In early July, 1945, U.S. President Harry Truman left United States on board the cruiser Augusta and sailed to Europe for the Potsdam Conference—a meeting with Churchill and Stalin. In Potsdam, he kept a diary (normally, he did not), which is known as the Truman Potsdam Diary Entries. This handwritten diary has a two-pages entry for July 25th.
A part of this note refers to the already planned atomic bomb use, where Truman himself wrote:
…This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War Mr. Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old Capitol or the new. He & I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives…
I propose that we take what Truman wrote seriously and try to analyse it. After all, he certainly meant exactly what he wrote—at a minimum, we have no reasons to assume otherwise. The last sentence, beginning with, “The target will be a purely military one…” is absolutely unequivocal—Truman forbade atomic attacks on any Japanese city and instructed Stimson to find a “purely military” target for the atomic bomb. What is more, he also told Stimson to issue a warning, so that the Japanese may surrender before this new bomb is used on them. Truman’s note also says that Stimson agreed with him (“He and I are in accord.”). So, it is obvious that this presidential directive was to be carried out as noted by Truman. The next day, July 25th, Stimson left the Potsdam Conference and travelled back to United States, where he arrived on 28th. According to Truman’s note quoted above, there can be no doubt what the presidential instructions given to him were. Stimson also kept a diary in Potsdam, and a relevant note in this diary informs us that his conversation with Truman on this subject actually took place on July 24, 1945.
Could Truman still change his mind before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima? We can surely imagine he could. Possibly George Marshall (who was present in Potsdam) convinced Truman that using an atomic bomb on some city was a better option, as it would shock the Japanese into surrender completely? Possibly, but he did not. How do we know this?
On August 9, 1945, the day of the Nagasaki bombing, Truman delivered a radio speech to the nation after his return to U.S. Starting from 22.44 (min.secs) Truman says:
The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.
The two sources above bracket the Hiroshima attack—Truman was against any atomic bomb attacks on cities eleven days before Hiroshima, and also three days after. This way we can be sure that he maintained this view throughout the whole bracketed period. What we have now discovered is that Truman was unequivocally against the way the atomic attack on Hiroshima was actually executed—mostly against civilians and without any prior warning. Any doubts about whether what Truman said in his radio speech is what he actually believed seem highly improbable. Lying about the nature of the target at this time had no use; as such, a lie would be exposed immediately by Japan—Hiroshima was not a military base, although one was in fact present in the city, and killing of civilians was not avoided at all. On the contrary, the number of civilians killed was huge and many times larger than the number of soldiers killed (higher than a 10:1 ratio according to English Wikipedia).
Therefore, we must conclude that on August 9, 1945, when giving his radio speech to the nation, Truman kept believing that Hiroshima WAS in fact a standalone military base—in accordance with his general directive given on July 25th to Henry Stimson. The reader should understand that this is quite likely, even though most educated people are well aware currently that Hiroshima is a Japanese city. Three days after the bombing, the name “Hiroshima” was still a novelty in the West, and Truman was certainly no expert on geography of Japan, while he had been heavily preoccupied with European matters since his inauguration in April. What follows is that at the time of his radio speech Truman also must have believed his July 25th directive to Stimson to have been properly implemented by him, as is normally expected—purely a military target, prior warning before the attack. This leaves no other option but to conclude that Stimson must have disobeyed Truman in this regard, which in formal terms is insubordination—a shocking but unavoidable conclusion.
There is however one more possibility which could explain the historical material quoted above—a misunderstanding between Truman and Stimson. The trouble with this is the unequivocal phrasing of Truman’s note put in his diary for July 25th. Truman was certain that he had an agreement with Stimson (“He and I are in accord”), and he also noted what the essence of this agreement was. This way, Truman could be certain about the meaning of their agreement, and he could show its contents to Stimson in case of any doubts. Therefore, in Truman’s eyes, there could be no question about his directive given to Stimson, and a failure to execute it could only be seen as insubordination. Essentially, by making his note for July 25th, Truman gave Stimson no toom to manoeuvre with regard to their agreement about atomic bomb use. If the reader has any doubts regarding the interpretation of events as discussed above, I can only say: try to look at it through Truman’s eyes. He noted what their (mutual!) decision was, and then Stimson simply did not follow it. Truman could no longer have trust in Stimson after such a non-performance.
Apart from the above, there is one more piece of historical evidence which constitutes a third source fully confirming the insubordination conclusion; and it is an article penned by Henry Stimson himself in Harper’s Magazine, in 1947, which is well-known.
In the article’s subheading, “The Use of the Bomb,” in the fifth paragraph, Stimson wrote: “…I approved four other targets including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, and Nagasaki on August 9…”
So, Stimson himself wrote that it was he who approved the final list of the four targets, which were four Japanese cities. The other two targets of the four were the cities of Niigata and Kokura. How do we know? They were all named in the historical order of July 25, 1945, by General Thomas Handy, which was issued to bomb Japanese cities with atomic bombs, and which action was then carried out for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Niigata and Kokura were not bombed because on August 10, 1945, Truman essentially forbade the automatic execution of this order (there is a note from Marshall to General Leslie Groves to that effect), while the Japanese sued for peace on the same day. These cities likely would have been bombed, if the Japanese continued to fight—the relevant order pinpointed four cities as targets. The city of Kokura was the original target of the second atomic raid and was switched to Nagasaki as a result of the lack of target visibility over Kokura due to clouds.
All this means that Stimson’s self-admitted approval of the atomic attacks was final: it was he and not Truman who approved the order to Handy order. Stimson’s authority to do so was his position as a Secretary of War, the civilian oversight over the armed forces. This means that he must have disobeyed Truman’s Potsdam directive, given to him when he was leaving, which is the insubordination in question. If we want to avoid the insubordination conclusion according to Stimson’s article for Harper’s, we must assume that Stimson “covered up” for Truman in the article, assuming responsibility actually borne by Truman; but then why would Truman note in his private diary that he forbade atomic bomb attacks on any Japanese city? Truman’s diary was for none’s eyes and it was only declassified in the 1970s, long after his death; so, there was no point lying in it about personal responsibility.
If Stimson was insubordinate to Truman, he should have been fired. In fact, he was relieved of his duties as Secretary of War on September 21, 1945 (the Wikipedia note on Stimson is enough), which is a mere six weeks after the Hiroshima bombing. The reason given was his health, but it is obvious that any insubordination involved in atomic bombings had to be kept secret. Stimson noted in his own diary that he had something akin to heart attack on the 8th of August (in his own opinion—he wrote “Heart attack” at the top of his August 8, 1945 diary entry), but his doctor “reassured him,” and he went to a conference with Truman on the same day. Moreover, he was not even hospitalised. On August 9, 1945 Stimson had another busy day, as he noted in his diary, and the same on for the 10th (he ended his diary note for this day with the words “This has been a pretty heavy day”). So, it is easy to conclude that he did not have any heart attack on August 8th and his note to that effect is not only untrue, but he realized himself that it was untrue! Stimson’s heart problem starting on August 8th has the word “phoney” written all over it, as he hardly gave it any space in his extensive diary which is completely focused on his work. Moreover, these alleged issues tellingly began exactly on the day Stimson had a conference with Truman—possibly the talk with Truman was the cause of Stimson’s feeling unwell?
Starting on August 11th, Stimson went for a three-week vacation, which he spent at St. Hubert’s Club in the vicinity of Saranac Lake in the Adirondack Mountains. This is a highly remote location even today, and it had to be much more remote in 1945. Why did Stimson choose such a remote location, if he had heart-related health problems, is anyone’s guess. In the Adirondack Mountains, he was likely hours away from the nearest hospital (the nearest large city seems to be Toronto, Canada, nearly 100 miles away). My guess explaining this situation is that he did not have any heart problems at all, and this is exactly what his doctor concluded after examining Stimson on August 8, 1945, in Stimson’s own words noted in his diary. Therefore, Stimson’s leaving his post on September 21, 1945 is the historical source number four, which only provides additional confirmation of my thesis.
There is also one more historical source which clearly shows Truman’s attitude to atomic attacks on civilian targets, and it is the exchange of letters between him and U.S. Senator Richard Russell, on August 7 and 9, 1945. Russell sent a very hawkish and extensive telegram to Truman, inter alia arguing and urging him to abandon the policy of warning Japanese cities before any air raids on them—mass napalm or atomic. It seems that Russell did not realize at the time that Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, actually without any warning. Russell’s telegram is also freely available on the web.
Truman responded in a very diplomatic manner, in the end writing:
For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of “pigheadedness” of the leaders of a nation and, for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary. It is my opinion that after the Russians enter into war the Japanese will very shortly fold up. My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.
Russians entered the war, in the Japanese theatre, on the same day, August 9, 1945 and it seems that Truman simply did not know this at the time of writing his response to Russell. Anyway, it is clear that Truman refused to approve the ruthless means proposed by Russell, and this necessarily includes the no-prior-warning policy proposed by him. Earlier in the war, USAAF did in fact warn Japanese populations regularly about imminent fire bomb raids on particular cities. What follows is that Truman was for prior warnings on the day Nagasaki was bombed without any warning, which is also the day he gave his radio speech to the nation, as discussed above. As a result, we have a double confirmation of his attitude towards this subject, first expressed in his Potsdam diary note of July 25, 1945, and this double confirmation is dated August 9, 1945. What actually transpired during the atomic attacks was in total opposition to his triple documented view on this matter (prior warning necessary, military targets only), and this could only happen by the insubordination of Henry Stimson, as has been shown above.
It has to be noted that after the atomic attacks, Truman never shunned in public the responsibility for them. Reportedly, he always claimed that it was he personally who authorised these bombings and always claimed to have had no remorse due to the necessity of finally bringing Japan to surrender. This is however in total conflict with his private note of July 25, as above, his radio speech to the nation and his letter to senator Russell, as well as Stimson’s admission of personal responsibility in this regard found in his article for Harper’s about atomic bomb use. This conflict can be resolved by realising that Truman had no other option—essentially, he had to cover up for the United States as insubordination could not be implicated in such a grave matter as atomic attacks, for obvious PR-related reasons. Uncovering the actual insubordination committed by Stimson would put the U.S.A. in a scandalously bad light, so it had to be avoided at all costs. The insubordination was kept secret even though Stimson essentially revealed his responsibility in his article for Harper’s, because Truman’s diary note of July 25 was kept secret for many years. Even the much later declassification of all of the above historical sources did not bring it to light, because to see it, you need to put all the pieces of the puzzle together.
By the way, the historical sources quoted above completely absolve Truman from any responsibility for the actual atomic attacks, as he never ordered them to be executed on civilians. On the contrary, he expressly forbade it and it is noted verbatim in his private diary. Truman’s name is unjustly tarnished with the horrific responsibility for obliterating two large Japanese cities with nuclear fire, and he definitely should be cleared of this. The said responsibility rests entirely on Stimson’s shoulders. What follows is that U.S. did not have a single policy towards atomic attacks, as is still normally surmised. There was a split between Truman’s view and Stimson’s view and the latter prevailed, which should not have happened as per bureaucratic hierarchy but unfortunately it did. By the way, it may also be noted that Leslie Groves also happened to have a personal view on atomic bomb use, as he strived a few times to put Kyoto on the list of targets. Therefore, it is not unusual that some involved figure may have had his own personal view on this matter.
Quite obviously, the question must be posed as to why U.S. historians did not discover the insubordination in question until the present day. My own guess is that they subconsciously avoided putting the U.S. in a bad light, as the insubordination conclusion is not only revelatory, it is also incredibly scandalous. The resulting picture has two large cities having been burned, together with their inhabitants, as a result of an insubordination of one old man. Some of the deaths meted out to unsuspecting Japanese civilians in atomic attacks can only be compared to burning alive at the stake.
By the way, Stimson, aged 78 at the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, provides a likely explanation of his disobedience with regard to Truman, who was only 60 and without any experience in international politics, a field which was home turf for Stimson. Truman’s political experience until his presidency was extensive but essentially completely domestic. Stimson had every reason to feel that Truman was naive and a know-nothing, which unfortunately applied also to firebombing of Japan. This new way of war was born on March 9, 1945; so, a month before Truman became president. Truman did not stop it and it continued unabated, leading to near-complete destruction of Japan’s largest cities, with hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians dying from burns as a result. This was certainly well known by the U.S. military, for example, by listening in to the Japanese radio, but also from air reconnaissance. Therefore, Truman’s opposition to atomic attacks on cities may be construed to be illogical—after all, firebombing was by then a well-established practice; so, Truman’s humane objections appearing all of sudden were in conflict with reality, which made them so much easier to ignore. And one more thing to add: Stimson’s 78 years of age made him an elderly statesman. Elderly people are notorious for being obstinate and not easily turned around. Truman told Stimson what to do, but it was a huge turnaround of the whole policy, and Stimson just did not turn around. Possibly, it was not even his fault, when we take his age into account. For Truman, however, Stimson surely turned out to be uncontrollable and thus had to go.
One more circumstance which needs mentioning was that atomic bombs were decided to be used against cities already in May 1945, during the meetings of the so-called Interim Committee, which was formed in order to deal with nuclear power related matters. This Committee succeeded after the so-called Target Committee, and its chairman was Stimson. The final recommendation of the said Committee, prepared on June 21, 1945, reads:
…The Committee reaffirmed the position taken at 31 May and 1 June meetings that the weapon (atomic bomb – author’s note) be used against Japan at the earliest opportunity, that it be used without warning, that it be used on a dual target, namely, on a military installation or a war plant surrounded by or adjacent to homes or other buildings most susceptible to damage.
The Committee therefore made a target not only of “a military installation or a war plant,” but also of surrounding homes, which clearly means an urban target. This way, civilians were made an official part of the target, which may be contrary to the then-known laws of war. However, there is reasoning behind this decision—as U.S. bombers were in reality unable to distinguish between civilian and military targets within Japanese cities, and thus entire cities were deemed military targets. Leaflets were dropped on the cities to warn people against impending firebomb attacks, and then if any civilians disregarded them and chose to stay in any given city soon to be bombed, they chose their own fate and U.S. bomber forces could not be blamed for their deaths. This reasoning might also have influenced Stimson—most Japanese cities had some military in them, so they were military targets for U.S. bombers, and it cannot be any other way with these new atomic bombs.
However, Truman wrote “purely military target” in his note of July 25, and this surely cannot apply to any city unless is it entirely military, which in turn seems to be impossible. The above stipulation by Truman undermined the whole U.S. policy towards air raids on Japan, and Stimson became its likely victim, too. We may imagine that Stimson’s brain filtered out the word “purely” as something obviously erroneous, and he proceeded to act as if nothing like that was ever said to him. However, Truman made the fateful note of July 25, which nailed Stimson’s insubordination and prevented him from escaping unscathed.
Making the civilians’ homes an official part of the target brings about another sinister conclusion—the members of the Interim Committee wanted to have an atomic bomb experiment performed on a living city, in order to see the actual destruction radii as well as to find out about the number of people killed in such an attack. Destroying some little naval base or army camp was not enough for them—they wanted to really see what these new bombs could do to cities, which were clearly their preferred targets. Dropping the bomb on some military installation could be argued to be a very inefficient use of the bomb, and only a city could make an “efficient” target. Efficiency here refers simply to the amount of damage caused and the number of people killed. That tens of thousands of people should die horrific deaths as a result was not a convincing counterargument for the Interim Committee and Henry Stimson, its official chairman. They were concerned only with the American interest in bringing the war to its conclusion as soon as possible, while the fate of Japanese women and children did not matter to them as much as it did to Truman.
According to the book, Day One. Before Hiroshima and After, by Peter Wyden, the Committee’s final report in question was immediately brought to Truman’s attention by James Byrnes, Committee member, and Truman concurred. If so, it would again make his later opposition to the concept of attacks on cities illogical—either you bomb them as recommended by the Committee, or you do not. This makes the insubordination of Stimson even more likely—what is then the president’s final opinion? Truman’s final opinion is certainly the later one, of July 25, 1945. What also needs to be said is that this later opinion was informed by the results of the first atomic bomb test, which took place on July 17, 1945. Truman had the report of the test results (written by Manhattan Project military director General Leslie Groves) read to him on July 21, 1945, and only after familiarising himself with this report, was he fully aware of the power of the bomb involved. Therefore, his earlier opinion in this matter became necessarily invalidated, and Stimson had no right to base his actions on this earlier opinion.
By the way, Leslie Groves’ report shows very vividly the effects of the bomb, so that there is no doubt that the gentlemen involved here did realise what would be the result of dropping it on a city; my personal choice among many of its phrases is this: “For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday.”
The test was performed half an hour before sunrise, thus in darkness, and none could have any doubts about what would happen to people two miles away from ground zero—they were going to get very badly burned, and this is exactly what happened during the attacks.
The insubordination by Henry Stimson as proposed above may seem too improbable, unheard of and too outlandish to be true. However, it is not as unheard of as one may feel. There is one more famous top-level insubordination in history, in which Truman was the ignored superior, and it is the insubordination by Douglas MacArthur, for which he was fired by Truman on April 10, 1951 as a commander of UN forces in Korea. MacArthur ignored Truman’s clear directive not to meddle in political affairs; he did it in a gross way and was fired as a result, even though he was extremely popular in the United States as both WW2 and Korean War hero. Truman suffered a huge public backlash after MacArthur’s firing and became quite unpopular at the end of his second term, even though he was certainly right to fire MacArthur over the whole affair.
Another well-known Allied insubordination scandal is one by U.S. general Mark W. Clark, the commander of U.S. Fifth Army during the final phase of battle of Anzio in the Italian Campaign of WW2. Clark clearly disobeyed the instructions given to him by his British superior General Harold Alexander. It happened when having finally achieved a breakthrough from Anzio beachhead in late May 1944, he ordered his subordinate, General Truscott, to turn left to the northwest and drive straight at Rome instead of keeping the easterly orientation of the American spearhead, which was intended by Alexander to cut off the German Tenth Army losing the Battle of Cassino at the same time. The results were disastrous indeed: Germans managed a fighting withdrawal from the Cassino sector of the front, were not surrounded and in the end halted the Allied offensive up the Italian Peninsula at the so-called Gothic line in the autumn. At the time of these events Clark was a three-star general. He was not disciplined in any way, mostly due to unwillingness by Alexander who did not believe any positive effect could be obtained by disciplining Clark. Some historians have concluded that the Italian Campaign was extended by nearly a year as a result, with untold thousands of casualties for both sides.
Summing up:
1. Truman never authorised the historical order by General Handy to drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities—no such authorisation is preserved and there are no historical references to such an authorisation, if we look at the period from July 17, 1945 to August 9, 1945, which is between the first test and the bombing of Nagasaki.
2. Moreover, there is Stimson’s article in Harper’s where he wrote that it was he who approved the list of targets personally, which clearly refers to the final order given to Handy to bomb four Japanese cities.
3. In Potsdam Truman prohibited Stimson from using the atomic bomb on civilians (“not on women and children”), and wrote this in his diary in no uncertain terms. Next day Stimson left Potsdam and travelled back to U.S.A. So, it is obvious as to what the presidential instructions given to him were.
4. Instead, Truman directed Stimson to use a “purely military target” for the atomic bomb and issue a prior warning, neither of which was done. This is again noted verbatim in Truman’s diary.
5. On August 9, 1945 Truman essentially told the American nation on radio that killing civilians was avoided in the atomic attack on Hiroshima. This is in full agreement with his July 25, 1945 directive to Stimson.
6. Stimson was relieved of his duties on September 21, 1945. Health issues related to his heart were quoted. However, Stimson went for a three-week long vacation in the highly remote Adirondack Mountains immediately after these alleged health issues turned up. Tellingly, Stimson’s “heart attack” took place exactly on the day he had a conference with Truman after his return to the U.S.A.
All the above in my opinion can be explained by only one word: INSUBORDINATION. The discovery presented herein may have weight that goes beyond its historical importance, as the insubordination argument could be used by the Japanese during an imaginable trial concerning war reparations from the United States. Such a trial is reportedly possible before some U.S. court, even though there is a bilateral agreement between Japan and the United States, where both sides renounce war reparation claims for the Pacific War.
If someone wants to avoid the interpretation presented here, he/she needs to question the authenticity or finality of the quoted historical sources—which as I see it cannot be done. There is a possibility of claiming that we just cannot know for sure what happened between Truman and Stimson within the period in question; but the historical evidence (five quoted sources/events altogether) actually do not point to uncertainty. It points to insubordination by Stimson as the only workable conclusion and this essay is my attempt to show it. In Polish we have a saying that in the Old Testament the testimony of two witnesses is assumed to be the truth. Here we have unequivocal testimonies by both men involved—and these testimonies in effect say that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed as a result of insubordination by one old man, U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.
