervention,” “transnational democracy,” “limitation of sovereignty,” etc.). During the Iraqi crisis in 2003, Madeleine Albright, in an interview with the newspaper Vedomosti, stated: “I believe in humanitarian interventions, such as in the case of Bosnia, but you have to get the timing right, the intelligence gathering right. I have always believed that the U.S. should pursue an active foreign policy, use its enormous power—not only military, but also political and economic—to help other countries build viable market economies and democracies, to solve problems that go beyond individual states, to fight terrorism, to seek the removal of trade barriers, to support international environmental treaties.”
However, faith alone is not enough to resolve complex, intricate problems, as it collides with reality, which shatters even the best wishes. This is evidenced by the statement of the modern French political scientist and philosopher Pierre Manent: “… the experience of the recent war in Kosovo, as well as the current unrest in the region, show that the establishment and maintenance of a decent political order in the Balkans will for a long time depend on the availability of military means, which, in their qualitative and quantitative indicators, are related to the means of war, and not to the means of ‘maintaining order’ or ‘humanitarian intervention.’ In short, Europe has not finished with war.”
In his annual report of the UN Secretary-General on the work of the Organization for 1999, Kofi Annan noted: “Proponents of the so-called democratic peace thesis point out that democratic countries almost never fight each other and that internal armed conflicts occur in them much less frequently than in non-democratic countries.” There are various explanations for this—the presence of common values and norms, openness and predictability of decision-making procedures, “the unique ability to exchange intentions based on a stable foundation of rational trust and reduced risks, to rely on reliable commitments and not just hopes and dreams.” These facts give grounds for supporters of the “democratic peace” theory to assert that democracies are far from being the embodiment of pacifism. They often fight and even initiate wars. But they fight only with autocracies and never with each other. In coalition wars, they may enter into temporary alliances with autocracies, but they are always on the same side of the front with other democracies participating in the war. There may be very serious disagreements between democracies regarding the advisability of war with one or another autocratic regime, but they never lead to armed clashes between democracies themselves. Incidentally, a similar thesis about the impossibility of war between socialist countries existed in Soviet ideology. The military conflict between China and Vietnam crossed out this ideological concept.
It should be noted that the assertion about the impossibility of armed clashes between democracies is quite controversial, since the use of the universal quantifier (“never”) casts doubt on this assertion. With a single example that refutes this position, according to the laws of formal logic, the stated judgment moves from the category of true to the category of false.
At the same time, supporters of the “democratic peace” theory claim that wars between democratic states and others, which are considered by the former to be autocratic, “rebellious”, “problematic” or “rogue,” are fundamentally possible. A serious problem in this regard is the methodological basis for dividing states into the specified types. The question arises: what are the criteria for classifying a particular regime as a democracy, autocracy, etc.? Naturally, the question is not simple, and therefore presupposes the possibility of different calculation methods. Different researchers offer approaches that differ from each other, yielding different quantitative results. With certain discrepancies, different countries will be included in the number of democracies and autocracies. Thus, when specifically considering the issue, the final data will be approximate. An idea of how complex the problems of objective classification of countries into democratic and non-democratic are can be obtained by familiarizing oneself with the publications of domestic researchers.
If it is impossible to avoid the use of violence between political entities, what provides the basis for using military force in international politics? Apparently, it is the law (the right) and consolidated political will. The constitutions (basic law) of most democratic states provide for the right to declare and wage war. Thus, the Constitution of the United States of America provides for the possibility of declaring war. It does not define the conditions for the declaration, the nature of the declared war, which can be defensive or offensive, etc. (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, Section 10, Clause 3). The Constitution of the Russian Federation provides for the possibility of introducing martial law by the President of the Russian Federation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or an immediate threat of aggression on the territory of the Russian Federation or in certain areas thereof (Article 87, Clause 2), a state of emergency (Article 88). This creates the legal basis for war. In addition to this basis, modern democracies create economic, military, political, financial and other foundations for the creation of military force and the conditions for its use, if necessary.
In his time, Proudhon subjected war to a devastating criticism and substantiated the inevitability of its disappearance. He wrote: “French democrats! Instead of chewing over old formulas, old ideas and old paradoxes—instead of being carried away by outdated utopias and arousing extinct passions, get on par with events, study the spirit and deeds of your century, observe its aspirations and you will be convinced that war no longer has the slightest reason to exist; that it can no longer have anything organic, civilizing, liberal.” As his main arguments, he cited the legal groundlessness, economic inexpediency of war, its moral bankruptcy, etc. However, he would have been horrified if he had learned that after his death the number of wars and their consequences not only did not decrease, but rather increased unprecedentedly, and the French democrats did not even think of condemning wars, much less abandoning them.
A natural and fundamental question arises: is it necessary and possible to completely abandon the use of force? In a number of cases, the use of military force is necessary or inevitable. But when it contradicts the norms of international law, many participants in the global political process question its validity and effectiveness.
Didier Bigo makes an interesting generalization that confirms the prospects for the use of military force in international relations: “The barbarian is not equal and will never be equal to the civilized man. He cannot even be absolved of the blame for his savagery. The cause of the unrest has thus been found. It lies not so much in economics and politics as in geography and culture. A return to geopolitics makes it possible to prove that some peoples are not yet ripe for democracy and remain ‘barbaric.’ The expected Western universalization has not occurred. The export of the state model of social organization, like the export of democracy, has not been very successful… This makes confrontation inevitable.”
Perhaps a critical look at the problems of war, peace and democracy will enable us to take a sober look at the limits of democracy’s ability to establish peace and prevent war. We must not allow the enthusiasm for democratization to turn into an enthusiasm for war and military conflict.
Illusions periodically take hold of the minds of thinkers, politicians and public figures. Often these delusions arise in periods preceding some historical cataclysms. For example, the intellectual atmosphere of the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries showed that the bourgeoisie, politicians and thinkers of that time, with rare exceptions, believed that humanity was moving towards an era of peace and prosperity. Historical practice has made radical adjustments to these views. The First World War, later called the “war to end all wars,” with its horrors gave rise to the opinion that such a slaughter could not be repeated; but the Second World War dispelled these illusions as well. This shows that no matter how good the intentions may be, illusions and delusions regarding the possibility of wars and military conflicts are based on, they carry a great danger for the destinies of nations. Therefore, a realistic view of things seems more desirable and productive, although not always pleasant. One cannot help but remember the conclusion clearly formulated by the ancient Romans: “Si vis pacem, para bellum.” But there is no need to prepare for war; we must strive to prevent it, including by military-political means.
In the late 19th – early 20th centuries, it was common to compare war to a disease. This was discussed by the Russian philosopher Vladimir S. Solovyov, Gason Bouthoul, the French sociologist and philosopher, and many others. Bouthoul even suggested changing the wording of the famous Roman maxim as follows: “If you want peace, experience war.” Obviously, political scientists should follow the path of studying this phenomenon in order to, if not completely eliminate this “disease” from the life of society, then at least minimize the troubles it brings. Much still needs to be done in this area. After all, the very concept of “war” in our time is losing its usual outlines, becoming indefinite, vague. Phenomena are included under it that do not have the qualitative characteristics that correspond to the classical concept. Theoretical comprehension of the problem of the emergence of wars involving democratic regimes of modern times and applied research of this problem can benefit all mankind, countries and specific people.
An analysis of the phenomenon of war and its connection with the life of society allows us to make some generalizations: 1) wars are characteristic of all periods of human history and of all types of political structure of society; 2) the gap in the economic, political, technological, etc. level of development of countries of the world tends to increase; 3) the imperfection of international law and the international security system does not guarantee peaceful existence; 4) modern democratic regimes do not reject war as a way of achieving political (for example, the spread of democracy) and other goals; 5) the mentality of politicians, military and other actors allows the existence of wars as an instrument of politics, etc.
On this basis, it becomes obvious that the current state of international relations does not give hope for “eternal peace.” Democratic states, being included in the system of relations based on the possibility of using armed violence in politics, reserve the right to use military force. This raises the question of the need to create an adequate system of international security, providing for the availability of military power to maintain peace.
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Featured: Sirin and Alkonost (The Birds of Joy and Sorrow), by Viktor Vasnetsov (1896).
